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The introduction and Chapter II freely borrow from the $UWLFOH³*RG¶V'LFH´$WWKHWLPHRI
the submission the article is forthcoming on the University of Dayton Law Review. The 
&KDSWHU,,,LVODUJHO\WDNHQIURP³$ULVWRWOHDQG2SWLPDO'HWHUUHQFH´SXEOLVKHGRQWKH-RUXQDO
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et al. Et alii / Et aliae (and others)
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I. Introduction 
1. Introduction   
 
Throughout our history, human beings have always faced events that they could not entirely 
comprehend.1 The reactions to these prima facie random events are an incredibly powerful 
SUR[\IRUVRFLHWLHV¶SUHYDLOLQJDSSURDFKWRQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDDQGWROLIHLQJHQHUDO)URPWKLV
perspective, simplifying to an extreme extent it is possible to identify three phases. From ancient 
times until Middle Ages, UDQGRPHYHQWVZHUHRIWHQDWWULEXWHGWRJRGV¶ZLOODQGVXSHUQDWXUDO
forces. In this vein, a storm was perceived as the divine punishment for immoral behavior, while 
countless little acts were performed to earn the appreciation of divinities. Humans felt powerless 
against the forces of Nature. 
The second phase began with the advent of the scientific method, as it induced a drastic 
change in WKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHZRUOG7KHZRUGµUDQGRP¶EHFDPHV\QRQ\PRXVRIDtemporary
state of ignorance. The power of human intellect was going to overcome the ignorance and to 
attribute a specific cause for the only apparently random event. The human was turning into a 
demon,2 and there was little doubt that the world was going to reveal all of its secrets to this 
demon.
However, the universe has proven far more complex than scientists had imagined. As Capra 
QRWHGµ>H@YHU\WLPHWKHSK\VLFLVWVDVNHGQDWXUHDquestion...nature answered with a paradox, 
DQGWKHPRUHWKH\WULHGWRFODULI\WKHVLWXDWLRQWKHVKDUSHUWKHSDUDGR[HVEHFDPH¶3 The third 
phase had begun. Chaos theory and quantum mechanics forced scientists to completely change 
                                                          
1 For an historical perspective, cf David F Nightingale, Games, gods and gambling: The origins and history of 
probability and statistical ideas from the earliest times to the Newtonian era (Hafner Publishing Company 1962). 
This introduction is a stylized oversimplification of a very complex and nuanced evolutionary process. 
2 The term demon refers to the famous description of determinism offered by Laplace. The French mathematician 
argued that, given sufficient information, a demon (not different in nature from a human being) would have been 
able to read the past and predict the future. A more detailed treatment of this point will be offered in chapter II. C 
Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Preface to A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (first published 1812). 
3 Fritjof Capra, Tao Physics (Flamingo 1982). 
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their perception of the world; the universe was not an open book that was awaiting to be read.  
Researchers abandoned the ambition of identifying deterministic causes for every event, and 
probabilistic studies quickly became a widespread reality in many branches of human 
knowledge. From this perspective, suffices it to think that the study of the micro-world is 
dominated by something called the indeterminacy principle!4
2.  The Rise and Fall of the Demon 
 
Any philosophical inquiry should start with a clear definition of the terminology. From this 
perspective, a wide array of definitions of determinism has been advanced and some of them 
are to a certain extent compatible with the findings of modern science.5 For the purpose of this 
work, the focus can be narrowed down to two kinds of determinism; namely Laplacian 
determinism and metaphysical determinism. Both concepts will be introduced in this section. 
An important caveat is that depending on the definition adopted, determinism is not necessarily 
synonymous of perfect predictability. However, for the two kinds of determinism considered in 
this work, this is irrelevant. In fact, Laplacian determinism postulates perfect predictability, 
whereas for metaphysical determinism our predictive capacity is irrelevant.  
The manifesto of Laplacian dHWHUPLQLVPLVIRXQGLQ/DSODFH¶VWUHDWLVHRQSUREDELOLW\:
µ:HRXJKWWRUHJDUGWKHSUHVHQWVWDWHRIWKHXQLYHUVHDVWKHHIIHFWRILWVDQWHFHGHQW
state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the 
forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all 
                                                          
4 Ibidem.  
5 2QWKLVUHVSHFW(DUPDQZULWHVWKDWµ7KHUHLVDWHQGHQF\LQWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOOLWHUDWXUHWRIL[DWHRQWKH/DSODFLDQ
YDULHW\ RI GHWHUPLQLVP %XW RWKHU NLQGV RI GHWHUPLQLVP FURS XS LQ SK\VLFV¶ -RKQ (DUPDQ µ$VSHFWV RI
'HWHUPLQLVP LQ0RGHUQ 3K\VLFV¶ LQ -HUHP\ %XWWHU¿HOG DQG -RKQ (DUPDQ HGV The Philosophy of Physics. 
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Part B (North-Holland 2007) 1373. The focus of this thesis is specifically 
on Laplacian determinism, as legal treatment of causation seems to postulate its existence. 
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things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the 
motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided 
that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it 
nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its 
H\HV¶6
In other words, in a deterministic universe the future states are uniquely determined by the 
preceding ones and E\WKHODZVRIQDWXUH,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDW/DSODFH¶VVWDWHPHQWDIILUPV
more than a metaphysical determinism; it also entails the scientific determinism a la Popper.7
More precisely, this philosopher defines scientific determinism as follows:  
µWKH doctrine that the structure of the world is such that any event can be rationally 
predicted, with any desired degree of precision, if we are given a sufficiently precise 
description of past events, together with all the laws of nature. [emphasis in the 
original]’8
The difference between scientific determinism and metaphysical determinism is therefore that 
the former implies the possibility to predict future states of the world, whereas the latter is 
agnostic on the point.  
Notably, metaphysical determinism cannot be proven or disproven, and hence its 
embracement constitutes a mere act of faith.9 Nevertheless, because scientific determinism 
                                                          
6 Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Preface to A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities (first published 1812). Quoted from 
Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (Harcourt, Brace, and World 1961) 281±282. 
7 Karl Popper, The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism (Routledge 1988) 1-2.  
8 Ibidem.  
9 5HLFKHQEDFK ZULWHV WKDW µ7KLV GLVFUHSDQF\ >EHWZHHQ LGHDOL]HG DQG DFWXDO SK\VLFDO VWDWHV@ KDV RIWHQ EHHQ
disregarded as irrelevant, as being due to the imperfection of the experimenter and therefore negligible in a 
statement about causality as a property of nature. With such an attitude, however, the way to a solution of the 
problem of causality is barred. Statements about the physical world have meaning only so far as they are connected 
with verifiable UHVXOWV¶+DQV5HLFKHQEDFKPhilosophic Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (UCP 1944) 2. On 
this point, also cf Popper (n 7). 
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implies metaphysical determinism, any proof in favor of the former can strengthen our faith in 
the latter. 
The extreme confidence in the capacity of human beings to comprehend and uncover the 
mysteries of nature should not be surprising; Laplace was writing in an age dominated by the 
deterministic triumph of Newtonian physics.10 The idea of univocally determined causal links 
was completely pervasive in every field of human knowledge. No matter how unattractive its 
extreme consequences were, hardly anyone would have questioned that scientific discoveries 
were leading us to a complete comprehension of the universe.11
The works of Immanuel Kant are the best example of how hard it was to depart from this 
sacred conception.12 The German philosopher understood perfectly well what were the 
consequences of embracing the form of determinism generally associated with Newtonian 
physics; DQGLQIDFWKHDIILUPHGWKDWGLVSRVLQJRIFRPSOHWHLQIRUPDWLRQµZHFRXOGFDOFXODWHD
human being's conduct for the future with certainty, just like any lunar or solar eclipse.¶13
.DQW¶VGHYRWLRQWRWKHGHWHUPLQLVWLFQDWXUHRI1HZWRQLDQSK\VLFVZDVDVVWURng as his faith in 
the free will of human beings, and hence, all his philosophy was dominated by the paradox of 
noumena14 who were free in themselves, yet relegated to live in a predetermined environment. 
                                                          
10 The deterministic character of Newtonian physics is questionable to say the least. Without taking side in this 
H[WUHPHO\FRPSOH[GHEDWHZHZLOOERUURZ3RSSHU¶VWHUPLQRORJ\DQGGHILQHLWDVprima facie deterministic. Cf 
Popper (n 7). For a throughout discussion on the alleged deterministic nature of Newtonian physics cf John 
Earman, A Primer on Determinism (vol. 37, Springer 1986). 
11 ,QWKHZRUGVRI3RLQFDUpµ:HKDYHEHFRPHDEVROXWHGHWHUPLQLVWVDQGHYHQWKRVHZKRZDQWWRUHVHUYHWKHULJKWV
of human free will let determinism reign undividedly in the inorganic world at least. Every phenomenon, however 
minute, has a cause; and a mind infinitely powerful, infinitely well-informed about the laws of nature, could have 
foreseen it from the beginning of the centuries. If such a mind existed, we could not play with it at any game of 
FKDQFHZHVKRXOGDOZD\VORVH¶+HQUL3RLQFDUp*HRUJH%UXFH+DOVWHGWUµ&KDQFH¶The Monist 31. 
12 $FFRUGLQJWR3RSSHUµ7KHSRZHURIWKHEHOLHILQµVFLHQWLILF¶GHWHUPLQLVPPD\EHJDXJHGE\WKHIDFWWKDW.DQW
who for moral reasons rejected determinism, nevertheless felt compelled to accept it as an undeniable fact, 
HVWDEOLVKHGE\VFLHQFH¶cf Popper (n 7).  
13 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Werner Pluhar tr, first published 1788, Hackett Publishing 
Company 2002) 126.   
14 For Kant noumena are a priori ideas of pure reason (i.e. not depending upon experience) Cf Theodore Oizerman, 
µ,.DQW
V'RFWULQHRIWKH7KLQJVLQ7KHPVHOYHVDQG1RXPHQD¶3KLORVRSK\DQG3KHQRPHQRORJLFDO
Research 333. 
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The free will was not powerful enough to free Kant fURPWKHGHPRQ¶VFKDLQVBoth forms of 
determinism were postulated to be true. 
2.1. Quantum Mechanics, Chaos Theory, and Predictability 
 
Besides its incredible predictive power, quantum mechanics presents two fundamental 
characteristics.15 In the first place, during its initial developments, in spite of the astonishing 
experimental successes obtained, no one had a logical explanation for what was happening.16
Secondly, in the previous centuries, scientific discoveries had been perceived as a step towards 
the complete comprehension of our universe. Each of these steps increased the confidence of 
scientists and reinforced the perception that the ultimate knowledge was becoming closer and 
closer.17 Quantum mechanics abruptly ended these tendencies; the more discoveries were being 
made the more paradoxes emerged and the more the universe looked too complicated to be fully 
comprehended. Reichenbach captures these two traits when he states that: 
µ,WZDVZLWKWKHSKDVHRIWKHSK\VLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVWKDWWKHQRYHOW\Rf the logical 
form of quantum mechanics was realized. Something had been achieved in this new 
theory which was contrary to traditional concepts of knowledge and reality. It was 
not easy, however, to say what had happened.¶18
                                                          
15 Quantum mechanics is the branch of physics that aims at describing the microscopic world. Despite the 
theoretical riddles, it predicts extremely well the behavior of its object of study. 
16 5HLFKHQEDFKZULWHVµ,WLVDPRVWDVWRQLVKLQJIDFWWKDWWKLVSKDVHZKLFK led up to quantum mechanics, began 
ZLWKRXW D FOHDU LQVLJKW LQWRZKDW ZDV DFWXDOO\ EHLQJ GRQH«7KLV SHULRG UHSUHVHQWV DQ DPD]LQJ WULXPSK RI
mathematical technique which, masterly applied and guided by a physical instinct more than by logical principles, 
dHWHUPLQHGWKHSDWKWRWKHGLVFRYHU\RIDWKHRU\ZKLFKZDVDEOHWRHPEUDFHDOOREVHUYDEOHGDWD¶Cf Reichenbach 
(n 9) Preface v-vi. On this regards cf DOVR&DSUDµ(YHU\WLPHWKHSK\VLFLVWVDVNHGQDWXUHDTXHVWLRQLQDQDWRPLF
experiment, nature answered with a paradox, and the more they tried to clarify the situation, the sharper the 
paradoxes became. It took them long time to accept the fact that these paradoxes belong to the intrinsic structure 
RIDWRPLFSK\VLFV¶Capra (n 3) 76. 
17 This is clearly an oversimplification; however, it captures the change in the prevailing approach exemplified by 
the words of Laplace and the works of Fritjof Capra. 
18 Cf Reichenbach (n 9) preface vi.  
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The maze unveiled by the Copenhagen School revealed a reality that had very little in 
common with the typical portrait painted by the scientists and the philosophers of the previous 
FHQWXULHVµ4XDQWXPWKHRU\KDVGHPROLVKHGWKHFODVVLFDOFRQFHSWVRI«VWULFWO\GHWHUPLQLVWLF
laws of naturH¶.19
The main problem is that, within quantum mechanics, it is impossible to predict with absolute 
certainty the behavior of a single particle, regardless of how sophisticated the tools used to 
H[SORUHWKHUHDOLW\DUHµ:HFDQQHYHUSUHGLFWDQDWRPLFHYHQW with certainty; we can only say 
KRZ OLNHO\ LW LV WR KDSSHQ¶.20 To the contrary, statistical predictions on a sufficiently large 
number of particles reach peaks of precisions and accuracy that are alien to most fields of 
science. From this perspective, one of the building blocks was laid by Heisenberg. Roughly 
speaking, the indeterminacy principle (for position and momentum21) that carries his name 
denies the possibility to identify the exact simultaneous values of position and momentum of a 
particle. In other words, it is not possible to have at the same time precise information about the 
position and the momentum of a particle.22 This is in sharp contrast with the Laplacian idea of 
determinism. 
There is one widespread misconception about the indeterminacy of observation within 
quantum mechanics. It is generally assumed that the reason behind the need to adopt statistical 
predictions is exclusively the unavoidable interaction between the observer and the observed 
object. In other words, it is often argued that the inevitable disturbance of infinitesimally small 
objects by the means of observations is the cause of the indeterminacy principle.23 The obvious 
corollary to this thesis is that such uncertainty is automatically eliminated if macroscopic 
                                                          
19 Cf Capra (n 3) 78. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 The momentum is the product of the mass and velocity of a particle. 
22 For a precise formulation of the indeterminacy principle, John Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of 
Quantum Mechanics (PUP 1955). 
23 Heisenberg himself embraced this perspective. Cf Reichenbach (n 9) 16. 
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objects are studied. Although the entire argument against this claim cannot be reproduced 
here,24 it suffices to say that also within the realm of classic physics the observational tool alters 
the observed object, yet not necessarily in an unpredictable way.  To be sure, the observational 
mean is not different in nature from any other physical entity that interacts with the observed 
object, and hence if its influence on the latter is unpredictable so could be that of any other 
entity.25 In other words, the influence of the mean of observation in itself cannot explain the 
indeterminacy of predictions. Only when combined with the indeterminacy principle it becomes 
a sufficient condition.26
From the considerations developed above, it follows that quantum mechanics cannot be 
reduced to a strictly deterministic theory, nor its philosophical implications can be relegated at 
the microscopic level.27 Although quantum mechanics does not rule out every deterministic 
explanation of the world,28 a first mortal wound was inflicted on the demon. In fact, quantum 
mechanics is incompatible with Laplacian determinism. 
                                                          
24 For a mathematical proof that the disturbance of the observational means is not the cause of the degree of 
uncertainty in the predictions Reichenbach (n 9) 104. &IDOVR+DQV5HLFKHQEDFKµ=LHOHXQG:HJHSK\VLNDOLVFKHQ
(UNHQQWQLV¶LQ+DQV:*HLJHUDQG.DUO6FKHHOHGVHandbuch der Physik (vol. 4, Springer 1929) 78.  
25 To use the words of Reichenbach µLQVWUXPHQWVRIPHDVXUHPHQWGRQRWUHSUHVHQWH[FHSWLRQVWRSK\VLFDOODZ¶cf 
Reichebach (n 9$QREYLRXVH[DPSOHRIWKLVFODLPRIIHUHGE\WKH$XWKRULVWKDWµ>Z@KHQZHSXWDWKHUPRPHWHU
into a glass of water we know that the temperature of the water will be changed by the introduction of the 
thermometer; therefore we cannot interpret the reading taken from the thermometer as giving the water 
temperature before the measurement, but must consider this reading as an observation from which we can 
determine the original temperature of the water only by means of inferences. These inferences can be made when 
ZHLQFOXGHLQWKHPDWKHRU\RIWKHWKHUPRPHWHU¶cf Reichebach (n 9) 16. 
26 ibid 17.  
27 The most famous description of quantum uncertainty affecting a macro-observable phenomenon is the 
6FKU|GLQJHU¶V&DW7RRYHUVLPSOLI\6FKU|GLQJHUGHVFULEHVDVFHQDULRLQZKLFKDFDWLVERWKGHDGDQGDOLYHPRUH
precisely it should be said that the cat is in a superposition of two states ± dead cat and live cat). Cf Hilary Putnam, 
µ$3KLORVRSKHU/RRNVDW4XDQWXP0HFKDQLFVDJDLQ¶ (2005) 56 BJFS 615. 
28 Cf Toby Handfield, A Philosophical Guide to Chance (CUP 2012). 
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2.2 Chaotic Systems and Predictions 
 
The seeds of a second ambush to the demon were planted by James Clerck Maxwell and Henri 
Poincaré. 
/DSODFH¶V GHWHUPLQLVP LV LQ IDFW JURXQGHG RQ Wwo hidden assumptions:29 in the first place, 
/DSODFH¶VK\SRWKHVLVUHTXLUHV WKDWVPDOOFDXVHVSURGXFHVPDOOHIIHFWV LQRWKHUZRUGVVPDOO
imperfections in the initial data generate only small deviations in the results. However, as both 
Poincaré30 and Maxwell31 noticed, this is not an absolute truth, and in fact it generally holds 
only for linear systems, while nature is pervaded by chaotic systems. In chaotic systems, small 
differences in initial conditions cascade through various iterations into drastically different 
outcomes. 32  Secondly, Laplace assumes that to include more objects into a model it is sufficient 
                                                          
29:LOOLDP-)LUWKµ&KDRV-3UHGLFWLQJWKH8QSUHGLFWDEOH¶BMJ 1565. 
30 In a YHU\IDPRXVSDVVDJH3RLQFDUqVWDWHVWKDWµ>D@YHU\VOLJKWFDXVHZKLFKHVFDSHVXVGHWHUPLQHVDFRQVLGHUDEOH
effect which we cannot help seeing, and then we say this effect is due to chance. If we could know exactly the 
laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial instant, we should be able to predict exactly the 
situation of this same universe at a subsequent instant. But even then when the natural laws should have no further 
secret for us, we could know the initial situation only approximately. If that permits us to foresee the subsequent 
situation with the same degree of approximation, this is all we require, we say the phenomenon has been predicted, 
that it is ruled by laws; but it is not always so. It may happen that slight differences in the initial conditions produce 
very great differences in the final phenomena; a slight error in the former would make an enormous error in the 
ODWWHU3UHGLFWLRQEHFRPHVLPSRVVLEOHDQGZHKDYHWKHIRUWXLWRXVSKHQRPHQRQ¶>HPSKDVLVRULJLQDO@&I3RLQFDUé
(n 11) 34.  
31,QDOHFWXUHGHOLYHUHGLQ&DPEULGJHLQ0D[ZHOODIILUPHGWKDWµ0XFKOLJKWPD\EHWKURZQRQVRPHRIWKHVH
questions by consideration of stability and instability. When the state of things is such that an infinitely small 
variation of the present state will alter only by an infinitely small quantity the state at some future rime, the 
condition of the system, whether it is at rest or in motion, is said to be stable; but when an infinitely small variation 
in the present state may bring about a finite difference in the state of the system in a finite time, the condition of 
the system is said to be unstable. It is manifest that the existence of unstable conditions renders impossible the 
prediction of future events, if our knowledge of the present state is only approximate and not accurate. It has been 
well pointed out by Professor Balfour Stewart that physical stability is the characteristic of those systems from 
the contemplation of which determinists draw their arguments, and physical instability that of those living bodies, 
and moral instability that of those developable souls, which furnish to consciousness the conviction of free 
ZLOO>HPSKDVLVDGGHG@¶,Q/HZLV&DPSEHOODQG:LOOLDP*DUQHWWThe Life of James Clerk Maxwell (Macmillan 
1882) 211.  
32 To have a flavor of the dramatic variance in the results it suffices to recall how nonlinear theory attracted the 
DWWHQWLRQ RI WKH VFLHQWLILF FRPPXQLW\ +LJJLQV ZULWHV WKDW µ,Q  (GZDUG /RUHQ] D PDWKHPDWLFLDQ-
meteorologist working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, observed what he believed was order 
masquerading as randomness. He used simple mathematical model of weather patterns and a computer capable of 
performing multiple iterations (repetitions). After accidentally imputing an incorrect decimal point in a number, 
he noted that small variations in initial conditions (temperature or atmospheric pressure) would cascade through 
YDULRXVLWHUDWLRQVLQWRUHPDUNDEO\GLIIHUHQWRXWSXWZHDWKHUFRQGLWLRQV¶-RKQ3 +LJJLQVµ1RQOLQHDU6\VWHPVLQ
0HGLFLQH¶<-%0$VLWRIWHQKDSSHQVLQWKHVHFDVHVVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWYHUVLRQVRIWKLVVWRU\
exist. Cf &KULVWLDQ2HVWUHLFKHUµ$+LVWRU\RI&KDRV7KHRU\¶'&1
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an increase in the calculation power of roughly the same proportion. Once again, this 
relationship is not linear as it was imagined by the French mathematician; therefore the increase 
in calculation power required to analyze complex systems grows at a very fast rate, making it 
very hard to imagine that complex systems can be captured in their entirety. Given that chaotic 
systems are extremely sensitive to infinitesimal variations of initial conditions, it is clear why 
chaos theory poses an insurmountable obstacle to our capacity to make predictions. On the one 
hand, in any field of human knowledge initial conditions can be defined only with a certain 
degree of precision, and on the other hand only a limited number of factors can be included in 
a model,QWKHZRUGVRI3RLQFDUpµSUHGLFWLRQEHFRPHVLPSRVVLEOH¶33
The paradox of isolation offers a nice perspective of the desperate battle that the demon is 
fighting;34 to understand causes and effects it is necessary to isolate the components that are 
being studied. The more we can isolate the components that we want to study, the more 
precisely we can analyze initial conditions. Clearly, to obtain absolute precision in the definition 
of initial conditions we would need to completely isolate the component that we want to study. 
Yet, if we assume that it is possible to completely isolate a specific component, the doctrine of 
universal causal interdependence is defeated. In other words, to achieve Laplacian predictability 
we need to be able to define initial conditions with an infinite degree of precision. However the 
more we approach this goal the more we undermine metaphysical determinism. Complete 
Laplacian determinism requires the death of metaphysical determinism, yet metaphysical 
determinism is a necessary condition for Laplacian determinism, so that nothing can be 
predicted in the way imagined by the French mathematician. Not coincidentally, Reichl writes 
thaW µZHQRZNQRZ WKDW WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW1HZWRQ¶V HTXDWLRQV FDQSUHGLFW WKH IXWXUH LV D
                                                          
33 Cf Poincaré (n 11) 34.  
34 Mario Bunge, Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science (HUP 1959). 
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IDOODF\¶.35 Not even the most deterministic of all theories meets the standard defined by Laplace 
and by legal scholars.   
During the past decades it has been discovered that chaotic systems are ubiquitous in nature, 
and hence it became evident that the demon was finally defeated. Scientific determinism had to 
be abandoned thus our faith in metaphysical determinism ought to be weakened. 
3. Research Question  
 
Most sciences have reached what was defined above as the third stage of their development and 
therefore routinely use probabilistic tools. This is not without consequences for legal scholars. 
In many instances the courts and the regulators have to face the findings of modern science, 
generally expressed in probabilistic terms.36 It is therefore interesting to investigate how 
probabilistic considerations influence the traditional understanding of the law.  In other words, 
the idea behind this thesis can be summarized in a very short question µwhat should be the role 
of probability in tort law"¶ This question could obviously be extended to other branches of the 
law, yet the focus will be on tort law only. On the one hand, an excessively broad enquiry would 
render the subject intractable. On the other hand, tort law seems like a reasonable starting point 
given the pivotal role played by the causal link in tort cases.   
In fact, the first and undoubtedly most important questions emerge with regards to causality. 
Despite the fact that in many areas of tort law (i.e. toxic cases, medical malpractices, etc.) the 
evidence that the courts have at their disposal is almost exclusively probabilistic in nature,37 the 
                                                          
35 Linda E Reichl, The transition to chaos: Conservative Classical Systems and Quantum Manifestations (Springer 
2004) 3. 
36 &I6WHYH&*ROGµ:hen Certainty Dissolves into Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic Causation for the Post-
*HQRPLF(UD¶://5'DYLG5RVHQEHUJµ&DVXDO&RQQHFWLRQLQ0DVV([SRVXUH&DVHV$
3XEOLF/DZ9LVLRQRIWKH7RUW6\VWHP¶
37 Cf Gold (n 36). 
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law is still clinging on a deterministic concept of causation.38 In this vein, although proportional 
liability39 and the loss of chance doctrine40 are steps in the right direction, it will be shown that 
they are intrinsically deterministic in nature.  The first important question is therefore how to 
reconcile the legal concept of causality with the findings of modern science. This task will be 
attempted in chapter II. 
As the idea of causation is the backbone of tort law, challenging the traditional deterministic 
concept of causality raises a series of other interrogatives. Firstly, it is important to understand 
if the debate on the traditional goals of tort law should be reshaped to accommodate 
probabilistic considerations. More precisely, law and economics scholars argue that tort law 
should aim at minimizing accident costs,41 whereas legal philosophers advocate the supremacy 
of corrective justice.42 Despite a few attempts to reconcile the two theories,43 cost minimization 
and corrective justice are still portrayed as incompatible.44 For the purpose of this work, it 
should be noted that both theories are grounded on a deterministic view of causation. Chapter 
III will investigate whether it becomes easier to accommodate deterrence and corrective justice 
in a probabilistic world. 
                                                          
38 $PRQJWKHRWKHUVFI5LFKDUG::ULJKW µ&DXVDWLRQ5HVSRQVLELOLW\5LVN3UREDELOLW\1DNHG6WDWLVWLFVDQG
3URRI3UXQLQJWKH%UDPEOH%XVKE\&ODULI\LQJWKH&RQFHSWV¶,/50RUHUHFHQWO\.HQ2OLSKDQW
µ8QFHUWDLQFactual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some Comparative Notes. (2010) 37 WMLR 37 1599. 
39 5LFKDUG'HOJDGRµ%H\RQG6LQGHOO5HOD[DWLRQRI&DXVHLQ)DFW5XOHVIRU,QGHWHUPLQDWH3ODLQWLIIV¶
&/5'DQLHO$)DUEHUµ7R[LF&DXVDWLRQ¶0/5.6DXO/HYPRUHµ3UREDELOLVWLF5HFRYHULHV
5HVWLWXWLRQ DQG 5HFXUULQJ :URQJV¶   -/6  $JDLQVW SURSRUWLRQDO OLDELOLW\ FI 'DYLG $ )LVFKHU
µ3URSRUWLRQDO/LDELOLW\6WDWLVWLFDO(YLGHQFHDQGWKH3UREDELOLW\3DUDGR[¶9/5
'DYLG$)LVFKHUµ7RUW5HFRYHU\IRU/RVVRID&KDQFH¶:)/5.6WHYHQ5.RFKµ:KRVH/RVV
,V ,W$Q\ZD\"(IIHFWVRI WKH /RVW&KDQFH'RFWULQHRQ&LYLO/LWLJDWLRQDQG0HGLFDO0DOSUDFWLFH ,QVXUDQFH¶
1&/5$OL(O+DMµ7KH/RVVRI&KDQFH'RFWULQHLQ0HGLFDO0DOSUDFWLFH$/RVW&DVH"¶
Available at SSRN 16744156DQG\6WHHOµ5DWLRQDOLVLQJ/RVVRID&KDQFHLQ7RUW¶LQ(ULND&KDPEHUODLQ6WHSKDQ
*$3LWHODQG-DVRQ:1H\HUV-HGVTort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy, +DUW3XEOLVKLQJ
/RXLV.DSORZDQG6WHYHQ6KDYHOOFairness versus Welfare+83
(UQHVW-:HLQULEThe Idea of Private Law+83
*DU\76FKZDUW]µ0L[HG7KHRULHVRI7RUW/DZ$IILUPLQJ%RWK'HWHUUHQFHDQG&RUUHFWLYH-XVWLFH¶
7/5%UXFH&KDSPDQµ3OXUDOLVPLQ7RUWDQG$FFLGHQW/DZ7RZDUG$5HDVRQDEOH$FFRPPRGDWLRQ¶LQ
*HUDOG3RVWHPDHGPhilosophy and the Law of Torts &830DUN*HLVWIHOGµ(FRQRPLFV0RUDO
3KLORVRSK\DQGWKH3RVLWLYH$QDO\VLVRI7RUW/DZ¶ LQ*HUDOG3RVWHPDHGPhilosophy and the Law of Torts 
&830DUN*HLVWIHOGµ(IILFLHQF\)DLUQHVVDQGWKH(FRQRPLF$QDO\VLVRI7RUW/DZ’ LQ0DUN':KLWH
HGTheoretical Foundations of Law and Economics &83
2QWKLVSRLQWFI(UQHVW-:HLQULEµ'HWHUUHQFHDQG&RUUHFWLYH-XVWLFH¶8&/$/5  
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Secondly, and from a more practical perspective, the question is whether a probabilistic 
approach to the law of torts helps to solve riddles that have haunted legal scholars during the 
recent years. From this perspective, in chapter IV the attention will be on Credit Rating 
Agencies (CRAs) and on how their activity should be regulated. Credit rating agencies have 
been accused to have played a significant role in the global financial crisis.45 In this vein, it has 
been argued that the incentives of CRAs are impaired by an inherent conflict of interest46 and 
by the regulatory benefits attached to high ratings.47 Thus far both the legal and the economic 
literature have been unable to identify a workable solution to these problems.48 Chapter IV will 
therefore explore the possibility to improve CRAs incentives by exploiting the probabilistic 
nature of their predictions. 
In chapter V it will be shown how the law and economics movement ± at least at a first glance 
± offers very precise predictions as regards to the behavior of human beings.49 Therefore, it 
could be claimed that the law and economics movement is the answer to the indeterminacy of 
predictions. The last question to tackle is whether there is some truth in this claim and an 
economic approach to the study of the law can resurrect the demon of Laplacian determinism. 
4. Methodology
 
                                                          
45 (J.UXJPDQZULWHVWKDWµ,WZDVDV\VWHPWKDWORRNHGGLJQLILHGDQGUHVSHFWDEOHRQWKHVXUIDFH<HWLWSURGXFHG
huge conflicts of interest. Issuers of debt ² which increasingly meant Wall Street firms selling securities they 
created by slicing and dicing claims on things like subprime mortgages ² could choose among several rating 
agencies. So they could direct their business to whichever agency was most likely to give a favorable verdict, and 
WKUHDWHQWRSXOOEXVLQHVVIURPDQDJHQF\WKDWWULHGWRRKDUGWRGRLWVMRE,W¶VDOOWRRREYLRXVLQUHWURVSHFWKRZ
WKLVFRXOGKDYHFRUUXSWHGWKHSURFHVV¶3DXO.UXJPDQµ%HUDWLQJWKHRDWHUV¶New York Times A 144. 
46 Marco Pagano and PaROR9ROSLQµ&UHGLW5DWLQJV)DLOXUHVDQG3ROLF\2SWLRQV¶(3
47 &KULVWLDQ2SS0DUFXV2SSDQG0LOWRQ+DUULVµ5DWLQJ$JHQFLHVLQWKH)DFHRI5HJXODWLRQ¶-)(
48 -RKQ&-U&RIIHHµ5DWLQJV5HIRUP7KH*RRGWKH%DGDQGWKH8JO\¶010) 1 HBLR 232 and Frank Partnoy, 
µ5HWKLQNLQJ5HJXODWLRQRI&UHGLW-5DWLQJ$JHQFLHV$Q,QVWLWXWLRQDO,QYHVWRU3HUVSHFWLYH¶-,%/
49 6WHYHQ6KDYHOO µ6WULFWLiability versus NHJOLJHQFH¶  -/6DQG:LOOLDP0/DQGHVDQG5LFKDUG$
Posner, µ-RLQWDQGMultiple Tortfeasors: An (FRQRPLF$QDO\VLV¶-/6517.  
11_Edle BW Romana.job
19 
 
To XVHWKHZRUGVRI5RQDOG&RDVHµ[t]he practitioners in a given discipline extend or narrow 
the range of the questions that they attempt to answer according to whether they find it 
profitable to do so, and this is determined, in part, by the success or failure of the practitioners 
in other disciplines in answering the same questions.¶50 In this thesis, it is argued that the 
developments in other disciplines are pushing legal scholars to expand their areas of interest, 
and hence this work intends to be at the crossroad of the law and three other disciplines: 
economics, philosophy, and physics. The methodology adopted is therefore interdisciplinary 
and is driven by the topic of the different chapters. Chapter II discusses the concept of causation 
in natural sciences and philosophy and therefore the tools of philosophy of science are widely 
used to offer an interpretation of the findings of modern science. Chapter II and Chapter III use 
the tools of legal philosophers in order to argue that the findings of natural scientists and 
philosophers are relevant to the study of the law. Once having established that there are good 
philosophical reasons to adopt a view of the world that is in line with natural sciences, the thesis 
becomes purely normative. In this vein, Chapter II and Chapter IV analyze and compare 
different solutions to practical problems. At this stage, the role of law and economics becomes 
prominent, as it offers a relatively simple way to compare and rank different policy solutions. 
From this perspective, a key concept is the notion of efficiency. A policy solution will be 
considered superior to its alternatives whenever there are good reasons to affirm that it will be 
more efficient (i.e. it leads to a higher level of social welfare) than the other feasible policies. 
The concept of corrective justice will also be used to assess the consequences of the solutions 
presented. Lastly, as chapter V investigates the robustness of traditional law and economics 
model, a theoretical law and economics approach is adopted.   
Notably, as one of the goals is to explore the lessons that legal scholars could learn by looking 
at other disciplines, technical and mathematical formalizations will generally be avoided 
                                                          
50 5RQDOG+&RDVHµ(FRQRPLFVDQG&RQWLJXRXV'LVFLSOLQHV¶-/6
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whenever possible. Although this comes at a risk of some imperfections, it still seems to 
represent a suitable compromise. Technical language and sophisticated methodologies are 
generally a powerful boundary among different disciplines, and therefore they are to be avoided 
if the goal is exactly to overcome these boundaries.51
5. Roadmap 
 
This thesis rests on four claims. (i) The form of scientific determinism generally associated with 
Laplace¶V demon has been abandoned in natural sciences and philosophy, (ii) yet the law is still 
clinging to a deterministic view of the world. However, (iii) the indeterministic drift of natural 
scientists and philosophers should not be overlooked by legal scholars as (iv) the effects of the 
deterministic demon stretch way beyond the analysis of causation. Arguments in support of this 
first claim have been presented in the second section of this introduction. Chapter II deals with 
the second claim: it will be briefly shown that deterministic considerations play a fundamental 
role in the analysis of causation in the law of torts.52 Probabilistic considerations are sometimes 
introduced in the analysis, but they are limited to a relatively narrow number of circumstances. 
In the second part of chapter II it will be suggested that switching to a probabilistic concept of 
causation could help to solve some of the riddles that have been haunting legal scholars in the 
recent years (iii). A specific approach to probabilistic causation is developed by drawing the 
distinction between instant torts and lagged torts. More precisely, it will be suggested that the 
former should be analyzed by using a concept of ex-post probability, whereas the latter requires 
a focus on ex-ante probability.53
                                                          
51 Although it has been suggested language and methodologies are only short term barriers. Cf Coase (n 50). 
52 Gold (n 36). 
53 Ex-DQWHSUREDELOLW\UHIHUVWRWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQµ*LYHQWKDWWKHGULYHULVVSHHGLQJZKDWLVWKHSUREDELOLW\
WKDWKHZLOOFDXVHDQDFFLGHQW"¶7KLVNLQGRISUREDELOLW\WKHUHIRre refers to a situation existing before the accident. 
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Chapter III moves from the assumption that a non-Laplacian view of the world is to be 
adopted. Moving from this postulate, the goal of chapter III is to show that in a probabilistic 
world the debate on deterrence theory and corrective justice has to be reframed. Some attempts 
to accommodate the two apparently incompatible theories have been made, yet they have 
largely remained unheard.54 In this chapter, it will be suggested that the focus on probability 
strengthens the claim that corrective justice and deterrence have to be perceived as necessary 
complements.
Chapter IV deals with the fourth claim advanced in this work, namely that the demon has also 
very subtle ways of manifesting itself. In this vein, it will be suggested that a deterministic 
mindset does not allow identifying appropriate regulation for activities performed through the 
use of probabilistic models. The focus of this chapter will be on Credit Rating Agencies 
(henceforth CRAs). More precisely, it will be suggested that it is possible to give CRAs better 
incentives to produce accurate ratings by tying liability to their probabilistic predictions. 
Lastly, in chapter V the lens will be on the economic models of tort law, as there the 
predictions are often very precise and deterministic in nature. In fact, the fundamental theorems 
of tort law and economics state that under the classic assumptions any negligence rule gives 
both parties efficient incentives with respect to care.55 The activity level theorem asserts that 
under the classic assumptions no negligence rule gives both parties efficient incentives with 
respect to activity level.56 Despite the apparently accurate predictions offered by these 
theorems, it will be shown that they do not offer any information on the behavior of injurers 
and victims. In fact, for the theorems to hold it is necessary that care level and activity level are 
                                                          
Once the accident has taken place, the relevant question becomes whether the harm suffered by the pedestrian 
was caused by the driver. This enquiry uses ex-post probability (as they follow the accident).  
54 Chapman (n 43) and Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort Law (n 43).  
55 7KHILUVWWRODEHOWKHVHILQGLQJVµWKHILUVWIXQGDPHQWDOWKHRUHPVRIWRUWODZDQGHFRQRPLFV¶ZDV'DUL-Mattiacci. 
Cf Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacciµ7RUW/DZDQG(FRQRPLFV¶ In Hatzis N Aristides (ed), Economics Analysis of Law: 
A European Perspective, (EE 2002).   
56 Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). 
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independent goods. In other words, law and economics scholars implicitly assumed that 
whenever a party has an excessive activity level the best reaction of the other party is to reduce 
the activity level, never to increase the care level.57  Relaxing this assumption, even the 
extremely simplified world of the economists is dominated by an indeterminacy principle. 
II. God`s Dice: Causation in a Probabilistic World 
1. Introduction 
 
                                                          
57 This preliminary criticism is slightly imprecise. A more detailed and accurate description of this problem will 
be introduced in chapter V. 
13_Edle BW Romana.job
23 
 
Also limiting oneself to a single jurisdiction, a whole thesis would not suffice to offer an even 
remotely accurate account of the countless facets of causation in the law.   
Therefore, in this chapter I shall only offer a very brief overview. In doing so, I will follow 
the non-conventional approach of Guido Calabresi and distinguish thUHHFRQFHSWVRIµcause¶
µFDXVDOOLQN¶ µbut for FDXVH¶DQGµSUR[LPDWHFDXVH¶.58 This distinction allows to disentangle 
three different concepts which are important to highlight. 
7KHµFDXVDOOLQN¶ is the closest relative to the idea of causation studied in natural sciences and 
in philosophy. The focus is on empirical patterns and on the idea that a certain factor will 
increase the likelihood of a certain (negative) outcome.59 It must be noted, however, that 
technically speaking there is an infinite spectrum of factors that is causally linked to every 
injury. Therefore, the causal enquiry within the law has to be limited to the connection between 
actions under the control of human wills and the harm suffered by the victims.60
The second concept that has to be presented is the µbut for cause¶. From this perspective, 
causation is established if the damage would have not occurred but for the breach of duty. As 
traditionally cRQFHLYHG E\ OHJDO VFKRODUV WKH µbut for¶ test was considered to be strictly 
deterministic, however it can be adapted to a probabilistic view of the world.  The difference 
between the two interpretations of the test lies in how often the µbut for¶ cause (c) is assumed 
to be followed by the effect (e). If (e) invariably follows (c) then the µbut for¶ test has a 
determiQLVWLFQDWXUH&RQYHUVHO\WKHµbut for¶ test has a probabilistic form when stated in the 
IROORZLQJWHUPVµthe probability of (e) occurring but for (cZRXOGKDYHEHHQORZHU¶. In this 
                                                          
58 *XLGR&DODEUHVLµ&RQFHUQLQJ&DXVHDQGWKH/DZRI7RUWV$Q(VVD\IRU+DUU\.DOYHQ-U¶8&/5
69, 71. 
59 Ibidem.
60 It should be noted that determining which actions are within human control is an incredibly difficult ±if not 
impossible ± task. Cf Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics
(OUP 2009) 20-33 and Giuseppe Maggio, Alessandro Romano and Angela Troisi, µThe Legal Origin of Income 
,QHTXDOLW\¶, (2014) 7 LDR 1, 15-18 (arguing that it is practically impossible to distinguish between factors within 
and outside human control).  
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case, the probability of e following c is never exactly equal to zero or one. When considered in 
LWVSUREDELOLVWLFYHUVLRQWKHµEXWIRU¶WHVWFORVHO\UHVHPEOHVWKHµFDXVDOOLQN¶
An interesting evolution of this approach was introduced by Hart and Honoré,61 and was 
developed by Richard Wright.62 7KHµnecessDU\HOHPHQWRIDVXIILFLHQWVHW¶ (NESS) test that 
they propose is built on the idea that:  
µA particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific 
consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.¶63
Lastly, the elusive concept of µSUR[LPDWHFDXVH¶ prevents that the defendants be held liable 
for the additional harm caused by an intervening event that breaks the chain of causation 
between the negligent act and the harm.64 Many (often contradictory) justifications have been 
presented to explain the emergence of proximate cause in the common law realm;65 among 
them especially relevant appears the concern for limiting the compensation owed by the injurer 
to the foreseeable consequences of his negligent conduct.66
It is not hard to prove that among legal scholars a deterministic view of the universe is still 
prevailing. An influential writer like Wright no earlier than 2011 affirmed that:  
                                                          
61 Herbert L A Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd edn 1985, OUP) 109-114. 
62 Cf Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush 
by Clarifying the Concepts (n 38) 
63 Ibidem.
64 There iVQRFRQVHQVXVRQWKHGHILQLWLRQRISUR[LPDWHFDXVH&I%ODFN¶V/DZ'LFWLRQDU\ th edition 
1RWFRLQFLGHQWDOO\3DJH.HHWRQHWDOZULWHµWKHUHLVSHUKDSVQRWKLQJLQWKHHQWLUHILHOGRIODZZKLFKKDV
called forth more disagreement, or upon wKLFKWKHRSLQLRQVDUHLQVXFKDZHOWHURIFRQIXVLRQ¶Cf Keeton Page et 
al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th edn, W. Page Keeton ed 1984) 263. 
65 For an extensive discussion on the point cf 3DWULFN-.HOOH\µ3UR[LPDWH&DXVHLQ1HJOLJHQFH/DZ+Lstory, 
7KHRU\DQGWKH3UHVHQW'DUNQHVV¶:8/
66 One of the pioneers was Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts (15th ed, 1951). More recently Fishman writes 
µFRPPRQODZSUR[LPDWHFDXVHUHIHUVWRUHDVRQDEO\DQWLFLSDWHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRUWKHODFNRI intervening forces 
EHWZHHQWKHFKDOOHQJHGDFWLYLW\DQGKDUP7KHEHVWDUJXPHQWIRUDSSO\LQJWKHSUR[LPDWHFDXVH«LVWKDWLWLVQRW
fair to hold actors responsible for every effect that could be causally linked to their conduct regardless of how 
remote, unuVXDO RU XQIRUHVHHDEOH WKH FRQVHTXHQFH¶ FLWDWLRQV RPLWWHG 5REHUW / )LVFKPDQ 7KH'LYLGHV RI
Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in Endangered Species Act (2008) 93 ILJ 688.    
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µCausal law is a law of nature; it describes an empirically based, invariable, 
nonprobabilistic relation between some minimal set of abstractly described antecedent 
conditions and some abstractly described consequent condition, such that the concrete 
instantiation of all the antecedent conditions will always immediately result in the 
concrete instantiation of the consequent condition. Any concrete condition that is part 
of the instantiation of the completely instantiated antecedent of the causal law is a cause 
of (contributed to) the instantiation of the consequent.¶67 (emphasis added) 
The demons of the past are alive in the realm of the law, while modern science is not. If these 
axioms are accepted, it is not surprising that when the law is confronted with the findings of 
modern science ± generally expressed in terms of probabilistic relations ± many problems arise.   
2. Why Should Legal Scholars fight the demon?  
 
In an extremely important article Jacques Hadamard68 SURYHVWKDWµno finite degree of precision 
of initial conditions will allow us to predict whether or not a planetary system (of many bodies) 
ZLOOEHVWDEOHLQ/DSODFH¶VVHQVH¶69 The problem however, is that we can never define initial 
conditions with an infinite precision (neither we can capture with infinite precision the resulting 
state), and hence probabilistic descriptions of phenomena are here to stay. On this regard, 
Bunge, one of the most influential philosophers of science of our time, writes that: 
µThis uncertainty in the initial information . . . spoils the one-to one correspondence 
among neatly defined states even if, as in classical physics, the theoretical values are 
                                                          
5LFKDUG::ULJKWµ3URYLQJ&DXVDWLRQ3UREDELOLW\YHUVXV%HOLHI¶ LQ5LFKDUG*ROGEHUJHGPerspectives on 
Causation+DUW3XEOLVKLQJ
-DFTXHV+DGDPDUGµ/HV6XUIDFHVj&RXUEXUHV2SSRVpHVHW/HXUV/LJQHV*pRGpVLTXH¶-0DWK3XUHV
HW$SSO
&I3RRSHUQ
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supposed to be sharply defined . . . [therefore] all laws, whether causal or not, when 
framed in observational terms acquire statistical features.¶70 (emphasis in the original) 
And:
µ[W]hether chance is regarded as a radical ultimate . . . or not, statistical determinacy 
has to be accounted for by every philosophy of modern science; it is no longer possible 
to state dogmatically that chance is but a name for human ignorance, or to declare the 
hope that it will ultimately be shown to be reduced to causation.¶71
Firstly, it is important to note that these words were written over 50 years before the work of 
Wright,72 which shows how slowly ideas flow among the different fields of human knowledge. 
Secondly, Bunge is probably more a determinist than many contemporary philosophers, yet the 
idea of exclusively nonprobabilistic laws is totally alien to his thought.  
The scenario does not change much if we refer to a philosopher cited by Wright himself: Sosa. 
In the introduction to a collection of articles on causation Sosa and Tooley write that:  
µOne of the more significant developments in the philosophy of causation in this 
century has been the emergence of the idea that causation is not restricted to 
deterministic processes . . . .One suggestion, advanced by philosophers such as 
Reichenbach, Good, and Suppes, is that probabilistic notions should play a central role 
in the analysis of causal concepts.¶73
Nevertheless, law scholars have largely adopted two antithetical perspectives with regards to 
the debate on causation in the scientific and in the philosophical arena: on the one hand, it has 
                                                          
&I%XQJHQ 
71 Id. at 17.  
72 Cf Wright, Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief (n 67). 
73 Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley, Causation (OUP 1993). 
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been argued that the traditional but for test confRUPVWRSKLORVRSKHUV¶DQGVFLHQWLVWV¶LGHDRI
causation,74 whereas on the other hand, it has been affirmed that causation in the law has little 
(if anything) to do with philosophical or scientific considerations.75 As I have shown, the former 
perspective is for the most part false, whereas the latter is extremely dangerous. On these 
premixes, and especially on the consideration that the law is interested in identifying causal 
links in concrete single cases, let us analyze how the traditional version of the µbut for¶ test, the 
NESS test, and proximate cause perform in the light of modern science.  
The analysis needs not be too long; WKHGHWHUPLQLVWLFYHUVLRQRIWKHµEXWIRU¶WHVW and NESS 
require that causes are necessary and sufficient, yet in a non-Laplacean world no cause is both 
necessary and sufficient In a probabilistic world, a set of causes can produce or not produce a 
specific outcome, however one single outcome will never be the necessary result of any set of 
causes.76 The other side of the coin is that no set of causes is a sufficient condition for any 
outcome. The deterministic version of the µEXW IRU¶ test and NESS can only survive in a 
Laplacean universe. In the one where we live, however, they lead to the conclusion that no 
liability ever exists, because no conduct can be a necessary and sufficient condition for any 
harm.
7KHHOXVLYHFRQFHSWRIµproximate cause¶ does not fare better. The common wisdom is that 
the doctrine of proximate causation prevents the defendants from being held liable for events 
                                                          
74 $PRQJWKHRWKHUV:ULJKWDIILUPVWKDWµ>W@KHact must have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of the 
injury. The test reflects a deeply rooted belief that a condition cannot be a cause of some event unless it is, in some 
sense, necessary for the occurrence of the event. This view is shared by lawyers, philosophers, scientists, and the 
JHQHUDOSXEOLF¶5LFKDUG::ULJKW µ&DXVDWLRQLQ7RUW/DZ¶74 CLR 1735, 1775. 
75 Cf e.g. Jane 6WDSOHWRQµ&KRRVLQJ:KDW:H0HDQE\&DXVDWLRQLQWKH/DZ¶MLR 433. (noting that 
µ>W@UDGLWLRQDOO\ODZ\HUVGLVGDLQHGSKLORVRSKLFDOHQTXLULHVLQWR³FDXVDWLRQ´DVEHLQJWRRDEVWUDFWRUYDJXH¶
76 Wright writes that µ[a] fully specified causal law or generalization would state an invariable connection between 
the cause and the consequence: given the actual existence of the fully specified set of antecedent conditions, the 
consequence must (emphasis added) follow. In other words, the fully specified set of antecedent conditions is 
sufficient (emphasis original) for thHRFFXUUHQFHRI WKH FRQVHTXHQFH¶ This definition of the term sufficient is 
incompatible with probabilistic causation Wright, µCausation in Tort Law¶ (n 74) 1789.   
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WKDW DUH µtoo remote¶77 so to limit the compensation owed by the injurer to the foreseeable 
consequences of his negligent conduct. 78
Borrowing (part of) the taxonomy developed by Mark Grady, let us consider two faces of 
foreseeability: µfreakish risks¶79 DQGWKHSDUDGLJP6'.µVFLHQWLVWVGLGQ¶WNQRZ¶).80
In the category of freakish risks are included all those unusual and abnormal consequences of 
a determinate action that are too rare to be foreseen. Interestingly, there is simply no reason to 
talk about proximate cause in order to exclude these events from the scope of liability. 
According to the traditional economic analysis of law, compensation is due only when the 
expected harm (magnitude of the harm times the probability) is higher than precaution costs.81
%\GHILQLWLRQDµIUHDNLVKULVN¶ will have a very low probability of materializing and therefore 
the expected harm will systematically be much smaller than the harm itself; compensation will 
generally not be triggered. In other words, the frequency of an event is a factor that should enter 
the negligence calculus and not the debate on causation. 
The SDK paradigm deals with a very different set of cases, in which it is not known ex-ante 
that a certain conduct is dangerous. Take for example the Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. V. 
Morts Dock & Engineering Co. case.82 Here, the defendant did not prevent the bunker oil of his 
ship from reaching the Sidney Harbor. Given the state of the art of scientific knowledge, this 
situation was perceived as relatively safe because bunker oil was considered nonflammable 
ZKHQVSUHDGRQZDWHU+RZHYHUWKHEXQNHURLOVRRQLJQLWHGDQGGHVWUR\HGWKHSODLQWLII¶VGRFN
                                                          
77 &I%ODFN¶V/DZ'LFWLRQDU\Q64) 265-266. 
78 Cf Frishman (n 66) 688. 
79 7KHWHUPLVERUURZHGIURP6WHYHQ6KDYHOOµ$Q$QDO\VLVRI&DXVDWLRQDQGWKH6FRSHRI/LDELOLW\LQWKH/DZRI
7RUWV¶ (1980) 9 JLS 463, 490. 
80 0DUN)*UDG\µ&DXVDWLRQDQGForeseeability¶LQ Jennifer Arlen (ed), Research Handbook on the Economics 
of Torts (EE 2014) 114, 133. 
81 This is generally known as the Learned Hand formula. Cf United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 
G&LUDGYRFDWLQJWKHXVHRIDIRUPXODIRUGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDSHUVRQ¶VFRQGXFWIHOO below the 
appropriate standard of care). Efficiency requires that marginal costs and benefits are considered. 
82 Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (Wagon Mound 1), [1961] 1 A.C. (P.C.) (appeal 
taken from N.S.W.). 
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The court decided that no compensation was due because the accident was not foreseeable at 
the time in which the defendant negligently allowed the bunker oil to escape from its ship. This 
is despite the fact that ex-post it became clear that the µuntaken precautiRQ¶ would have been 
effective (and efficient) in preventing the harm. *UDG\FRQFOXGHVWKDWµto impose liability in this 
situation for a possibly efficient act could only reduce activity levels or induce inefficient 
precaution substitutions.¶83
Let us analyze this problem in a probabilistic context in which scientific knowledge is 
inherently probabilistic. Let us define t0 the time of the accident and t1 the time when it becomes 
known that bunker oil is flammable also when spread on water. In t0 the injurer thought that 
there was a probability p0 of an accident, whereas in t1 scientific studies suggested that the 
probability was equal to p1 (with p0 < p1). Due to the limits of scientific knowledge, neither p0
or p1 is equal to the real probability (say p*), however scientific studies suggested that p1 was a 
more accurate approximation of p*. Foreseeability then reduces to the choice between the less 
or the more accurate approximation of p* in the negligence finding. Adopting a dynamic 
perspective, contrarily to what Grady says, this choice involves a trade-off recognized by the 
law and economics literature.84 In terms of efficiency, by opting for p0 the court will prevent 
the effects described by Grady, whereas choosing p1 the court will incentivize research and 
development activities. Similarly, if the problem is framed in terms of corrective justice, it 
might be more or less desirable that unknown risks are borne by the injurer depending on the 
concept of fairness adopted. It is however apparent that this trade-off has nothing to do with 
causation. In the case described, for example, it might be considered fair that the injurer bears 
                                                          
83 Grady (n 80) 134. 
84 This trade-off in the law and economics literature is generally framed in terms of strict liability versus 
negligence, with the former giving more incentives in discovering new risks. Cf e.g. Alfred Endres and Regina 
Bertram, µThe Development of Care Technology under Liability Law¶ 26 IRLE. 503 (2006). The problem 
in this context is similar. If firms are shielded from new risks because courts will adopt p0, they will have less 
incentives in discovering new sources of risk and new remedies.  
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the losses because the SODLQWLII¶V dock was destroyed as a direct consequence of his activity. 
Alternatively, one could argue that it would be unjust to force the injurer to pay for a harm he 
could have not foreseen. In either case, the causal process underlying the accident is still the 
same and has nothing to do with the decision of holding the injurer liable or not. 
Lastly, also the idea that an event might break the chain of causation is problematic. As noted 
by Morse µ>L@t is metaphyVLFDOO\LPSODXVLEOHWKDWWKHUHDUH³VKDUSEUHDNVLQWKHFDXVDOFKDLQV
of the universe that would provide moral rationale for the same sharp breaks in legal doctrine 
«>&@DXVDWLRQMXVWNHHSVUROOLQJDORQJ¶85
In other words, as the concept of proximate cause implies causal chains, which in turn are 
fictitious,86 it is detached from the modern debate on causality. Thus, it is not surprising that 
proximate cause becomes a vehicle to introduce policy goals that are not related to the cause-
effect relationship.87
Recently, Michael Moore offered an interesting alternative description of the concept of 
intervening cause. In his view, the strength RIOHJDOFDXVDWLRQGLPLQLVKHVµover the number of 
events through which it is transmitted.¶88 This conceptualization of the idea of intervening cause 
is however unworkable in a world (like ours) in which time and space are continuous and not 
discrete. In a continuous world, no matter how contiguous two events might appear in time and 
in space, there are always infinite events separating them. Let us assume that it is possible to 
represent a series of events on a Cartesian Plane where the horizontal axis is the time and each 
                                                          
85 6WHSKHQ-0RUVHµ0RUDO0HWDSK\VLFV RI&DXVDWLRQDQG5HVXOWV¶CLR 879, 880. 
2QWKLVUHJDUG%XQJHZULWHVWKDWµ-XVWDVLGHDOREMHFWVFDQQRWEHLVRODWHGIURPWKHLUSURSHUFRQWH[WPDWHULDO
H[LVWHQWVH[KLELWPXOWLSOHLQWHUFRQQHFWLRQVWKHUHIRUHWKHXQLYHUVHLVQRWDKHDSRIWKLQJVEXWDV\VWHPRILQWHUDFWLQJ
V\VWHPV$VDFRQVHTXHQFHDSDUWLFXODUHIIHFW(LVQRWRQO\WKHSURGXFWRIWKHvera e primaria causa &«EXWRI
PDQ\RWKHUIDFWRUV¶&I%XQJHQ
$OWKRXJKWDNLQJDGLIIHUHQWSDWKDVLPLODUFRQFOXVLRQZDVUHDFKHGE\WKHHDUO\865HDOLVWV,QWKHLUSHUVSHFWLYH
SUR[LPDWHFDXVDWLRQGHYLFHVZHUH³ZRUGRIPDJLFZKHUHE\XQSULQFLSOHGOLPLWDWLRQRIOLDELOLW\GHFLVLRQVFRXOGEH
DFKLHYHG D WZLOO RU ZKLP E\ XQWUDPPHOHG MXGJHV´ &I 'DYLG : 5REHUVWRQ µ$OORFDWLQJ $XWKRULW\ DPRQJ
,QVWLWXWLRQDO'HFLVLRQ0DNHUVLQ/RXLVLDQD6WDWH&RXUW1HJOLJHQFHDQG6WULFW/LDELOLW\&DVHV¶/D/5HY

0RRUH Q 
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event is a point (event-point). If the series of events is represented by a continuous function (i.e. 
we are not describing a discrete world), there will always be infinite event-points separating 
any two given event-points.  Or, to go back to the issue of proximate causation, there will always 
be infinite event-SRLQWV VHSDUDWLQJ WKH ³SUR[LPDWH´ FDXVH DQG WKH ³SUR[LPDWH´ HIIHFW
Alternatively, the problem could be framed in the following way. Let us assume that we want 
to understand how many event-links separate the proximate cause A from the proximate effect 
B. We will define event-link any event that has an effect on A and B. As shown by the paradox 
of isolation described in section 2.2. of the introduction, it is impossible to perfectly isolate 
some events from the others. To put it differently, there are no absolute boundaries in nature 
and hence every event has some direct or indirect influence on A and B.  Because we live in an 
infinitely large universe, and because no boundary can be drawn between any event and A/B, 
there will always be infinite event links separating A and B.   
A possible counterargument would be that most of these events only have a negligible impact 
on A/B relationship. However, this argument adds an additional layer of complexity. First it 
presupposes that it is possible to measure the intensity of the connection between any given 
event-link and A/B. Second, even accepting this unlikely assumption, this line of thought 
implies that an arbitrary threshold must be drawn to decide what is the minimum intensity 
accepted for an event to be considered as event-link. This entirely arbitrary choice that is not 
causal in nature would in turn determine whether the number of event links is low enough or 
not. Notably, also the choice of number of event-links that renders a cause not proximate is 
entirely arbitrary and not causal in nature. 
In short, unless absolutely arbitrary thresholds are introduced that the number of event links 
separating two given events is always infinity. Therefore, if legal causation loses strength when 
the number of event-links is high then legal causation can never be established.  
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3. The Probabilistic Approach to Causality 
 
Before developing the argument in support of probabilistic causation, a preliminary remark is 
required.  As the demon of scientific determinism has been defeated by modern science, there 
is no longer any reason to postulate metaphysical determinism. The pendulum has swung from 
a kind of scientific knowledge that prima facie suggested the existence of metaphysical 
determinism to the presumption that chance is to be considered a radical ultimate. The fact that 
metaphysical determinism itself has not been falsified should not be perceived as a proof of its 
strength, but as a sign of its inherently conjectural nature.89
The inadequateness of deterministic causation as an approach to explore the world has 
violently emerged over the last decades. Suffices it to think to toxic torts to understand that 
what has been discussed in the previous sections is far from being a purely philosophical and 
abstract whim. 90  Some scholars had hoped that scientific discoveries would have ameliorated 
(if not solved) the problem of indeterminate causation in this area, yet the reality is drastically 
GLIIHUHQW D µdeeper knowledge will extend rather than resolve the problem of causal 
indeterminacy.¶91 In this vein, the scientists operating in the field have no doubt; the 
                                                          
89 Cf Popper (n 7) and Reichenbach (n 9) 2. 
90 Steve Gold gave an influential definition of µWR[LFWRUWV¶. +HZURWHWKDWDWR[LFWRUWLVµan alleged personal injury 
and related harm resulting from exposure to a toxic substance -usually a chemical but perhaps a biological or 
UDGLRORJLFDODJHQW¶ 6WHYH*ROGµ1RWH&DXVDWLRQLQ7R[LF7RUWV%XUGHQVRI3URRI6WDQGDUGVRI3HUVXDsion, and 
6WDWLVWLFDO(YLGHQFH¶ (1986) 96 YLJ 376, 376. On this regards, 5RELQVRQZULWHV WKDW µ7KHUHFHQWRQVODXJKWRI
"toxic," "catastrophic injury," or "mass disaster" tort cases has made heavy demands on the tort system. The 
litigation is complex, the victims are numerous, the aggregate losses are daunting, and uncertainty over the causal 
RULJLQV RI LQMXU\ FUHDWHV H[FHSWLRQDO SUREOHPV RI SURRI¶ *OHQ 2 5RELQVRQ µ3UREDELOLVWLF &DXVDWLRQ DQG
&RPSHQVDWLRQIRU7RUWLRXV5LVN¶-/6, 779. 
91 Cf Gold (n 36) 240. 
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µprobabilistic description of the mutation process cannot be replaced by a deteUPLQLVWLFRQH¶,92
given the importance of stochastic events.93
3.1 A Pure (ex-ante) Probabilistic Approach 
 
A pure (ex-ante) probabilistic approach to causation is grounded on four building blocks: 
1. The main asset of any potential victim is formed by the probability of not suffering 
a specific harm (Pr). 
2. Causation is established whenever Pr is affected by the (negligent) conduct of a 
potential injurer. 
3. Compensation is due when - given the level of scientific knowledge ± it should be 
concluded that Pr was reduced by the (negligent) conduct of the tortfeasor. 
4. Compensation must be proportional to the Pr lost.  
Given its importance, some elaboration is required on the first point. In a probabilistic world 
it is impossible to be certain of being immune from a specific kind of harm. Even the most 
remote risk will always have a positive probability of materialL]LQJ$VWDWHPHQWRIWKHNLQGµI
have contracted the disease D because the firm A has polluted the environment¶ is therefore 
incorrect. The only possible statements are in the following form µbecause the firm A has 
polluted the environment, I had a greater chance of contracting the disease D¶. In other words, 
the victim has never had an entitlement to not contracting the disease D. The victim was merely 
entitled to not being on the receiving end of negligent conducts that increased the probability 
                                                          
92 Anatoly Ruvinsky, Genetics and Randomness (CRC Press 2010) 39. 
93 5RELQ+ROOLGD\µ'1$0HWK\ODWLRQDQG(SLJHQRW\SHV¶Biochemistry 500. The number of articles in 
which the role of probabilistic considerations is emphasized is enormous and rapidly growing. For an in depth 
analysis of the role of probability in toxic cases, cf Gold (n 36). 
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of contracting D. From these considerations it follows that the asset of the victim with regards 
to the disease D is not his entitlement to being healthy, but the probabilities that he had of not 
contracting the disease. 
One crucial piece of the puzzle is therefore that subjecting another person to risk (i.e. reducing 
his probability of not being harmed) constitutes harm in itself. On this regard, Stephen Perry 
DUJXHVWKDWDVIDUDVZHFDQGLVFULPLQDWHEHWZHHQWKHYLFWLPVWKDWFRQWUDFWHG'GXHWRILUP$¶V
pollution and those who contracted it due to the background risk, it makes no sense to consider 
risk compensable harm.94 Three important implications naturally follow.  
)LUVWO\3HUU\¶VDUJXPHQWSRVWXODWHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIWKHGHPRQDQGLQIDFWKHHFKRHV/DSODFH
by affirming that µa distinction can be drawn in principle between the two categories of cases¶.95
However, chaos theory, quantum mechanics, and the works of Hadamard have shown that 
perfect predictability cannot be achieved, and therefore it is not possible to perfectly 
discriminate among different causes. Not in practice, not in principle. Not surprisingly, the only 
arguments used by Perry to rule out the indeterministic hypothesis are extremely weak. On the 
one hand, he makes an unsubstantiated claim on the allegedly deterministic nature of the causal 
process analyzed by the House of Lords in the famous case Hotson v. East Berkshire Area 
Health Authority.96 On the other hand, he relies on the controversial philosophical thesis that 
the indeterminism at a macroscopic level is simply washed off.97 In a world in which scientific 
GHWHUPLQLVPGRHVQRWKROG3HUU\¶VDUJXPHQWVORVHDOORIWKHLUVWUHQJWKV
                                                          
6WHSKHQ3HUU\µ5LVN+DUPDQG5HVSRQVLELOLW\¶LQ'DYLG2ZHQVHGPhilosophical Foundations of Tort Law
283
95 Id. at 334.
>@$SS&DV+/3HUU\ZULWHVWKDWµLQPDQ\RIWKHIDFWVLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKULVNGDPDJHKDVEHHQ
DOOHJHGWKHFDXVDOSURFHVVHVDWZRUNVHHPPRUHOLNHO\WRKDYHEHHQGHWHUPLQLVWLFWKDQLQGHWHUPLQLVWLFLQFKDUDFWHU
7KLVLVWUXHRIHotson, IRUH[DPSOHZKHUHWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVPDGHWKHYHU\SODXVLEOHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWDWWKHWLPH
WKHSODLQWLIIDUULYHGDWWKHKRVSLWDOeitherHQRXJKEORRGYHVVHOVZHUHVWLOOLQWDFWWRPDNHKLVLQMXU\WUHDWDEOHor 
HQRXJKKDGEHHQGHVWUR\HGWRPDNHDYDVFXODUQHFURVLVLQHYLWDEOH¶7KHUHLVnothing KRZHYHUWKDWFDQLQGXFHRQH
WRWKLQNWKDWWKHFDXVDOSURFHVVZDVLQGHHGGHWHUPLQLVWLF 3HUU\Q
3HUU\QDW2QWKLVUHJDUG3XWQDPZULWHVµ7KDWWKHUHLVVRPHWKLQJVSHFLDODERXWPDFURREVHUYDEOHV
VHHPVWUHPHQGRXVO\XQOLNHO\3XWQDPQ
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Secondly, it is clear that the thesis advocated in this chapter goes beyond merely supporting 
proportional liability. By exorcising the demons of scientific determinism, the philosophical 
foundations of a new conception of harm are laid. As recognized by Perry himself, in a 
probabilistic world material harm is not the only possible kind of harm.98 In this vein, the harm 
can be defined as the reduction of this probability caused by the injurer. The need for this new 
conception of harm is even more pronounced now that technological progress is turning the 
traditional concHSWLRQRISK\VLFDOKDUPLQWRDµhopelessly imprecise screening devise¶.99 In fact, 
as Jamie Grodsky nicely put it, new technologies are dismantling the risk-injury divide by 
making it impossible to draw a bright line distinction between risk and harm.100
Thirdly, it is possible to provide an answer to those who claimed that legal scholars should 
not follow natural sciences in their indeterministic drift.101 As proven by Perry, the only way to 
detect the existence of a kind of harm based on ex-ante probabilities is to acknowledge that 
scientific determinism is a relic of the past.102 At the same time, clinging on scientific 
determinism would not make this harm evaporate. It would simply make the law blind to it. 
Notably, hidden in a probabilistic approach there is a risk of infinite regress. Once a 
probabilistic view of the world is embraced tout court, it must be recognized that also 
probabilistic predictions are reliable only with a certain probability. A statement in the form 
µFirm A has increased the probability of contracting disease D by 10%¶ can only be as reliable 
as the studies on which it is grounded. If a probabilistic approach is embraced to stay away from 
                                                          
3HUU\LVSHUIHFWO\DZDUHWKDWKLVDUJXPHQWKROGVRQO\LQDSXUHO\GHWHUPLQLVWLFZRUOG,QIDFWKHZULWHVWKDWµ>L@Q
WKH LQGHWHUPLQLVWLFFDVH WKHUHVHHPV WREHD WUXHGHWULPHQWDOVKLIW LQSRVLWLRQ WKDW LVVLPSO\QRWSUHVHQW LQ WKH
GHWHUPLQLVWLFFDVH¶3HUU\Q
Potter v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co3G
100 Not surprisingly, she also notes that µthere is no consistency in the courts as to what constitute physical injury¶.
-DPLH$*URGVN\µ*HQRPLFVDQG7R[LF7RUWV'LVPDQWOLQJWKH5LVN-,QMXU\'LYLGH¶6/5&I
DOVR6FRWW$EHUVRQµ1RWH$)LIW\-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the Minnesota Supreme 
&RXUW6KRXOG7DNH:KHQ&RQIURQWHGZLWKWKH,VVXH¶ (2006) 32 WMLR 1095, 1115. 
101 &I:ULJKWµCausation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble 
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts¶ (n 38) 1029. 
102 Perry (n 94) 338. 
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the deterministic demon, compensation should be scaled down to account for the finite accuracy 
of the study. Acting otherwise, the result of the study would be considered absolutely true and 
this is in sharp contrast with a probabilistic view of the world.  That is to say, if the harm is 
equal to 10 and the reliability of the study is 90% compensation should equal 9 (10*0.9). 
Unfortunately, this is only the tip of the iceberg. Also the reliability of the probabilistic study 
can be determined only with a certain probability, say for example again 90%. To account for 
this factor, compensation should be lowered to 8.1 (10*0.9*0.9). As in a probabilistic world 
determinist statements are barred, this chain of probabilistic statements is clearly infinite. In 
this vein, the original value of compensation has to be multiplied for an infinite number of 
factors, all strictly smaller than one. It follows that, no matter how large the harm is and how 
accurate the studies are, the compensation owed by any injurer will always tend to zero.  
Albeit apparently abstract, this consideration has an immediate practical implication. Most of 
the literature has generally portrayed all-or-nothing and proportional liability as mutually 
exclusive alternatives,103 whereas in a probabilistic world they become necessary complements. 
As also probabilistic predictions only have a finite confidence, a probabilistic approach is 
unworkable without drawing an arbitrary and artificial deterministic line to temper its 
consequences. In section V, I will try to establish where this deterministic line should be drawn.  
3.2 A Possible Counterargument   
 
Although probabilistic analysis of causality is gaining momentum among philosophers and has 
become pervasive in nearly every field of human knowledge, some problems still exist. Given 
the practical nature of the enquiry and the need for the law to provide answers in states that are 
                                                          
103 Cf 6WHYHQ6KDYHOOµUncertainty over Causation and the DeWHUPLQDWLRQRI&LYLO/LDELOLW\¶ (1985) 28 JLE 587, 
587-590. 
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extremely far from idealized experiments, I will not discuss systematically each of these 
criticalities.104 One point, however, needs to be addressed. The traditional probabilistic 
approach to causality defines as cause an event that increases the probability that a certain 
outcome will materialize, whereas some events that are generally considered causes reduce the 
probability of an effect.105 As explained by Sosa and Tooley, this is a problem that must be 
addressed by any probabilistic theory of causation.106 Suppose that two different kinds of 
disease exist; the first (C) is fatal with a probability of 0.1 and the second (D) with a probability 
0.8. Let us also assume that each disease confers immunity against the other.  Finally let us also 
assume that at least half of the people contract D.107 As noted by Sosa and Tooley µboth the 
unconditional probability of death, and the probability of death given the absence of the first 
disease, are greater than the probability of death given the presence of the disease, even though, 
by hypothesis, the disease does cause death with a certain probability.¶108
It seems that both for practical and for philosophical reasons the relevance of this problem 
might be limited. Firstly, the problem with the example presented above is that it equates death 
as an effect from any possible cause. It is hard to imagine that any theory on causality adopting 
this approach will take us far. For example, if we assume that C causes a fatal heart attack, 
whereas D causes a deadly loss of blood the apparent contradiction disappears. In fact, C would 
increase the chances of a heart attack and D would increase the probabilities of a deadly loss of 
blood. If we recognize that causes have infinite facets but we assume that outcomes are 
univocally defined, the emerging contradictions will be due to this asymmetric treatment more 
                                                          
104 As an example, it is way outside the scope of this chapter to discuss an issue as the Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen 
SUREOHPGHILQHGE\5HLFKHQEDFKDµFDXVDODQRPDO\¶)RUDGHEDWHRQWKLVSUREOHPCf %DV&)UDDVVHQµ7KH
Einstein-Podolsky-5RVHQ3DUDGR[¶Synthese 291. 
105 Patrick Suppesµ&RQIOLFWLQJ,QWXLWLRQVDERXW&DXVDOLW\¶063
106 Sosa & Tooley (n 73) 20. 
107 In this simplified example, no other causes of death exist.   
108 Sosa and Tooley (n 73) 20. They write µ[Under the assumptions described] both the unconditional probability 
that one will die within the relevant period, and the probability of death given that one does not have the first 
disease, must be equal or greater than 0,4, whereas the probability that one will die if one does not contract the 
first disease is only 0.1¶ thus proving the conclusion presented above. 
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than to our definition of cause. Conversely, if we admit that we can never define initial 
conditions with absolute precision (also because they are characterized by infinite dimensions) 
we should admit that also outcomes cannot be proven to be absolutely identical. The apparent 
paradox is vanished already. Secondly, given the modest purpose of this chapter (the 
enhancement of probabilistic considerations in the law) the importance of this problem is 
limited. Therefore, instead of talking about causes, I will say that an event has a causal effect 
whenever it affects the probabilities of a given outcome.  
To understand the gist of this problem let us reproduce the example described above with a 
slight modification. In order to make the idealized scenario relevant to tort law I will assume 
that C and D are causally related to the pollution produced by two factories A and B. All the 
other assumptions are identical. The pollution from A causes the disease C (fatal in one tenth 
of the times), whereas B causes the disease D (that kills 80% of the people who are infected). 
Once again, I assume that each one of these diseases completely immunizes against the other.  
Four different scenarios are possible, depending on the level of information available:  
1) It is not known that the pollution caused by A and B affects the probability of contracting 
C and D. In this case no liability can be imposed on the two firms. 
2) It is known that pollution from one of the firms causes the disease with a certain 
probability, whereas no information is available with regard to the other firm. In this 
case, it is unavoidable that the firm who is introducing a known risk will be held liable, 
while the other will go unpunished. 
3) All the relevant information is known, apart from the fact that one disease protects 
against the other. In other words, it is not known that the disease C is actually 
µbeneficial¶. In this case, it is desirable to impose liability on both firms. Liability cannot 
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be excluded on the ground that pollution from one firm might have a beneficial effect 
in terms of reducing other dimensions of risk. The reason is simple: this possibility can 
never be ruled out, hence liability would not be imposed on any conduct. 
4) All the information is known. Assuming that there are no policy reasons to shut down 
firm D, then it is socially desirable that firm C is not held liable. This is because the 
pollution caused by firm C is paradoxically preventing more deaths than it is causing. 
However causation is not the mechanism to achieve this outcome. In fact, causation is 
established. A affects the probabilities of C happening. Yet, A should still be shielded 
from liability due to the positive externalities of its activity.  
This result can be achieved either through tort law or by introducing a system of social 
insurance. In the former case, let us assume that A could have prevented the harm by buying a 
device that fully eliminates its pollution. If positive externalities are introduced in the 
negligence calculus,109 A will be found negligent only if the cost of the device is lower than the 
harm it prevents minus the positive externalities. As this difference is negative, no matter how 
cheap the device is, A will never be considered negligent.  
Alternatively, a social insurance system would introduce the possibility that the victims of C 
will be compensated by a public fund instead of being compensated by A. It should be noted 
that this solution has already been adopted in many countries for victims of vaccines.110
Although at a first glance this context might appear drastically different, A is de facto a vaccine 
against the disease D. Regardless of the path followed, causation is the wrong tool to protect A 
because the causal link cannot (and should not) be denied. It is a matter of efficient care. 
                                                          
109 For a treatment of how the legal system deals (and ought to deal) with positive externalities cf Giuseppe Dari-
0DWWLDFFLµ1HJDWLYH/LDELOLW\¶(2009) 38 JLS 21. 
110 Cf, among the others, Laine Rutkow, Brad Maggi, Joanna Zablotsky, and Thomas R Oliver, ‘Balancing 
Consumer and Industry Interests in Public Health: The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and its 
Influence During the Last Two DHFDGHV¶PSLR 681. 
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3.3 The Hidden Demon of Law and Economics 
 
Law and economics scholars have long advocated the use of probabilistic notions in the law, 
yet paradoxically in most cases they did so while relying either implicitly or explicitly on a 
strictly deterministic view of the world.  
A prominent example of determinism in disguise are the works from Steven Shavell on 
uncertain causation.111 Already in the set-up of his model Shavell reveals his Laplacean credo 
by assuming that µthere is one and only one entity for which the following statement is true: 
³7KHDFFLGHQWZRXOGQRWKDYHRFFXUUHGLQWKHDEVHQFHRIWKHHQWLW\´¶112 And that  µWhen an 
accident occurs, there will be a chance that the entity that caused it will not be known to the 
court . . . but the conditional probability that the entity caused the accident will be determined 
by the court.¶113 The former statement is typical of Laplacean one to one relationships between 
causes and effects, whereas the latter is a reference to epistemological uncertainty.  
Although one might be tempted to question whether these statements are merely working 
assumptions or a declaration of agnosticism about the nature of the world, in other parts of his 
analysis Shavell reveals his deterministic credo. Without the need to dig for nuances, Shavell 
portrays proportional liability and the µall or nothing¶ approach as mutually exclusive, without 
recognizing the problem of infinite regress associated with a probabilistic approach. In this vein, 
Shavell assumes that the probabilistic signal received by the court is perfectly accurate and thus 
the judge can assess with 100% accuracy the probabilistic contribution of each factor. As he 
overlooks that also probabilistic predictions have a finite level of accuracy,114 in his framework 
courts are assumed to have perfect information on the causal links taking place in a probabilistic 
                                                          
111 Cf especially Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability (n 103). 
Id.DW
Ibidem.
,QKLVPRGHOWKHFRXUWFDQSHUIHFWO\REVHUYHWKHFRQGLWLRQDOSUREDELOLW\WKDWDQDFFLGHQWFDXVHGE\WKHSDUW\
DSSHDUVWREHRIDPELJXRXVRULJLQDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQDOSUREDELOLW\WKDWDQDFFLGHQWFDXVHGE\WKHQDWXUDODJHQW
DSSHDUVWREHRIDPELJXRXVRULJLQId.DW  
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world (even better than quantum physicists). In turn, this rules out every uncertainty 
surrounding causal investigations.  
7KHUHIRUH DWWHPSWLQJ WR ORFDWH 6KDYHOO¶V ZRUN LQ D SUREDEilistic world would produce a 
paradoxical result. In a probabilistic world a probabilistic signal is all that there is to know about 
FDXVDOOLQNVDVWKLVVLJQDOUHFHLYHGE\WKHFRXUWLVDVVXPHGWREHSHUIHFW6KDYHOO¶VZRUNRQ
uncertain causation de facto rules out the existence of uncertain causation. Predictably, Shavell 
concludes that the µuse of proportional liability results in the same outcome that would be 
observed in absence of any uncertainty over causation.¶115
Moreover, Shavell writes that µ[t]his principle [of fairness] is in perfect accord with the use 
of a threshold probability criterion in the determination of liability. On the other hand, the 
principle would be violated by use of proportional liability, as a party would suffer some 
sanction even when it was unlikely that he caused a harm.¶116 This argument mirrors perfectly 
the one advanced by Glenn Robinson and by Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, thus showing that 
many influential law and economics scholar wear the same disguise.117
Following Shavell¶VDVVXPSWLRQV, however, every injurer that could be held liable reduced 
WKHYLFWLP¶VFKDQFHVRIQRWJHWWLQJKDUPHG&RQVHTXHQWO\± according to his own model ± there 
is no risk that liability is imposed on parties who did not cause any harm.118  His argument on 
fairness only holds in a world where the following syllogism is true: (i) if there is a binary 
relationship between causes and effects, (ii) and if such relationship can be identified at least in 
principle then (iii) risk creation is not harm in itselI,QVKRUW6KDYHOO¶VDUJXPHQWRQO\KROGVLQ
                                                          
115 Id. at 599. 
116 Id. at 605. 
117 Robinson (n 90) DW  DQG$ULHO 3RUDW DQG$OH[ 6WHLQ µ,QGHWHUPLQDWH&DXVDWLRQ DQG$SSRUWLRQPHQW RI
'DPDJHV$Q(VVD\RQ+ROWE\$OOHQDQG)DLUFKLOG¶OJLS 667, 681.  
118 Recall in fact that reducing the chances of not getting harmed is the only form of harm in a probabilistic world. 
Claiming that compensation would not perfectly mirror the amount of risk created would not suffice to save 
6KDYHOO¶VDUJXPHQW,QIDFWXQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWULVNFUHDWLRQLVKDUPWKLVSUREOHPZRXOGEHHYHQ more 
VHYHUHXQGHUDQ³DOORUQRWKLQJ´DSSURDFK 
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a deterministic world, and hence it is possible to offer a univocally deterministic account of the 
assumptions underlying his model.  
3.4 A Spurious (ex-post) Probabilistic Approach 
 
An alternative way to include probabilistic considerations in the study of causation is what I 
will define a spurious (ex-post) probabilistic approach. This approach is generally referred to 
as proportional liability,119 and one of its macroscopic application was the market share liability 
imposed on some pharmaceutical firms.120 This framework is grounded on a deterministic idea 
of the world and probabilistic considerations are included only when justified by specific 
characteristics of the case. Namely, the uncertainty surrounding causal investigations is 
regarded to be above a certain threshold.121
Under this approach, compensation is triggered only in the presence of material harm and the 
focus is shifted on ex post probability. The questions are framed in the following form µwhat is 
the probability that the accident that has taken place was caused by the alleged injurer?¶
This is the traditional compromise advocated by law and economics scholars when an idea of 
probabilistic causation in the law was proposed. This approach has the relevant advantage to 
                                                          
119 (J -RKQ0DNGLVL µ3URSRUWLRQDO /LDELOLW\$&RPSUHKHQVLYH5XOH WR$SSRUWLRQ7RUW'DPDJHV%DVHG RQ
3UREDELOLW\¶(1988) 67 NCLR 1063. 
120 For an extensive discussion of the theory behind proportional liability and its applications cf David A Fischer, 
µProducts Liability--An Analysis of Market Share Liability - I Introduction¶34 VLR 1623. 
121 Cf Richard Delgado (n 39). Cf also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980) (where the California Supreme Court developed a causation theory based 
on market shares). 
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allow reaching efficient outcomes provided that some very restrictive assumptions are 
verified.122
The logic behind this approach can be captured with the following example. Let us assume 
that a doctor negligently gives a pill with strong side effects to 10 patients and they all die. Let 
us further assume that this pill is responsible for the death of 7 of the patients, but due to 
epistemological uncertainty it is impossible to identify them. Lastly, let us assume that the loss 
suffered in each fatality is 10. It follows that the harm caused by the doctor is 70. Perfect 
compensation and optimal deterrence are achieved if he is made to repay each one of its 7 victim 
with 10. However, this solution is not viable because by assumption it is not known who the 
seven victims are.  
Framed in terms of ex-post probability the relevant question is µZKDWLVWKHSUREDELOLW\WKDWD
JLYHQSDWLHQWKDVEHHQNLOOHGE\WKHSLOOV"¶. If we assume that patients are identical the answer 
is 70% for each patient. In this vein, proponents of this approach argue that perfect 
compensation cannot be achieved. However, optimal deterrence will be obtained if the doctor 
compensates each victim with 7, because he will have to pay a sum that is equal to the harm 
caused. For this approach to be a viable strategy the ex-post probability must be known.  
4. Normative Implications 
 
Having defined the two possible approaches to probabilistic causation, the question is how they 
should be combined to develop a workable and philosophically sound approach to the issue of 
causation. For the sake of simplicity, I will divide tort cases in two macro-categories: traditional 
                                                          
122 For example, the courts must receive a perfect probabilistic signal on the causal relationship between the 
conduct and the harm. Cf Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability (n 103) 
589-590. All the assumptions and the proof are spelled out in Chapter V. 
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torts, and new generation torts. The difference between the two kinds of cases is the prima facie
degree of uncertainty surrounding causal investigations. In traditional cases the causal link can 
be established prima facie in a deterministic way, whereas causal indeterminacy plagues new 
generation cases also on the very surface.  
4.1 Traditional Torts 
 
Examples of traditional torts are a car hitting a pedestrian or a defective product exploding and 
hurting a consumer. Events of this kind are generally considered a good reason to embrace a 
deterministic concept of causation and to postulate the deterministic nature of the world. Both 
these statements ignore the fact that traditional torts can also be explained by assuming 
probabilistic relations between causes and effects. To defeat the deterministic argument it 
suffices to state that cars hitting pedestrians will cause harm with an extremely high probability. 
In a more precise language, traditional torts can be coherently interpreted within the 
probabilistic framework by saying that given a certain cause the probability of an event 
approaches 1. To counter this argument a determinist would have to prove that this causal 
relationship not only manifests with a probability that is close to 1, but that no exception can 
ever be found. The impracticability of this quest has been known since Hume.123
An important consequence is that whoever argues in favor of a deterministic concept of 
causation (in the Laplacean sense) will never be able to rule out the probabilistic theory. 
Furthermore, any deterministic theory runs against the finding of modern science and modern 
philosophy which emphasize the importance of probabilistic relations, especially at an 
epistemological level. Consequently, the only reason to advocate a strictly deterministic 
                                                          
123 Cf Hume David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (PF Collier & Son (1910), [1748]).
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concept of causation is an a priori belief on the nature of the world. The traditional concept of 
causation imposes therefore such unverifiable dogma on the world. 
From a practical perspective, traditional torts are easily handled both by a deterministic and a 
(ex-post) probabilistic approach to causation. In fact, by assumption we are dealing with cases 
where the causal link is established with a probability that departs only infinitesimally from 1. 
It follows that by adopting a spurious (ex-post) probabilistic approach also compensation would 
be rounded up to cover for the entire harm.).124 In other words, there is no practical reason to 
revive the demon when the focus is on traditional torts as defined here.  
4.2 New Generation Cases 
 
Toxic torts and medical malpractice cases constitute prominent examples of this category of 
cases. Here, causal indeterminacy haunts every step of causal investigation and a deterministic 
fiction is unworkable given the explicitly and intrinsically probabilistic nature of the evidence 
available to the courts.125
4.2.1. Ex – Ante versus Ex – Post Probability 
 
I have defended the idea of a pure probabilistic approach to the study of causation, yet two 
problems remain open. First, it might be objected that the ex-ante probability of an event is 
generally extremely hard to measure. This perception stems from the fact that, besides their 
prima facie deterministic nature, traditional cases also have an additional characteristic trait. 
                                                          
/HWXVDVVXPHWKDWDFDUKLWVDSHGHVWULDQEUHDNLQJLWVOHJ/HWXVDOVRDVVXPHWKDWWKHH[SRVWSUREDELOLW\LV
HTXDOWRDQGWKDWDOHJLVZRUWK¼8QGHUWKHSUREDELOLVWLFDSSURDFKWKHFRPSHQVDWLRQRZHG
ZRXOGEHHTXDOWR7KLVQXPEHUZLOOEHURXQGHGWR
&I*ROGQ 
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For traditional torts, it is generally easier to answer questions regarding the ex-post probability 
(µwhat is the probability that the harm suffered by the pedestrian was caused by the careless 
conduct of the driver that hit him?¶) than investigating ex-ante probability (µhow much the 
careless driving of the injurer increased to risk of an accident for a certain pedestrian?¶). In turn, 
this has generated a bias in the legal arena that automatically assumes ex-ante probability to be 
always harder to assess.126
Unfortunately, the most discussed stream of new generation cases, asbestos related claims, 
strengthened this bias.127 In fact, asbestosis and mesothelioma belong to the category of 
µsignature diseases¶. The peculiarity of this kind of cases is that they µnearly always occur as a 
result of exposure to a certain substance¶.128 Hence, determining the ex-post probability that a 
specific substance was the actual cause of the disease is relatively easier, at least in comparison 
to cases involving non-signature diseases.129 However, because for any substance there is 
generally more than one source, also assigning the ex-post probability to any specific source is 
not a trivial task. The enormous controversy surrounding causal investigation in asbestos related 
litigation testifies that investigating the ex-post probability is problematic even for signature 
diseases.130 More importantly, non-signature diseases are rare,131 so they should be regarded as 
the exception rather than the norm. In this vein, a theory of causation on new generation cases 
should not be grounded on cases involving asbestosis or other non-signature diseases.  
                                                          
126 For example, WKH7KLUG&LUFXLWVWDWHGWKDW³[R]ecognizing [monitoring] does not require courts to speculate about 
WKHSUREDELOLW\RIIXWXUHLQMXU\´ In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli 1), 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990). Not 
recognizing however, that also adopting an ex-post perspective the courts need to speculate about probability. 
127 For an overview, Cf Stephen J. Carroll, et al., Asbestos litigation (Rand 2005). 
128 CfHJ0DUJDUHW$%HUJHUµ8SVHWWLQJWKH%DODQFHbetween Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme 
&RXUW
V7ULORJ\RQ([SHUW7HVWLPRQ\LQ7R[LF7RUW/LWLJDWLRQ¶ (2001) 64 LCP 289, 298. 
129 Cf, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, µThe Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products’
(2005) 64 MLR 613, 688 (noting that unlike other tort cases asbestosis and mesothelioma are signature diseases 
µin which there is a clearly evident and exclusive causal connection¶ to asbestos exposure). 
130 Carroll et al. (n 1275). 
131 Grodsky (n 100) 1731. 
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Despite this bias, new generation cases often rely on epidemiological studies and do not 
involve signature diseases. Epidemiological studies explicitly attempt to measure the increase 
in the risk of a certain outcome associated with a given event (not coincidentally called µrisk 
factor¶).132  Therefore, as the focus of many of these studies is forward-looking, there is no 
reason to postulate that the information available on ex-post probability is systematically 
superior to the information available on ex-ante probability.133 Therefore, because using ex-
ante probability in new generation cases means to speak the same language of many modern 
scientific studies, in many instances ± especially when no signature disease is involved ± it will 
be practically more convenient than investigating ex-post probability. Take, for example, the 
mentioned study on the association between smoking and cancer. As this research focused on the risk 
created by smoking, the output of the study was an association between smoking and cancer based on 
ex-ante probability.
It is not my intention to claim that the information available on ex-ante probability is 
systematically more accurate. Yet, also the opposite claim cannot be defended; it cannot be 
stated a priori that information on ex-post probability is always more readily available. That 
claims regarding ex-ante probability are mere speculations, whereas the ex-post causal link can 
be assessed in a (quasi) deterministic way is a myth that should be dispelled. 
                                                          
132 For example, the association between tobacco smoking and cancer derives from studies assessing the incidence 
RI WREDFFRDVD µULVN IDFWRU¶ IRU WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIFDQFHU&I:ROIJDQJ$KUHQV.ODXV.ULFNHEHUJDQG ,ULV
Pigeot, µ$Q,QWURGXFWLRQWR(SLGHPLRORJ\¶LQ:ROIJDQJ$KUHQVDQG,ULV3LJHRWHGVHandbook of Epidemiology
(2014) 14 (µOne of the milestones in epidemiological research was the development of rigorous case-control 
designs, which facilitate the investigation of risk factors for chronic diseases with long induction periods. The 
most famous study of this type, although not the first one, is the study on smoking and lung cancer by Doll and 
Hill¶). The parallelism with the ex-ante and ex-post investigations in the law is nicely shown by the words of the 
influential epidemiologist Rodolfo Saracci when he wrote µThe prospective study observes events in their natural 
course from causes to possible effects. Computing and comparing incidence rates or risks of chronic bronchitis in 
smokers and non-smokers seeks to answer the question: how often do smokers develop the disease compared to 
non-smokers? A case-control study observes the events in a reverse sequence, from effects to possible causes. It 
starts from the disease and seeks to answer the question: what proportion of people with chronic bronchitis have 
been smokers compared to people with no disease?¶ Rodolfo Saracci, Epidemiology: A Very Short Introduction
(OUP 2010) 111. 
133 Robinson (n 90) 793. 
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An additional objection that could be raised is that everyone is exposed to some form of risk 
in a way or another, thus admitting compensation for risk would be imposing an excessive 
burden on the legal system. There are a number of problems with this view. First, this statement 
clings on the idea that also de minimis risks should be taken into account. However, if we apply 
the same logic to the traditional conception of harm, it is just equally true that everyone is 
harmed in a way or another. 134 For instance, pollution is causing an unlimited number of 
minimal injuries to each one of us, yet these harms are not cognizable by the law, and rightfully 
so. I cannot go to a court and demand compensation because I can jog for 50 feet less due to 
breathing polluted air. Implicit in any legal system is the idea that some de minimis harm cannot 
be compensated. If a similar implicit (or even explicit) threshold is applied to risk, the threat of 
excessive litigation is already tempered. Second, it is at least dubious that people would sue on 
the basis of very small risks as they are associated to very small compensations. 
4.2.2. When and How to Apply the Pure Probabilistic Approach 
 
I suggest that the pure probabilistic approach ought to be the norm and departures from it are 
to be grounded only on normative reasons or practical considerations. Incidentally, this is what 
I advocate with regards to traditional torts.135 Because, as a practical matter, for traditional cases 
the deterministic fiction and the ex-post probabilistic approach are generally much easier to 
handle, and hence a switch from the default rule of an ex-ante framework is justified.  
However, for new generation cases the situation is reversed. The deterministic fiction is 
unworkable, while the objections against an ex-ante probabilistic approach appear untenable 
                                                          
134 Cf, for example, Rainer v. Union Carbide Corp., 402 F.3d at 621 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that µAccepting the 
plaintiffs' claim would therefore throw open the possibility of litigation by any person experiencing even the most 
benign subcellular damage¶). 
&I6HFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHU
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without the dHPRQ¶V support. Therefore, for new generation cases a move from the pure 
probabilistic approach is justified only in those circumstances in which there is much more 
information available on ex-post than on ex-ante probability. 
The case for an ex-ante probabilistic approach is especially, but not only, compelling for 
lagged torts.136 The reason is that the ex-post probabilistic approach is based on a necessary 
imprecision in the definition of the concept of harm. As stated above, if we admit that (also in 
principle) we live in a world that we can interpret only in probabilistic terms, then the asset of 
a victim should be considered the probability of not getting harmed. Consequently, the harm 
comes into existence as soon as this probability is reduced, regardless of the moment at which 
the material harm will emerge. Thus, while the spurious probabilistic approach can be effective 
for prima facie deterministic instant torts, it is inappropriate for lagged torts. The reason is 
simple: an ex-post approach becomes effective only after a material harm has taken place. In 
the case of lagged torts a material harm does not arise immediately, and hence there will be a 
certain time interval in which the asset of the patient has already been harmed, but tort law is 
completely ineffective. Take, for example, smoking and cancer. As a risk factor, smoking 
increases the chances of contracting cancer almost from the very first cigarette. Yet, the law of 
torts is ineffective until the cancer is diagnosed.  
4.2.3. The Demon in the Probability 
 
As stated above, embedded in any probabilistic approach, be it spurious or pure, there is a 
problem of infinite regress. Unless the deterministic fiction is somehow reintroduced into the 
                                                          
7KHSUREOHPVFUHDWHGE\ ODJJHG WRUWVZLWK UHJDUGV WRFDXVDWLRQDUHFHUWDLQO\QRWDQHZGLVFRYHU\2Q WKLV
UHJDUGFI5RELQVRQQ:LOOLDP0/DQGHVDQG5LFKDUG$3RVQHUµ7RUW/DZDVD5HJXODWRU\5HJLPH
IRU&DWDVWURSKLF3HUVRQDO,QMXULHV¶-/6 
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picture, no compensation can ever be awarded due to the necessarily infinite length of the chain 
of probabilistic claims. I argue that the demon should be standing at the second step of this 
chain of probabilistic claims. Harm should be intended in a purely probabilistic sense, and hence 
be defined in terms of Pr. At the same time, the compensation owed should be scaled down to 
reflect the accuracy of the probabilistic study. After this additional step, the probabilistic chain 
of causation should be interrupted.  
In practical terms, this solution equals to adopting the proportional approach traditionally 
advocated by the law and economics literature, but incorporating the new definition of harm 
presented in this work. This solution would therefore allow exploiting all the efficiencies of the 
proportional approach identified by the law and economics literature,137 while adopting a 
definition of harm that is consistent with the findings of modern science. Because of this 
definition of harm, it is possible to prevent the void created by lagged torts, and to exploit the 
knowledge created by studies on ex-ante probability.  
5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that a purely probabilistic concept of causation should become 
the norm, whereas deterministic causation and ex post probabilistic causations should be 
considered a heuristic tools only when there are practical justifications. In other words, I claim 
WKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHDVKLIWLQWKHµEXUGHQRISURRI¶$WWKHSUHVHQWWLPHWKHVWDQGDUGDQDO\VLV
is still deterministic in nature while to frame causation in probabilistic terms it is necessary to 
prove that in a certain context the epistemological uncertainty is above a given threshold. That 
is, the burden of proof is on the shoulders of advocates of probabilistic causation that must 
                                                          
&I6KDYHOOUncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil LiabilityQ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
27_Edle BW Romana.job
51 
 
explain why deterministic causation would not work in the case at hand. To the contrary, I claim 
that probabilistic causation should be the default option, unless it can be proven that 
deterministic causation is a workable heuristic tool.  In this sense, the burden of proof would 
lie with the proponents of deterministic causation that must explain why a departure from a 
probabilistic analysis is justified for a given category of cases.  
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III. Aristotle and Optimal Deterrence: The Goals of Tort Law in 
a Probabilistic World 
1. Introduction 
 
In the past decades a heated debate has emerged between the champions of the Aristotelian 
corrective justice138 and the supporters of economic efficiency.139 Despite few attempts of 
reconciliation,140 it appears that there is an enormous gap between the opposing doctrines, as 
they seem to imply completely incompatible policies. Moreover, it seems that law and 
economics scholars and moral theorists cannot find a common ground to debate. The scholars 
on each side seem to be much more concerned with refining their own theory than with finding 
an agreement. Not surprisingly, the more the two theories are refined the more they become 
abstract and impenetrable to the scholars of the other faction. On the one hand, economists have 
developed models that are extremely complex and sophisticated. On the other hand, corrective 
justice theorists are becoming more and more interested in the fascinating, yet challenging work 
of Immanuel Kant. From this perspective, even many legal scholars are skeptical that the 
framework developed by the German philosopher can be useful. The idea that law can be 
presented as lean, minimal and self-contained seems to be in sharp contradiction with the 
pluralism advocated by many contemporary scholars.141
Starting fURPWKH.DQWLDQ¶VDUJXPHQWRIFRQFHSWXDOO\VHTXHQFHGLGHDV in this chapter I will 
suggest that the friction between the two theories is only illusory. Not only corrective justice 
                                                          
138 *HRUJH3)OHWFKHUµ)DLUQHVVDQG8WLOLW\LQ7RUW7KHRU\¶HLR 5REHUW$(SVWHLQµ$7KHRU\RI
6WULFW/LDELOLW\¶-/6-XOHV/&ROHPDQµ0RUDO7KHRULHVRI7RUWV7KHLU6FRSHDQG/LPLWV3DUW,¶
(1982) 1 LP 371. 
139 On this point, Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (YUP 1970); Richard 
$3RVQHUµ$7KHRU\RI1HJOLJHQFH¶-/6 29; Kaplow and Shavell (n 41). 
140 Cf Chapman (n 43) and Geistfeld (n 43). 
141 (UQHVW-:HLQULEµ/DZDVD.DQWLDQ,GHDRI5HDVRQ¶&/5
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and deterrence are not mutually exclusive, but they should be considered necessary 
complements. The one without the other cannot offer a satisfying description of tort law as a 
whole. Furthermore, I will show that relaxing the assumption on the deterministic nature of the 
world strongly reinforces the claim that corrective justice requires deterrence. 
2. The Goals of Tort Law 
Law and economics scholars would chase optimal deterrence in order to maximize welfare. It 
is conventional wisdom that optimal deterrence can be achieved only if damages are equal to 
the harm times the inverse of the probability that compensation is due.142 The obvious 
implication is that the use of punitive damages should be widespread, since such probability is 
strictly smaller than one. With regards to sanctions, one of the core ideas advocated by Becker 
is that if sanctions are monetary and individuals are risk neutral in wealth, then optimal 
sanctions tend to infinity.143 At a first glance it might appear that, from an economic perspective, 
the obvious solution to achieve optimal deterrence at the least cost would be to increase the 
magnitude of the fines and to introduce (or enhance, depending on which side of the ocean we 
stand) punitive damages. 
Conversely, it is not possible to offer a single definition of corrective justice and hence for 
now the focus will be on the original definition offered by Aristotle. According to him, 
corrective justice involves the notion of balance, or equipoise, between two individuals.144 Torts 
can be considered transactions that alter this balance; corrective justice aims at righting the 
scales. As corrective justice sees remedies as a mean to undo the wrongs,145 it is straightforward 
                                                          
1420LWFKHOO$3ROLQVN\DQG6WHYHQ6KDYHOOµ3XQLWLYH'DPDJHV$Q(FRQRPLF$QDO\VLV¶+/5 869. 
143 *DU\6%HFNHUµ&ULPHDQG3XQLVKPHQW$Q(FRQRPLF$SSURDFK¶-3(
144 Aristotle (Trans: Martin Ostwald), Nicomachean Ethics (Library of Liberal Arts 1962). 
145 Cf Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice (n 44). 
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that compensation should equal the harm.146 Using a more formal language, a superficial look 
at deterrence theory might induce one to think that the probability of detection by public 
authorities should tend to zero (with the consequent introduction of enormous fines), and 
compensation should always exceed the harm. Corrective justice implies neither of these two 
policies.
Not only the opposing doctrines have completely diverging policy implications, they are 
usually assumed to be absolutely incompatible because they rest on opposite axioms. As it will 
be shown, the only common trait is that they are both grounded on a deterministic concept of 
causation.
2.1 Deterrence Theory 
The idea of sanctions (or more generally punishment) to deter unwanted behavior has a 
millenarian history,147 but an economic formalization is owed to the pioneering works by 
Becker,148 Calabresi,149 and Posner.150
According to the economic theory of deterrence, a potential injurer will be optimally deterred 
only if his expected liability is equal to the potential harm that his conduct might cause. In 
mathematical terms optimal deterrence will be achieved if: 
Pf * M f+ Pd * D = H               (3.1) 
                                                          
146We are considering the simple case in which the harm suffered by the victim is equal to the gains of the 
tortfeasor. It is controversial which measure should be used when the harm and the gain are not identical. For an 
insightful discussion of the problem cf (UQHVW-:HLQULEµ5HVWLWXWLRQDU\'DPDJHVDV&RUUHFWLYH-XVWLFH¶
TIL 1. 
147 For an overview, cf 5LFKDUG1/HERZµ7KXF\GLGHVDQG'HWHUUHQFH¶Security Studies 163. 
148 Cf Becker (n 143). 
149 Cf Calabresi (n 139).  
150 Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Vol 5, Aspen Law & Business 1998). 
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Where Mf is the magnitude of the fine attached to the wrongful action. Pf is the probability 
that a fine will be inflicted on the injurer. D is the amount that the injurer will have to pay to 
compensate the victim. Pd is the probability that compensation will be due, and H is the harm 
suffered by the victim.  
A few key points should be noted. Firstly, this very general formulation is extremely flexible 
and can be adapted to a very diverse set of cases. A driver that is considering the opportunity 
of speeding will take into account both the expected fine and the expected liability from a 
possible accident, and hence (3.1) appropriately describes his incentives. Clearly, this is not 
always the case, as often no sanction is attached to a conduct that generates a tort. In these cases, 
the expected fine will be equal to zero and the total expected liability151 will be equal to the 
expected damages. Optimal deterrence will be achieved for Pd * D = H.
Secondly, the right hand of the equation represents the harm suffered by the victim, instead 
of the benefit gained by the injurer. In fact, if the only concern is to maximize overall efficiency, 
a certain conduct is desirable whenever the benefits are greater than the expected harm. If the 
expected liability of the injurer is exactly equal to the expected harm, he will engage in the 
activity if and only if its potential benefits are greater than that. The injurer will be able to 
compensate the victim, while still keeping some of the benefits derived from his conduct. In 
other words, it is at least potentially possible to achieve a Pareto improvement. That is, at least 
one person is better off, while no one is worse off.  
Thirdly, when Mf > 0 and Pf   > 0, neither the expected fine (Pf * Mf) nor the expected 
compensation (Pd * D) should be equal to the harm, but their sum should be. Notably this 
                                                          
151 The label total liability will be used to denote the sum of the fine and the damages. Similarly, total expected 
liability indicates the sum of the expected fine and the expected damages. 
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mathematical representation would be incomplete whenever a tort destroys resources, thus 
generating a deadweight loss152 (DWL) for the society. (3.1) becomes: 
Pf*Mf+ Pd*D =H + DWL                          (3.2) 
If the injurer is not induced to consider the deadweight loss, it will impose an externality on 
the society and engage in inefficient conducts. 
The condition imposed by (3.2) is necessary but not sufficient to maximize social welfare, 
especially in case of bilateral accidents. In order not to give victims excessive (or insufficient) 
incentives to sue (3.2) should be divided into the following equations: 
Pf * Mf = DWL (3.3) 
Pd*D = H (3.4) 
 (3.3) and (3.4) have to hold simultaneously. The reason to impose these additional conditions 
can be understood focusing on (3.4). In fact, if Pd * D > H the victim would potentially be better 
off if the accident takes place, and hence, he will have no incentives to take any precaution (and 
might even actively try to increase the probability of an accident). On the other hand, if Pd * D 
< H the victim is forced to internalize some of the expected losses caused by the injurer, thus 
will adopt an excessive level of care or a sub-optimal activity level. 
In other words, to induce both parties to behave optimally the expected fine should be equal 
to the deadweight loss caused by the conduct, while the expected compensation owed by the 
injurer should equal the expected damages. 
                                                          
152 In economics, a deadweight loss is a loss of efficiency caused by a sub-optimal state of the economy. Jerry A 
HDXVPDQµ([DFWConsumer's Surplus and Deadweight LRVV¶) 71 AER 662. 
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As stated above, if the only goal to be achieved is economic efficiency, the seminal paper by 
Becker implies that Pf should tend to zero, while the monetary fine should tend to infinity.153
At the same time, since Pd is strictly less than one, D should always exceed H. Such a solution 
might appear extreme, and in fact law and economics scholars have identified many reasons 
ZK\ %HFNHU¶V FODLP RQO\ ZRUNV XQGHU FHUWDLQ FRQGLWLRQV DQG XS WR D FHUWDLQ WKUHVKROG.154
+RZHYHUZLWKLQ FHUWDLQ OLPLWV %HFNHU¶V FODLP LVZLGHO\ UHJDUGHd as correct; therefore, an 
economist would not hesitate to call for higher sanctions whenever the probability of detection 
of a certain conduct is low. At the same time, it is dominant in the economic literature the idea 
that compensation should equal the harm times the inverse of the probability that compensation 
is due.155
2.2 Corrective Justice 
Just like deterrence theory, corrective justice has an illustrious tradition and its roots go as far 
as ancient Greece. Unlike deterrence theory, though, it is impossible to offer a description that 
would be accepted by all the scholars that consider it to be the corner stone of private law. For 
this reason, only the aspects that are relevant to the discussion at hand will be underlined. 
The most important characteristic of corrective justice is the connection between the two 
parties, and hence, its focus is invariably on binary relationships. Corrective justice inevitably 
deals with pairs of actors, generally labeled as the doer and the sufferer of an injustice. The 
pRVLWLRQRIWKHGRHUDQGWKHVXIIHUHUDUHLQH[WULFDEO\WLHGWRJHWKHUEHFDXVHµWKHGRLQJDQGWKH
VXIIHULQJRIDQLQMXVWLFHDUHWKHDFWLYHDQGSDVVLYHFRUUHODWHVRIHDFKRWKHU¶156 In other words 
                                                          
153 Cf Becker (n 143). 
154'DYLG)ULHGPDQDQG:LOOLDP6MRVWURPµ+DQJHG)RU$6KHHS7KH(FRQRPLFV2I0DUJLQDO'HWHUUHQFH¶
22 JLS 345. 
155 Cf Polinsky and Shavell (n 88). 
156 (UQHVW-:HLQULEµ7KH-XULGLFDO&ODVVLILFDWLRQRI2EOLJDWLRQV¶LQ3%LUNVHGThe Classification of Obligations 
(OUP 1997) 41. 
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the link between the doer and the sufferer is the most characteristic trait of corrective justice. 
In the second place, as Weinrib writes:  
µWKHSODLQWLII¶V>VXIIHUHU@VXLWLVDQDWWHPSWWRYLQGLFDWHDULJKWWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW
>GRHU@KDVXQMXVWO\ LQIULQJHG¶DQG WKHµUHPHG\UHFWLILHV WKH LQMXVWLFHDQG WKHUHE\
reflects iWVVWUXFWXUHDQGFRQWHQW¶157
A very important point is that rectification is considered to be aimed at undoing the wrong, 
therefore the remedy has to be a response to the factors that are constitutive of the injustice. To 
use Aristotle terminology, corrective justice aims at achieving fairness and equality and can be 
expressed in terms of equality of quantities, explicitly defined in mathematical terms by the 
philosopher. The equality should not be intended in a literal sense, but in a notional one. 
Equality consists in people having their own and the holdings of the parties prior to the 
interaction constitute the relevant baseline. In other words, before the interaction the doer (A) 
and the sufferer (B) will have a certain endowment that is assumed to reflect equality: 
ܣ ൌ ܤ (3.5)
After the interaction the doer will now have something that belongs to the sufferer, and hence: 
ܣ ൐ ܤ (3.6)
As stated above, corrective justice aims at righting the scales by bringing A and B in the 
situation described by (3.5). Furthermore, the victim should ideally be in the same situation in 
which she was before the interaction. We write: 
ͳൌͲൌͳൌͲ (3.7)
                                                          
157 Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice (n 146). 
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To denote that at the time t1, the sufferer should not only be equal to the doer at time t1, but 
should also be equal to herself at time t0. Notably, this equality cannot be considered merely 
referring to wealth, yet money has to be an - at least imperfect - substitute of the relevant 
variable. It would make very little sense to claim that the harm should be rectified by a wealth 
transfer if this was not the case. 
If money is not considered an (imperfect) substitute for the relevant variable, it becomes 
impossible to fit in the corrective justice framework the fact that in every developed legal 
system the largely predominant route taken by courts to compensate the sufferer is to attach a 
monetary value to the injustice. If the idea that tort law is shaped by corrective justice is 
defended, it should also be adopted the idea that wealth is the closest substitute of the relevant 
variable. It is possible to imagine a wide range of different remedies (e.g. the doer could be 
forced to work for the sufferer for a certain time or to provide a certain service), however if 
monetary compensation is the (quasi) universally accepted remedy it must be concluded that 
money is in fact the best substitute available for the relevant variable. 
Having defined the two main goals of tort law, the result produced by a probabilistic 
framework can be compared to the ones achieved by more traditional approaches. 
3. An Impossible Marriage? 
 
The first attempt at lessening the gap between corrective justice and deterrence was performed 
by Gary Schwartz.158 However, his work only created a small chink in the wall that separates 
the two theories. The central point raised by Weinrib in reply to Schwarz is that corrective 
                                                          
158 Cf  Schwartz (n 43). 
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justice is intrinsically focused on the binary relationship between the doer and the sufferer, 
whereas this relationship hardly has any relevance for deterrence theorists. In the words of 
Posner, it makes economic sense to take money from the defendant in order to induce him to 
take cost-MXVWLILHG SUHFDXWLRQV µbut that the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an 
HFRQRPLFVWDQGSRLQWDGHWDLO¶.159 Furthermore, deterrence theory introduces exogenous goals 
like loss spreading that are incompatible with the framework developed by corrective justice 
theorists.  
µIt seems that loss spreading is over-inclusive as a goal of tort law, and the idea that 
money should be exacted from some for the benefit of others in order to spread the 
burden of a catastrophic loss as lightly and as widely as possible is as pertinent to 
non-tortiouVLQMXU\DVWRDWRUWLRXVRQH¶160
 If the goal is to exploit the concept of diminishing marginal utility in order to maximize social 
welfare there is no reason to even introduce tort law. A combination of social insurance and 
progressive taxation appears to be more appropriate.161 From this perspective, the efficacy of 
tort law is strongly limited by the requirement of causation that is indeed heterogeneous to the 
idea of loss spreading. For instance, it could be argued that a centralized system of social 
insurance might be extremely cheaper in terms of administrative costs than the elephantine 
apparatus necessary to support tort law. At the same time, incentives could be preserved by 
calibrating insurance premiums on the level of risk of each individual. Given the focus on 
overall utility adopted by economists, it is paradoxical that only plaintiffs who are lucky enough 
to be harmed by a wealthy defendant do not have to bear a concentrated loss. A system of social 
insurance would be much more coherent as it allows every defendant to obtain compensation, 
                                                          
159 Cf Posner (n 94).  
160 Cf Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n 42) 37. 
161 Cf Calabresi (n 139). 
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not just the ones that were hit by deep pocketed injurers. Even if compensating every victim 
would result in only partial compensation - holding constant the total amount of compensation 
paid by the class of injurers - for the very principle of decreasing marginal utility social 
insurance should be favored by the same scholars who claim that tort law has to achieve loss-
spreading. 162  The burden of proving why tort law should be an appropriate mechanism to 
achieve loss spreading lies on law and economics scholars. 
These considerations lead Weinrib to write that: 
µThis difference does not preclude the two approaches from arriving at the same 
results. [however] concurrent results would not efface the theoretical differences 
that generated them. Nor, of course, would these results indicate the existence of a 
mixed theory. All we would have is a coincidence of results from two independent 
theories.¶163
In other words, deterrence would be an effect of the law, instead of being a cause. The door 
is opened to the possibility that corrective justice and deterrence theory, while incompatible in 
the way presented above, may still coexist as conceptually sequenced ideas. In the words of 
Weinrib: 
µIn this sequenced argument, corrective justice is prior to deterrence because it 
illuminates the nature of the wrongs that positive law deters. Deterrence is then 
necessary as a further element in this sequence by virtue of being implicated in the 
actualization of corrective justice through the legal institutions of positive law.¶164
                                                          
162 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, (n 139) 39±45. 
163 Cf Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice (n 44) 628.  
164 Ibid, 639.  
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Clearly this idea will hardly please deterrence theorists as this sequenced argument denies 
that deterrence has any relevance for the content of the norms themselves. As Weinrib himself 
admits:
µsituating deterrence within a conceptually ordered sequence that includes 
corrective justice affirms both corrective justice and deterrence without resolving 
the tension between them when each is claimed a ground of the norms.¶165
3.1 The Need for Corrective Justice  
 
To build a legal system on the theory of deterrence presupposes a series of assumptions that is 
hard to feel comfortable with. To mention a few: agents have to estimate the probability of 
every accident and the probability that their conducts are discovered. Furthermore, individuals 
need to be aware of the legal standards (that needs to be optimal as well) and they need to know 
the value of the expected fine. Although achieving a good level of deterrence still intuitively 
seems a desirable goal, the idea of optimal deterrence appears to be very far from reality. 
Moreover, the fact that every legal system takes very seriously the bilateral nature of the 
relationship between the doer and the sufferer can hardly be explained as a mere coincidence 
or as the cheapest way to achieve optimal deterrence. 
No matter how rooted is economic thought into oneself, it is very hard to contest that 
corrective justice offers a powerful explanation for the existing tort law. Most of the features of 
modern tort law seem to be perfectly explainable from a corrective justice standpoint and such 
theory provides a straightforward focal point around which policies can be shaped. At the same 
                                                          
165 Ibidem. 
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time, as correctly argued by Weinrib, corrective justice and deterrence cannot contemporarily 
determine the contents of the norms.166 Nevertheless, a piece of the puzzle is still missing. 
Corrective justice rests on two very strong assumptions: (i) the doer is identified and is 
actually held liable. There can be no corrective justice without compensation. In other words, 
for corrective justice to be achieved the probability that a certain conduct is discovered should 
tend to 1. (ii) The wrong does not destroy resources, only transfers them from the sufferer to 
the doer. ,Q$ULVWRWOH¶Vwork, a wrong implies a mere transfer of resources, not what is known 
in economics as a deadweight loss.167  Let us recall (3.2) and let us remember the conditions 
imposed by (3.3) and (3.4). 
Pf*Mf+ Pd*D =H + DWL                           (3.2) 
Pf * Mf = DWL                                              (3.3) 
Pd*D = H  (3.4) 
As the portion of the segment is merely transferred from one party to the other, DWL = 0.
Moreover, in order to achieve corrective justice the doer has to be held liable and damages have 
to be awarded, thus Pd = 1. Lastly, the compensation received has to equal the harm suffered. 
The equation (3.2) becomes D = H.
7KLVLVDGLIIHUHQWZD\WRUHVWDWH$ULVWRWOH¶VOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJLQWKHSDVVDJHFLWHGDERYHAE 
is equal to CD, and should be taken away from the doer and assigned again to the sufferer. 
Notably, under these assumptions also optimal deterrence is achieved. If the interaction 
between the doer and the sufferer takes place in an ideal world, corrective justice cannot be 
                                                          
166 Ibidem. 
167 $ULVWRWOHZULWHVµ/HWWKHOLQHV$$¶%%¶DQG&&¶EHHTXDOWRRQHDQRWKHUIURPWKHOLQH$$¶OHWWKHVHJPHQW
AE have been subtracted, and to WKHOLQH&&¶OHWWKHVHJPHQW&' have been added, VRWKDWWKHZKROHOLQH'&&¶
H[FHHGVWKHOLQH$(¶E\WKHVHJPHQW&'DQGWKHVHJPHQW&)WKHUHIRUHLWH[FHHGVWKHOLQH%%¶E\WKHVHJPHQW
CD. Cf Aristotle (n 90). 
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attained without achieving also optimal deterrence.168 It is important to be aware that in an ideal 
setting the two doctrines are perfectly compatible, as they lead to an identical outcome. 
It should be noted that while perfect corrective justice automatically implies optimal 
deterrence, the reverse does not hold. In fact, in an ideal world, optimal deterrence can be 
achieved for any suitable combination of Pd and D, whereas corrective justice requires Pd to be 
equal (or at least approaching) to one. As calibrating the relevant parameters in order to achieve 
corrective justice automatically implies that also optimal deterrence is achieved (whereas the 
opposite does not hold), it seems that the idea of conceptually sequenced arguments is the best 
compromise available. From this perspective, the conclusion drawn by Weinrib is correct: 
norms should be grounded solely on corrective justice considerations and deterrence only 
comes as a consequence of the norms and institution created in order to achieve corrective 
justice.  
Although this line of reasoning appears to be flawless, it points to the first rift in the castle 
erected by corrective justice theorists: social institutions that enforce the law are not perfect and 
come at a cost that is ultimately borne by each doer and each sufferer through their taxes. In the 
next section, the main problems created by an approach based exclusively on corrective justice 
will be examined. 
3.2 Shaping the Target: The Limits of Corrective Justice 
 
                                                          
168 It is important to note that in the ideal world described by economists the administrative costs are assumed to 
be equal to 0; therefore D = H is a satisfying equilibrium. Cf Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). 
Even if administrative costs are taken into account this solution would still minimize primary and secondary 
accident costs. The discrepancy between deterrence and corrective justice would be then limited to tertiary costs. 
For a definition of primary, secondary and tertiary costs cf /RXLV79LVVFKHUµTort Damages¶LQ0LFKDHO)DXUH
(ed), The Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (2nd ed, EE 2009). 
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Every work on corrective justice underlines the importance of the link between the doer and the 
sufferer on which the whole law of torts is based. Although the importance of this link is not 
questioned, there is something misguiding in the way it is usually worded. It is generally stated 
that such a link is created by the wrong, whereas it is more correct to state that the wrong is part 
of the link. 
A slightly modified version of an example offered by Aristotle can enlighten the difference: 
Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house and D a shoe. If A and B decide to trade C and 
D, a link is established. In the eyes of the philosopher, the bargain should be characterized by 
a proportionate requital. Only then the city can be held together. In fact, considerations of 
rectificatory justice arise in connection with both voluntary and involuntary transactions.169 In 
both cases the predominant trait is the link between the parties, and in both cases the goal is to 
achieve corrective justice. If there are no relevant constraints, the builder and the shoemaker 
will exchange their products only if neither of the two will be worse off. Therefore, the bargain 
will take place only if the builder and the shoemaker obtain something that they consider to be 
worth at least as much as the price they are paying.170 For obvious UHDVRQV $ULVWRWOH¶V
terminology does not coincide with the one usually employed in modern economics, yet 
conceptually he is not too distant from welfare economics. In fact, Aristotle writes: 
µ[that] demand holds things together as a single unit is shown by the fact that when 
men do not need one another, i.e. when neither needs the other or one does not need 
the other, they do not exchange.¶171
                                                          
169 Cf Aristotle (n 90). 
170 Aristotle includes gratitude, friendship etc. in the calculus. This approach is compatible with modern economic 
theory. 
171 Aristotle (n 90). 
35_Edle BW Romana.job
67 
 
 There is clearly no mention of Pareto efficiency, surplus from the trade, and all the 
terminology that is present on any modern economic textbook, yet the underlying idea seems 
to be very similar. Furthermore, Aristotle explicitly states that: 
µWRKDYHPRUHWKDQRQH¶VRZQLVFDOOHGJDLQLQJDQGWRKDYHOHVVWKDQRQH¶VRULJLQDO
share is called losing, e.g. in buying and selling and in all other matters in which 
the law has left people free to make their own terms.¶172
In other words, it is firmly rooted in Aristotle the idea that parties engaging in voluntary 
transactions can set the terms they consider to be better for them. The positive opinion that 
Aristotle has of voluntary trade suggests that parties who willingly engage in a transaction will 
opt for terms that imply a proportionate requital, thus keeping the city united. Given the 
importance that Aristotle attributes to the poleis173, to preserve voluntary transactions can be 
considered a priority. This conclusion is perfectly compatible with the principle of modern 
economics that any voluntary transaction leads to an increase in total welfare. 
Now let us assume there are only two builders in our polis, A and E, and that all the 
shoemakers need a house. Let us also assume that A and E stipulate a secret agreement to 
artificially raise the price of C in terms of D for all the shoemakers. The shoemakers are now 
forced to accept the terms imposed by A and E and to pay an excessive price. As the shoemakers 
are not free to make their own terms, these transactions are in the domain of what Aristotle calls 
involuntary transactions. If the link is FUHDWHGE\WKHµZURQJ¶corrective justice comes into play 
at this stage. Theoretically, the builders should be forced to return the surcharge to the 
shoemakers that have bought a house. Moreover, as suggested by basic economic theory, in 
order to raise the price the builders had to restrict the output, hence forcing some shoemakers 
                                                          
172 Ibidem. 
173 The poleis (sing. Polis) meanVFLWLHVLQ*UHHN,WLVWKHWHUPFRPPRQO\XVHGWRGHVFULEHWKHµFLW\-VWDWHV¶RIWKH
ancient Greece.  
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to sleep on the street. In this scenario, perfect corrective justice cannot be achieved. It is 
impossible for builders and shoemakers to return to the situation preceding the wrong. In fact, 
asking the builders to return their extra profits is not sufficient to compensate the shoemakers 
that were forced to sleep on the street. If A and E are simply asked to produce more houses and 
sell them to the homeless shoemakers, this would not repay them for the nights they spent on 
the street. Conversely, if the builders are forced to pay damages in addition, their situation 
would become worse than the initial one. To use Aristotle¶V terminology, it is impossible to 
satisfy the condition imposed by (3.7) simply because the sum of the segments is not the same 
before and after the interaction. In other words, whenever the sum of the segments is shortened 
the wrong cannot be undone. 
This conclusion is strengthened by looking at other accidents that destroy resources in a more 
evident way. Product liability or car accidents are prominent examples. A firm has very little to 
gain from a product that explodes in the hands of its customer causing a serious injury. It might 
be argued that the gain is the saving in precaution costs, yet it is a heroic claim that there is an 
equality of any sort between them and the harm. Similarly, monetary compensation cannot 
restore the initial situation. From this perspective, it makes very little sense to shape the law to 
achieve a goal that is beyond our reach. It would be much more interesting to develop a 
comprehensive theory to understand which deviations from the ideal corrective justice should 
be accepted. 
However the friction between the real world and corrective justice as intended by Aristotle is 
only an illusion. Aristotle¶V idea is that voluntary transactions create a binary link that is as 
strong as the one usually underlined by corrective justice theorists with regards to wrongs. The 
philosopher is suggesting that both voluntary and involuntary interactions create a binary 
relationship between the parties embracing the whole interaction, not just the wrong. To use the 
above mentioned example, the link between the consumer and the firm is created when the 
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defective product is purchased (voluntary interaction) and not when the product explodes 
(involuntary interaction) causing the harm. In the first part of the binary relationship justice is 
achieved through proportionate requital. The binary relationship between the parties is altered 
when the product explodes and the judge tries to equalize it. Yet, as a voluntary relationship 
appears to be way more desirable, not only for the society (polis) but also for the parties 
themselves, norms that will prevent voluntary relationships to be altered by involuntary 
interactions are desirable. In other words, it is not contested that corrective justice must be the 
starting point to understand tort law, nor it is being claimed that deterrence and corrective justice 
should simultaneously coexist in determining the content of the law. The idea of a conceptually 
sequenced argument that moves from corrective justice is accepted. 
However, instead of claiming that corrective justice and deterrence are lying on a straight 
line, it seems that they are lying on a circle. Norms should be shaped to guarantee that corrective 
justice is ensured (both voluntary and involuntary acts). However, as voluntary interactions are 
preferable - and involuntary transactions cannot always be corrected - norms should be created 
to avoid that voluntary interactions are altered by wrongs. In turn, these norms will affect the 
way in which wrongs are treated when they cannot be avoided. A clear example is precautionary 
PHDVXUHVDVWKH\LQWHUIHUHZLWKSDUWLHV¶LQWHUDFWLRQEHIRUHWKHZURQJDFWXDOO\WDNHVSODFH
Not only corrective justice and deterrence should both inform the norms, even though via a 
sequentially ordered argument, it seems that the one without the other is detached from reality. 
Deterrence theory cannot illuminate the connection between the parties and, without the cage 
of corrective justice, it leads to embrace exogenous goals that are heterogeneous and partially 
incompatible with the core characteristics of tort law. Corrective justice can illuminate how to 
handle voluntary and involuntary transactions; yet, it cannot take into account that the former 
are a value that should be preserved. 
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3.3 Equality of What? 
 
Until now a very obvious question has been intentionally avoided. In terms of what the parties 
should be considered equal? How can equality be restored if the object of this equality is not 
known? 
The reason why this question has not been answered is simple: it is irrelevant for this inquiry. 
No matter what the relevant variable is, the argument presented here still holds. To prove the 
point let us assume that equality is defined in terms of Kantian rights. Understood as a 
manifestation of .DQWLDQ¶VULJKts, private law protects rights and not welfare.174 According to 
Kant, rights are of two kinds: the right to bodily integrity and the right to external objects of the 
will.175 Moreover, the relevant gains and losses are normative, not factual176. In fact, by 
inducing one of the clients of her competitors to opt for her products a firm is causing a factual 
loss to her rival. However, as such loss is not normative in character it is of no interest for 
private law. Let us go back to our example of the defective product. In the framework developed 
by Kant, the firm realized a normative gain but no factual gain, whereas its customer suffered 
both a factual loss and a normative loss. Coherently with the idea of justice developed by the 
German philosopher, the focus is on the correlative normative gains and losses of the parties. 
Specifically, the normative loss of the victim consists in the violation of her right to bodily 
integrity, whereas the normative gain for the firm results from negligently injuring her. 
The only mean available to the court to correct the normative loss suffered by the plaintiff is 
to award monetary damages. Yet, it is very optimistic to assume that a certain amount of money 
                                                          
174 Cf Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason (n 141). 
175 Immanuel Kant (ed and trans Mary Gregor), The Metaphysics of Morals (CUP 1996, [1785]). 
176 Normative gains and losses refer to what one ought to have (as defined by the relevant norm), whereas factual 
gains and losses refer to what one factually had. Cf Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n 42). 
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is enough to restore the right to bodily integrity. Using economic jargon, money is not a perfect 
substitute of the right violated, otherwise bodily integrity would be tradable. More simply, 
money will not buy the plaintiff a new hand nor is it possible to define exactly the value of the 
one he has lost (as proven by the enormous variance in the compensations awarded for serious 
body injuries). In other words, as compensation can only happen through money - and money 
is not a perfect replacement for Kantian rights - the sum of the length of the two segments will 
inevitably be shorter after the product explodes. Corrective justice will therefore become 
impossible to achieve. The only way to achieve equality is to preserve the voluntary transaction, 
trying to avoid that it is altered by the involuntary interaction. This line of reasoning applies to 
any variable that is not a perfect substitute for money. 
Conversely, if equality is defined in terms of wealth (or as a perfect substitute) any interaction 
that destroys economic resources inevitably shortens the sum of the segments, thus making 
corrective justice impossible to achieve. 
 In short, for any choice of the relevant variable an involuntary transaction can shorten the 
size of the segments making perfect corrective justice unattainable. 
4. The µSecond Generation¶ Mixed Theories: Commonalities 
 
Following the path opened by Schwartz, new attempts have been made to accommodate 
corrective justice and deterrence. From this perspective, the theories advanced by Geistfeld and 
Chapman call for special attention and will be further investigated in this section. Although 
both authors advocate the idea that a mixed theory is inevitable, there are some important 
differences with the framework proposed in this work. 
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The most obvious point of contact between the framework developed here and the theories 
advanced by Geistfeld177 and Chapman178 is the idea that corrective justice and deterrence not 
only can coexist, but that they ought to.179
Building on the sophisticated tools of social choice, Chapman takes a step further and tries to 
suggest concrete ways to accommodate the two allegedly heterogeneous goals. More 
importantly, Chapman suggests the adoption of a conceptually sequenced argument, thus it 
seems that no relevant friction exists with the framework developed here.180 Similarly, Geistfeld 
recognizes the µsymbiotic relationship¶ between economic analysis and normative principles, 
demonstrating how the former is often needed to give a practical and concrete meaning to the 
latter.181 It is also correctly underlined how the need to incorporate deterrence concerns is 
strengthened by the imperfect compensatory mechanisms available to the courts. 
4.1 The µSecond Generation¶ Mixed Theories: Differences 
 
Moving from the idea of path dependency,182 Geistfeld tries to address the most fundamental 
objection raised by moral philosophers: the structure of tort law system hardly seems the 
optimal choice to minimize accident costs and hence it cannot be considered coherent with the 
goal of optimal deterrence. It would be very puzzling, or so they say, to pursue a goal by creating 
something that is inappropriate for the task. 
                                                          
177 Cf Geistfeld (2001) (n 43).  
178 Cf Chapman (n 43). 
179 Cf Geistfeld (2009) (n 43). 
180 Cf Chapman (n 43). 
181 Ibidem. 
182 Path dependency implies that our choice depends not only on where we are now, but also upon where we were 
in tKHSDVW&IDPRQJWKHRWKHUV3DXO'DYLGµ&OLRDQGWKH(FRQRPLFVRI4:(57<¶$(5
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The answer provided by Geistfeld can be divided in two parts: (i) although an omniscient 
legislator concerned with efficiency might adopt a different solution if he could start from zero, 
behind the structure of tort law there are historical reasons that justify its existence; (ii) it is 
possible to offer an interpretation of tort law in terms of economic efficiency.183
With regards to the first claim Geistfeld argues that: 
µthe tort system was initially designed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to 
implement corrective justice for cases in which the defendant criminally injured the 
SODLQWLII«>KRZHYHU@ OHJDO GHFLVLRQPDNHUV UHMHFWHG QDWXUDO-law justifications in 
favor of more pragmatic, iQVWUXPHQWDOLVWMXVWLILFDWLRQV«7KHWRUWV\VWHPFRXOGQRW
wholly reject its corrective origins in favor of an overtly instrumentalist approach, 
as any change in judicial decision-making is constrained by the requirements of 
stare decisis.¶184
This historical description is certainly accurate, yet a few caveats should be made. Firstly, 
introducing some regulatory purposes into the picture does not automatically lead to accident 
costs minimization.185 Secondly, assigning such central role to stare decisis appears to be in 
sharp contrast with the evidence from legal systems in which precedents are not binding, as 
they cling more on corrective justice than common law countries. In other words, either civil 
law countries have developed equally effective means to preserve the uniformity of the law 
over time, or there had to be another reason not to abandon corrective justice. Notably, 
accepting the former explanation, the enormous body of economic literature underlining the 
wonders of stare decisis would lose much of its credibility.186 However, even admitting that the 
                                                          
183 Cf Geistfeld (2001) (n 43). 
184 Ibid, 254. 
185 Ibidem. 
186 Cf -RQDWKDQ50DFH\µ,QWHUQDODQG([WHUQDO&RVWVDQG%HQHILWVRI6WDUH'HFLVLV¶ Chi Kent L Rev 93. 
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distinguishing role of stare decisis has been systematically overstated,187 there would still be 
no explanation for the persistence of corrective justice over the centuries. An alternative 
justification could be introduced by abandoning the extremely reductionist approach typical of 
welfare economics and by allowing holism to play a part. In order to introduce this justification 
it is necessary to briefly sketch out the centuries old debate between holists and reductionists. 
4.1.1. Reductionism 
 
There is no univocal definition of methodological individualism188and the crucial ambivalence 
is whether the explanantia of social phenomena has to be found in individuals alone or in 
individuals plus relations between individuals.189 According to Popper,190 methodological 
individualism rightly insists that the µEHKDYLRU¶ and the µDFWLRQV¶ of collectives must be reduced 
to the behavior and the actions of human individuals. The use of the term µreduced¶ implies that 
according to a methodological individualist the goal of social science should consist exclusively 
of statements about individuals.191 Societies can be considered an aggregation of individuals 
and hence welfare maximization (or accident costs minimizations) can be achieved through the 
maximization of private welfares aggregated according to the relevant criteria. Let us now 
accept the conjecture advanced by Kaplow and Shavell that welfare functions can be all-
HQFRPSDVVLQJDQGLQFOXGHHYHU\IDFHWRILQGLYLGXDOV¶ZHOIDUH192 It follows that any conception 
RI MXVWLFH WKDW LV QRW FRKHUHQWZLWK WKH JRDO RIPD[LPL]LQJ WKH DJJUHJDWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶
welfare should not be pursued. As the debate between moral theorists and economists emerged 
                                                          
187 Cf 8JR0DWWHLDQG5REHUWR3DUGROHVLµ/DZDQG(FRQRPLFVLQ&LYLO/DZ&RXQWULHV$&RPSDUDWLYH$SSURDFK¶
(1991) 11 IRLE 265 DQG:RUDERRQ/XDQUDWDQDDQG$OHVVDQGUR5RPDQRµ6WDUH'HFLVLVLQWKH:720\WK'UHDP
or a 6LUHQ¶V Song? (2014) 48 JWT 773. 
188 OQWKLVUHJDUG6WHYHQ/XNHVµ0HWKRGRORJLFDO,QGLYLGXDOLVP5HFRQVLGHUHG¶%-6-RKQ2
1HLOO
Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (Heinemann Educational 1973); Lars Udehn, Methodological 
Individualism: Background, History and Meaning (RoutlHGJH,'µ7KH&KDQJLQJ)DFHRI0HWKRGRORJLFDO
,QGLYLGXDOLVP¶$56 479. 
189 *HRIIUH\0+RGJVRQµ0HDQLQJVRI0HWKRGRORJLFDO,QGLYLGXDOLVP¶-(0
190 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge 1945). 
191 Cf Hodgson (n 184). 
192 Kaplow and Shavell (n 41). 
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exactly because corrective justice and welfare maximization lead to divergent conclusions, 
corrective justice has no reason to exist in a reductionist world. However, almost every legal 
system assigns a prominent role to corrective justice.   
4.1.2. Holism 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, proposers of what Phillips calls Holism 2, advocate the five 
theses of organicism:  
µ(i) The analytic approach as typified by the physico-chemical sciences proves 
LQDGHTXDWHZKHQDSSOLHGWRFHUWDLQFDVHV«ii) the whole is more of the sum of its 
parts, (iii) the whole determines the nature of its parts, (iv) the parts cannot be 
understood if considered in isolation from the whole, (v) the parts are dynamically 
interrelated or interdependent.¶193
Moreover, even after a whole is studied, it cannot be explained in terms of its parts. From the 
perspective of an organicist, individuals are only a part of the whole society, thus it is not 
possible to gain any understanding of the individuals if we do not have knowledge about society 
as whole. The main claim is that merHO\ DJJUHJDWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ZHOIDUH GRHV QRW SURYLGH
exhaustive information on the welfare of a society considered as a whole. An economist will 
probably perceive this claim as absurd given the dominance of welfare economics. At the same 
time, some social scientists might even consider this claim to be dangerous due to the gross 
PLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDWWRWDOLWDULDQVWDWHVPDGHRI+HJHO¶V194 DQG*LHUNH¶V195 theories respectively 
on ethical state and human groups. 
                                                          
193 Denis C Phillips, Holistic Thought in Social Science (SUP 1976) 6. 
194 Georg W F Hegel (Trans J V Miller), The Phenomenology of Spirit (OUP 1977 [1807]).  
195 Otto von Gierke, Das Wesen der Meschlichen Verbände (Duncker & Humblot 1902). 
39_Edle BW Romana.job
76 
 
However, holistic thought is a fundamental component of most sciences. Beside historical 
reasons, there seems to be little justification to rule out a priori its relevance in a context where 
wholes (human societies) are extremely complex. Admitting the possibility that social welfare 
is not a mere aggregDWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOV¶ZHOIDUHRSHQVWKHGRRUWRWKHK\SRWKHVLVWKDWDFRQFHSW
of justice embedded in the society has an independent value. On the one hand, this would 
explain why corrective justice has not been abandoned by courts in any country, regardless of 
the existence of stare decisis. On the other hand, despite the attempts made by Kaplow and 
Shavell196 WRRIIHU DQ µanti-darwinist¶197 explanation of legal systems evolutions, it explains 
why the concept of justice has been present in one form or another in every human society. 
The third and more fundamental concern raised by *HLVWIHOG¶V WKHRU\ regards the causes 
underlying the µORFN-LQ¶ effect created by tort law.198 Geistfeld argues that: 
µEven if it would be cost-effective to change regulatory institutions, that change 
must be legislatively implemented. The various costs that individuals or groups 
would incur to the displacement of the tort system give them a substantial incentive 
for forming interests groups to defeat such legislation.¶199
However, interest groups are usually well organized by people with strong gains from 
particular government actions.200 To introduce the possibility that the macro-system ± tort law 
as a whole ± exists as a response to lobbying, implies that also the single norms composing the 
macro-system were implemented and are defended due to interest JURXSV¶ SUHVVXUH
                                                          
196 Cf Kaplow and Shavell (n 41). 
197 :LWKWKHWHUPµDQWL-GDUZLQLVW¶WKHDXWKRUVLQWHQGWKDWWKHHYROXWLRQDU\SURFHVVV\VWHPDWLFDOO\UHVXOWHGLQWKH
inferior outcome of societies based on fairness concerns. A devastating criticism to this argument on completely 
different grounds is advanced by Jules Coleman. Cf JuOHV/&ROHPDQµ7KH*URXQGVRI:elfare: Fairness Versus 
:HOIDUH¶</-
198 7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIKLVPHWDSKRURIWKHµFXUY\URDG¶VKRXOGQRWEHRYHUHVWLPDWHGVLQFHLWVLPSO\SURYHVWKDW
some costs are associated to every change.
199 Cf Geistfeld (2001) (n 43). 
200 Cf Mancur Jr Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (HUP 1971, 
revised edition). 
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Furthermore, interest groups also actively promote the implementation of legal rules that might 
favor them, instead of merely engaging in defensive lobbying.201 Lastly, it is well established 
that it is easier to organize pressure to address a specific and narrow issue than to promote a 
widespread interest like the preservation of tort law as a whole.202 In fact, the number of parties 
concerned is bound to be relatively smaller and their interests are likely to be more 
homogeneous. 
These hypotheses rule out what is left of cost minimization concerns. Tort law is described 
as a mean to protect the interests of the most powerful and better organized interests groups. 
Paradoxically, the historical account described by Geistfeld leads to a mixed theory between 
corrective justice and the Marxian idea that law is merely a mean to protect dominant classes 
(or powerful interest groups). 
5. Probability and the Goals of Tort Law 
 
The aim of the previous sections was to accommodate the two goals of tort law within the 
traditional deterministic framework. In this section, it will be shown that relaxing the 
assumption on the deterministic nature of the world strengthens the claim that deterrence and 
corrective justice cannot be treated as mutually exclusive.  
In order to understand why, let us recall that there is only one definition of harm that is 
compatible with a world in which the demon has been defeated. As in a probabilistic world 
even the most remote risk has a positive probability of materializing, the harm must be 
represented by the reduction in the ex-ante probabilities of not getting harmed. As shown in 
chapter IIIDVWDWHPHQWRIWKHNLQGµ,KDYHEHHQKDUPHGEHFDXVHWKHLQMXUHUKDVEHHQ QHJOLJHQW¶
                                                          
201 Ibidem. 
202 Ibidem. 
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is incorrect. 7KHRQO\SRVVLEOHVWDWHPHQWLVµsince the injurer has been negligent, my ex-ante 
probability of not gHWWLQJKDUPHGKDYHEHHQUHGXFHG¶. However, once this conception of harm 
is embraced, the chimera of the non-Aristotelian version of corrective justice becomes even 
more elusive. 
Given the definition of harm adopted in this thesis, the pure probabilistic approach is the only 
one that satisfies the requirements of corrective justice. In other words, if a traditional legal 
scholar is to defend the concept of corrective justice in a probabilistic world, he also has to 
accept that the emergence of material harm must be totally irrelevant to the law. If the pollution 
of firm A reduces the probability that a victim has of not contracting the disease D, then the 
victim should be entitled to compensation regardless of the fact that she might actually not 
contract the disease. Furthermore, also the amount of compensation owed to the victim would 
be identical in the case in which she contracts the disease and in the case in which she does not.   
Besides being unworkable, this conclusion is probably unacceptable for most legal scholars. 
No legal system treats exactly in the same way a victim who has suffered a material harm and 
an individual who did not suffer any harm in the traditional sense. Therefore, as a complete 
surrender to the demon comes at a too high price, deterrence is needed to minimize the departure 
from perfect corrective justice.  
6. Conclusions 
 
µFor we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, 
since otherwise, our inquiry would have been of no use¶
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics book II
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For over two millennia corrective justice has been the foundation of tort law, and private law 
in general. Most instrumentalist approaches that are so much à la mode, pursue goals that are 
in contrast with the basic features of tort law, and hence appear inadequate to offer a 
comprehensive account of its characteristics. 
No theory has been developed that can replace corrective justice, and no satisfying 
explanation has yet been offered on how it could coexist with deterrence. 
The idea of pure corrective justice is surely very appealing, yet it appears to be of little use, 
because involuntary interactions tend to irremediably alter the equality between parties. 
Similarly, enforcement is far from perfect. In this vein, it should not be neglected that Aristotle¶V
inquiry was practical in nature. He did not aim to develop a framework to achieve justice in an 
ideal world but to improve the concrete one he was facing. By disregarding that the probability 
of compensation will very rarely be close to one and that the complete undoing of a wrong is 
often impossible, Aristotle ethics is transformed into something completely abstract. 
Corrective justice is fundamental to underline the link between the parties and to offer an 
account of the main features of tort law. However, it completely ignores the fact that voluntary 
transactions are a value that should be protected. Not to maximize social welfare or to spread 
losses, but to preserve a just interaction between the parties. 
Corrective justice and deterrence should therefore be considered conceptually sequenced 
ideas. However, they appear to be lying on a circle, instead of a straight line. Not only corrective 
justice and deterrence should both inform the norms, even though through a sequentially 
ordered argument, it also seems that one without the other is detached from reality. 
On the one hand, deterrence theory cannot illuminate the connection between the parties and, 
without the beneficial influence of corrective justice, it tends to include exogenous goals that 
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are heterogeneous and partially incompatible with the core characteristics of tort law. On the 
other hand, corrective justice is extremely hard to achieve in a probabilistic world, while it 
ignores that voluntary transactions are a value that should be preserved. 
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IV. The Hidden Demon and Credit Rating Agencies
1. Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this work, it has been claimed that the deterministic demon has very subtle 
ways of impairing the function of a legal system. From this perspective, Credit Rating Agencies 
represent an interesting example of the threats associated to a deterministic mindset. Many U.S. 
courts have placed CRAs under the umbrella of the first amendment on the freedom of speech203
WKXV LPSO\LQJ WKDW UDWLQJV µPXVW EH SURYDEOH DV IDOVH EHIRUH OLDELOLW\ FDQ EH DVVHVVHG.¶204
However, as it will be argued in this chapter, this standard is unworkable for the kind of 
probabilistic predictions issued by rating agencies. The reason is simple: unless an event is 
given 100% probability, a probabilistic prediction cannot be falsified by observing the single 
factual outcome. Obviously, we should still not accept as true any probabilistic claim. For 
instance, it could be argued that Italian athletes have 99% chances of winning a gold medal in 
every competition during Olympic Games. This statement is very likely to be false, yet 
observing any single contest in which an Italian athlete did not win the gold medal is not enough 
to disprove it. 
Similarly, it is not surprising that Courts cannot infer the falsity of ratings by assessing the 
specific case at hand. However, the more the number of observations approaches infinity the 
more it is possible to discriminate between true and false probabilistic claims. To have absolute 
certainty (or to prove beyond any reasonable doubt to use legal terminology) the number of 
observations should indeed be infinity.  This threshold is relevant in criminal cases; whereas 
for CRAs it aSSOLHV WKHPXFKOHVVGHPDQGLQJµpreponderance of evidence¶ test (at most the 
                                                          
203 Cf for example Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc., 175 F.3d, 848-
 WK&LU  DIILUPLQJ WKDW µ7KH)LUVW$PHQGPHQW SURWHFWV 6	3¶V SUHSDUDWLRQ DQG SXEOLFDWLRQ RI LWV
UDWLQJV¶
204 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S.1 (1990) and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v. Hepps, 755 U.S. 767. 
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relevant test could bHFRQVLGHUHGWKHµstandard of clear and convincing HYLGHQFH¶). It follows 
that rDWLQJVFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGµIDOVH¶ during a civil case if over a sufficiently large number of 
observations the materialized outcome is far enough from the probabilistic predictions. 
In a recent case, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Sixth District stated that: 
‘We find no basis upon which we could conclude that the credit rating itself 
communicates any provably false factual connotation. Even if we could draw any 
fact-based inferences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven false 
EHFDXVHRIWKHLQKHUHQWO\VXEMHFWLYHQDWXUHRI0RRG\¶VUDWLQJVFDOFXODWLRQ.¶205
The emphasis on the word subjective is misguiding, as it should be placed on the probabilistic 
nature of the predictions offered by CRA. Although discussing every implication of the debate 
on the First Amendment lies outside the scope of this work,206 it must be noted that it is 
symptomatic of a deterministic mindset applied to an inherently probabilistic problem. As soon 
as we stop trying to assess the quality of ratings using deterministic categories (i.e. was the 
single rating true or false?) new paths to regulate CRAs activities are uncovered. In this chapter, 
it will be shown that a probabilistic approach can provide better incentives to CRAs thus 
increasing social welfare.  
2. Credit Rating Agencies 
 
The behavior of credit rating agencies (henceforth CRAs) has been under careful scrutiny in 
the past decade, particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. It has been argued 
that the incentives of CRAs are adversely affected by an inherent conflict of interest determined 
                                                          
205 Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs. Inc., 499 F. 3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2007). 
206 For an accurate description on this regard cf &DOHE'HDWVµ7DON7hat Isn't Cheap: Does the First Amendment 
3URWHFW&UHGLW5DWLQJ$JHQFLHV
IDXOW\0HWKRGRORJLHVIURP5HJXODWLRQ"¶&/5
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E\WKHµissuer-pays model¶207 and by the licensing power that financial regulations relying on 
ratings implicitly grant to CRAs.208 In this perspective, ratings are inflated209 either because 
issuers collude with CRAs in fooling investors or because, all else being equal, investors 
demand assets with higher ratings in order to enjoy regulatory benefits. Inflated ratings, the 
argument runs, support asset bubbles, which are in turn a major determinant of financial 
crises.210 Although the exact contribution of ratings to the global financial crisis is not 
discussed, following the mainstream literature it is assumed that accurate ratings are valuable 
for the society, whereas inflated ratings may reduce welfare, particularly when ratings have 
regulatory relevance.211
It is acknowledged that ratings are ultimately predictions and thus they can be as accurate as 
our ability to forecast the future can be. This observation has important consequences on how, 
in this chapter, it is argued that the incentives of CRAs should be policed. CRAs should be in 
principle allowed to choose how much to commit to the accuracy of their prediction, if to 
commit at all. That being said, a rating is defined as inaccurate if the implied predictions is not 
borne out by the actual unfolding of events. To simplify, a rating with a certain letter grade (for 
example Double-A+) is inaccurate if the frequency of default of firms or bonds with that letter 
grade is higher or lower respectively than the maximum (for example 0.0006) and the minimum 
                                                          
207 Krugman (n 45). 
208 As noted by Opp, Opp and Harris if regulatory benefits of high ratings are above a certain threshold, a rating 
DJHQF\µILQGVLWSURILWDEOHWRVWRSDFTXLULQJDQ\LQIRUPDWLRQDQGPHUHO\IDFLOLWDWHVUHJXODWRU\DUELWUDJHWKURXJK
UDWLQJLQIODWLRQ¶2SS2SSDQG+DUULVQ47) 47. 
209 The idea that ratings are inflated generally accepted both by legal scholars and economists. One notable 
exception is a study by Gorton and Ordoñez (2014) citing inter alia the study by Park (2011). This study, however, 
does not deny that the triple-A subprime-related securities turned out to be riskier than implied by their initial 
rating. Rather, their point is that few of these securities actually defaulted and that the losses stemming from such 
defaults were quantitatively small (too small to justify a global financial crisis. Cf Gary Gorton and Guillermo 
2UGRxH] µ&ROODWHUDO &ULVHV¶   $(5  6XQ <RXQJ 3DUN µ7KH 6L]H RI WKH 6XESULPH 6KRFN¶
(Unpublished manuscript, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 2011). 
210 &KDUOHV:&DORPLULVµ7KH6XESULPH7XUPRLO:KDW¶V2OG:KDW¶V1HZDQG :KDW¶V1H[W¶-6)
211Among the others, cf 3DWULFN%ROWRQ;DYLHU)UHL[DVDQG-RHO6KDSLURµ7KH&UHGLW5DWLQJV*DPH¶
JF 85. 
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(for example 0.0002) probability of default associated with the letter grade.212 There is rating 
inflation when the frequency of defaults turns out to be higher than the upper bound on the 
predicted probability of default.213 A rating is accurate when the defaults actually observed for 
a given class of rating fall within the range of probabilities and other measurable items (for 
instance, loss given default) implied by the CRA issuing a certain letter grade.214
In this chapter, it is argued that the accuracy of ratings can be improved via regulatory 
intervention, particularly by introducing a special liability rule for CRAs. This approach has 
been little explored by the literature. Apparently, a more straightforward solution to the problem 
of rating inflation could be based on eliminating its determinants by regulation. In this vein, all 
references to credit ratings could be scrapped from financial regulation in order to eliminate the 
regulatory benefits from high ratings.215 This is, incidentally, the approach chosen by the U.S. 
legislation with the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.216 Likewise, it could be argued along with a 
number of commentators217 that the issuer-pays model of CRAs remuneration is simply to be 
prohibited in order to eradicate the conflict of interests. 
                                                          
212 7KHH[DPSOHLVWDNHQIURP)LWFK¶VKLVWRULFDODQQXDOL]HGGHIDXOWH[SHULHQFHCf Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek 
anG(ULN6WDIIRUGµ7KH(FRQRPLFVRI6WUXFWXUHG)LQDQFH¶-(3
213 For a formal definition of rating inflation, see section 5 of this chapter. 
214 In this chapter, it is considered also the opposite reason of inaccuracy, namely rating deflation. However, for 
the reasons discussed in section 4, addressing this problem is not so interesting for policymaking. Under the status 
quo, where CRAs hardly face any liability, CRAs always have incentives to inflate ratings. Introducing liability 
may induce CRAs to systematically underrate financial assets. However, at some point this strategy would make 
ratings uninteresting for issuers and investors. Section 5.2 explicitly discusses why inducing CRAs to be 
moderately conservative with ratings is desirable, particularly in the case of structured finance products. 
215 Cf 0DUN-)ODQQHU\-RHO)+RXVWRQDQG)UDQN3DUWQR\µ&UHGLW'HIDXOW6ZDS6SUHDGV$V9LDEOH6XEVWLWXWHV
IRU&UHGLW5DWLQJV¶UPLR 2085. They argue that Credit Default Swap could to a certain extent replace 
ratings for regulatory purposes.  
216 Section 939A of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act) requires 
each Federal agency to remove references to credit rating. The implementation of this provision has proven 
difficult, although major agencies like the Federal Reserve Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
have ultimately found ways to issue the necessary regulations. The approach in the EU has been different. While 
EU legislation also aims at reducing over-reliance on ratings (see the Capital Requirements Directive IV and the 
recent Regulation 462/2013 and Directive 2013/14/EU on credit ratings), it explicitly acknowledges that financial 
regulation cannot simply do away with ratings in the absence of viable alternatives. 
217 Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet advocate the introduction of a new business model for CRAs that they call 
platform-pays model. Cf Jerome Mathis, James McAndrews and Jean-&KDUOHV5RFKHWµ5DWLQJWKH5DWHUV$UH
Reputation Concerns PRZHUIXO(QRXJKWR'LVFLSOLQH5DWLQJ$JHQFLHV"¶-0(2WKHUDOWHUQDWLYHV
are explored in John C Jr Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2006). 
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As straightforward as they may sound, these radical proposals of regulatory intervention are 
too farfetched. Rating agencies play a crucial role in helping to overcome information 
asymmetries not only between issuers and investors, but also between the latter and financial 
regulators. In the absence of viable alternatives to assess creditworthiness and credit risk, it is 
at least doubtful that financial regulation could just do without ratings.218 Similarly, the public 
good nature of ratings ± the use of ratings does not diminish their availability to others; and 
investors who do not pay for ratings can hardly be excluded from their use ± might frustrate the 
attempt to introduce a workable alternative to the issuer-pays model.219 More importantly, 
moving away from the issuer-pays model would not solve the problem so long as regulatory 
benefits are present. Because at least some regulated investors demand high ratings irrespective 
of their informativeness, switching to an investor-pays model is unlikely to stop rating inflation. 
Abandoning the realm of radical reforms, even more modest changes of the status quo 
proposed so far seem to suffer from serious drawbacks. For example, let us consider two of the 
most popular incremental reforms in the policy debate. One proposal is to increase competition 
between CRAs.220 The other is to increase the transparency of their ratings.221 Both reforms aim 
at reducing the ability of CRAs to collude with issuers or investors to generate inflated ratings. 
However, competition between CRAs is set to make matters worse because of the practice of 
so-FDOOHGµUDWLQJVKRSSLQJ¶. Because issuers can solicit222 as many ratings as they wish but pay 
for rating only if they request publication, more competition between CRAs may actually result 
in more rating inflation.223 To be sure, rating shopping could be prohibited, for example by 
                                                          
218 Cf Coffee, Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (n 48). 
219 )UDQN3DUWQR\µ7KH6LVNHODQG(EHUWRI)LQDQFLDOPDUNHWV7ZR7KXPEV'RZQIRUWKH&UHGLW5DWLQJ$JHQFLHV¶
(1999) 77 WULQ 619. 
220 Cf Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit-Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective (n 48). 
221 Cf Pagano and Volpin (n 46). 
222 In this chapter, unsolicited ratings, which typically concern sovereign issuers, are not discussed. 
223 %HFNHUDQG0LOERXUQVKRZWKDWµLQFUHDVHGFRPSHWLWLRQ from Fitch coincides with lower quality ratings from 
the incumbents: Rating levels went up, the correlation between ratings and market-implied yields fell, and the 
DELOLW\ RI UDWLQJV WR SUHGLFW GHIDXOW GHWHULRUDWHG¶ Cf %R %HFNHU DQG 7RGG 0LOERXUQ µ+RZ 'id Increased 
&RPSHWLWLRQ$IIHFW&UHGLW5DWLQJV"¶-)(
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requiring issuers to pay for ratings in advance224 and CRAs to disclose also unfavorable ratings. 
This solution may not solve the problem of implicit rating shopping, though, as issuers could 
OHDUQWKH&5$V¶DVVHVVPHQWLQIRUPDOO\EHIRUHHQWHULQJLQWRDFRQWUDFWZLWKWKHP.225 At the same 
time, forcing issuers to pay for ratings without knowing their contents may generate moral 
hazard. If CRAs can save on their costs after having secured an income independent of their 
assessment, eventually this would lead to the collapse of the market for ratings.226
The economic literature on CRAs has been so far unable to identify a workable policy, 
whether radical or incremental, that could ameliorate the incentive problems leading to rating 
inflation. However, the problem is in principle a simple one to solve: CRAs should earn market 
profits from producing accurate ratings but be punished if they produce inflated ratings, at least 
inasmuch as this behavior results in negative externalities to society. Since Coase227and 
Calabresi,228 law and economics identifies in the legal liability one of the instruments for 
policing incentives to produce negative externalities. In the presence of negative externalities, 
liability can improve welfare if transaction costs are sufficiently high to prevent market forces 
from coping with the problem. In the context of CRAs, transaction costs are high when 
reputational concerns are insufficient to stop the production of inflated ratings. However, 
because this is a classic commitment problem, it can be improved by appropriate enforceable 
contracts,229 including liability for ratings that turn out to be inaccurate. In this case, CRAs 
should be able to choose how much exposure to liability is necessary to commit to levels of 
accuracy that investors (and thus issuers) find acceptable to sustain a market for ratings. The 
situation is different when reputation is not just insufficient to commit CRAs to a level of 
                                                          
224 This is the essence of the so-called Cuomo Plan, named after the New York State Attorney General who 
proposed this approach. As noted by Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro, this approach does not eliminate rating shopping 
in the absence of an explicit obligation to disclose also unfavorable ratings.  Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211) 
225 Cf Pagano and Volpin (n 46).  
226 Cf Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211). 
227 5RQDOG+&RDVHµ3UREOHPRI6RFLDO&RVW¶-/(
228 Cf Calabresi (n 139). 
229 Robert D Cooter and Thomas S Ulen, Law and Economics (6th ed, Addison-Wesley 2011). 
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accuracy of their choice, but is displaced altogether by the ability of CRAs to support regulatory 
arbitrage, for instance because investing in a Triple-A asset of whatever creditworthiness brings 
regulatory benefits. In this situation, it is impossible to put the Coase Theorem back to work. 
On the one hand, CRAs are unambiguously better off opting out of any liability. On the other 
hand, those who suffer from inflated ratings (for example unregulated investors fooled by high 
ratings; or taxpayers bearing the cost of bailouts) can hardly negotiate with CRAs a commitment 
to accurate ratings even if that would improve welfare. In this case, the market is unable to 
correct the negative externalities problem. Hence, regulation should set a minimum degree of 
exposure to liability as a condition for ratings to enjoy regulatory relevance. 
In this chapter, the introduction of a simple and legally workable strict liability rule is 
advocated to improve the incentives of rating agencies: CRAs should be liable to pay damages 
whenever a bond or a company they rate defaults. This is different from the approach taken by 
regulation on both sides of the Atlantic in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. While in 
the US and, more recently, in the EU, CRAs have been subject to liability based on negligence 
(if not gross negligence or even intent),230 it is suggested that CRAs should face strict liability 
with three strong limitations. First, damage compensation should be capped at a multiplier of 
WKH&5$¶VLQFRPH6HFRQGOLDELOLW\VKRXOGRSHUDWHZLWKDWLPHIUDPHDSWWRVKLHOG&5$VIURP
systemic risk. Third, at least in the absence of regulatory benefits, CRAs should be able to 
decide how much to commit to their ratings by choosing a certain degree of liability exposure.  
                                                          
230 In the U.S., the exemption of CRAs from liability as experts pursuant to Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933 was removed in 2010 (see Dodd-Frank Act § 939G). As a result, CRAs are currently subject to liability 
under a due diligence standard provided that they are named as experts in the prospectus, which they can and do 
refuse. Cf Coffee, Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (n 48). On this side of the Atlantic, a EU-
wide liability of CRAs was only introduced in µ:KHUHDFUHGLWUDWLQJDJHQF\KDVFRPPLWWHGLQWHQWLRQDOO\
or with gross negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating, an 
investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to it due to that 
LQIULQJHPHQW¶DUWD5HJ(&QRDVDPHQGHGE\DUW5HJ(8QR
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These limitations are set in order to avoid crushing liability. Crushing liability deters a socially 
valuable activity, like the production of accurate ratings, by imposing on the actor subject to it 
a liability in excess to the harm that it causes to the society. A rule of strict liability would be 
crushing for CRAs if they were liable for more than their revenues from selling ratings that are 
as accurate as possible, given the limits of the existing forecasting models as reflected by the 
chosen level of commitment. Likewise, crushing liability would stem from correlated defaults 
requiring CRAs to pay damages, however capped. For simplicity, these correlated defaults are 
called systemic risk. Systemic risk cannot be insured and, because CRAs are effectively silent 
about systemic risk, they should not be responsible for it.231
In other words, a strict liability rule leads CRAs to produce more accurate ratings under the 
three limitations sketched out above. To begin with, the damages are capped based on the 
income from rating divided by the highest probability of default associated with the letter grade 
of the defaulted asset. This condition is sufficient to disallow profits from rating inflation 
without discouraging ratings altogether. More precisely, CRAs facing this strict liability make 
no loss conditional on the absence of rating inflation as revealed by the difference between the 
predicted default rate and the actual frequency of defaults. 
Moreover, a correction is introduced to protect CRAs from defaults depending on systemic 
risk. Two different approaches for corporate bonds and for structured finance products are 
needed, because they have a very different exposure to systemic risk. Corporate defaults tend 
to be strongly correlated only in the medium to long term. Therefore, as far as corporate bonds 
are concerned, liability should operate only for a limited period after the production or the 
confirmation of a rating. Although this is sufficient for corporate bonds, the defaults of 
                                                          
231$VQRWHGE\&RYDO-XUHNDQG6WDIIRUGFUHGLWUDWLQJVµDUHVLOHQWUHJDUGLQJWKHVWDWHRIWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKGHIDXOW
is likel\WRKDSSHQ¶7KHUHIRUHUDWLQJVDUHXQLQIRUPDWLYHDERXWV\VWHPLFULVN&I&RYDO-XUHNDQG6WDIIRUGQ
212). 
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structured finance products tend to be correlated also in the short term, particularly in a financial 
crisis.232 Because in this situation strict liability may discourage CRAs from rating structured 
finance altogether, an alternative solution to cope with systemic risk is proposed. Whenever 
extraordinary default rates are arguably dependent on systemic risk, liability should be 
conditional on inaccuracy being confirmed by the law of large numbers. When a public 
authority announces a financial crisis status, liability would be imposed on CRAs only if the 
frequency of observed defaults departed from the predictions made by CRAs over a sufficiently 
large number of cases and a sufficiently large time span, thus protecting CRAs from violent 
short-term fluctuations in the default rates. While limiting the extent to which strict liability 
over-deters ratings, particularly of structured finance products, this solution is countercyclical 
as it rewards the CRAs that were more conservative in their assessments during the upswing 
phase of an asset bubble. 
Finally, CRAs are allowed to decide how much to commit to a certain rating, that is  to the 
probabilities of default and the other estimates associated with each letter grade, by choosing 
the degree of exposure to liability. This condition allows liability to reflect the uncertainty of 
the forecasting models available to CRAs. The limited ability to foresee the future, along with 
the unobservability of several variables affecting the performance of the market for rating, is 
the reason why it is advocated a contractual approach to CRAs liability. This approach, 
however, creates a problem. In the presence of regulatory benefits, CRAs may choose an 
inefficiently low level of commitment and profit from providing regulated investors with 
artificially high ratings.233 To address this issue, regulation should require that CRAs face a 
minimum degree of liability exposure for their rating to enable regulatory benefits. This solution 
                                                          
232 Cf Coval, Jurek and Stafford (n 212). 
233 Cf Opp, Opp and Harris (n 47).  
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would still allow CRAs to choose their commitment levels with investors, but only in the 
absence of the negative externalities created by inflated ratings with a regulatory value. 
3. Related Literature 
 
As stated above, in the literature on CRAs, the existence of rating inflation is rarely disputed. 
However, the causes underlying rating inflation are not settled and there are different theories 
in this regard. 
According to a first strand of literature the fundamental reason why CRAs tend to inflate their 
ratings is that they are paid by the same issuers that they rate. In this vein, the problem of rating 
inflation would be solved if one could simply make investors pay for ratings, which is 
complicated by information leakage and the related free riding problem.234 However, even if it 
were possible to do away with the issuer-pays model, the case for legal intervention would not 
be straightforward. In a well-functioning market, reputational sanctions and competitive 
pressure could prevent opportunistic behavior by CRAs, regardless of the paying scheme 
adopted.
Many theoretical models have been developed to demonstrate how rating inflation emerges 
under different assumptions, thus suggesting the existence of market failures. Bolton, Freixas 
and Shapiro235 VKRZWKDWUDWLQJLQIODWLRQFDQEHGULYHQE\LQYHVWRUV¶Qaivety and by the freedom 
granted to issuers to purchase the rating that they prefer, which allows for rating shopping. 
Because the marginal investors may be unsophisticated and thus unable to identify and punish 
inaccurate ratings, CRAs will face lower reputational sanctions from inaccuracy while profiting 
                                                          
234 Cf Pagano and Volpin (n 46). 
235 Cf Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211). 
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from selling inflated ratings to issuers. Skreta and Veldkamp236 emphasize that rating inflation 
might emerge also in the presence of truth-telling CRAs if there is sufficient heterogeneity in 
the predictions of their models. A similar point is made by Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Spatt.237
7KH\DUJXHWKDWKHWHURJHQHLW\LQ&5$V¶SUHGLFWLRQVUHVXOWVLQUDWLQJLQIODWLRQHYHQLIH[SOLFLW
rating shopping is forbidden. The reason is that rating shopping can always occur implicitly. 
Because the methodologies of rating agencies are transparent to a certain extent, the issuer can 
select the CRA that uses model assumptions allowing for the highest possible rating. 
Opp, Opp and Harris238 take a different approach and show that rating inflation can depend 
exclusively on the regulatory function assigned to the ratings. Because ratings are embedded in 
financial regulation worldwide, regulated investors benefit from investing in highly rated 
securities even if the ratings are inaccurate. This strategy, for example, may lower the regulatory 
capital requirements for banks; may protect institutional investors from the threat of liability; 
and so forth.239 The underlying assumption is that the value of these regulatory benefits passed 
on tR&5$V YLD WKH LVVXHUV¶ IHHV H[FHHGV WKH UHSXWDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQ VWHPPLQJ IURP LQIODWHG
ratings. The implications of this approach are twofold. On the one hand, it is not necessary to 
assume investors naivety to explain inflated ratings. On the other hand, to the extent that inflated 
ratings depend on a demand by regulated investors, having investors rather than issuer pay for 
them cannot possibly ameliorate the problem.240
Although due to identification problems rating inflation is hard to show empirically, there is 
some empirical evidence suggesting its presence as well as its dependence on several market 
                                                          
236 Vasiliki 6NUHWDDQG/DXUD9HOGNDPSµ5DWLQJVShopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings InflatiRQ¶
(2009) 56 JME 678. 
237 )UDQFHVFR 6DQJLRUJL -RQDWKDQ 6RNRELQ DQG &KHVWHU 6 6SDWW µ&UHGLW-rating Shopping, Selection and 
Equilibrium Structure of RDWLQJV¶8QSXEOLVKHGZRUNLQJSDSHU.
238 Cf. Opp, Opp and Harris (n 47). 
239 Cf Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit-Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective (n 48). 
240 &I&KDUOHV:&DORPLULVµ$5HFLSHIRU5DWLQJV5HIRUP¶The Economists’ Voice 6.11: 1-5. 
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failures. Using a panel dataset covering from 1999 to 2009, Xia and Strobl241 find that the 
issuer-pays practice leads to higher ratings than the investor-pays practice. Baklyar and Galil242
gather empirical evidence on the Israeli corporate credit rating market and show that one agency 
(Midroog) systematically inflated ratings, whereas another (S&P-Maalot) inflated its ratings 
only as a response to rating shopping. Becker and Milbourn243 hint at rating inflation only 
indirectly. Their study reveals that the entry of Fitch in the market for ratings worsened the 
quality of ratings. This finding suggests that the adverse effects of rating shopping on rating 
inflation outweigh the benefits of increased competition.  
The lesson to be learnt from the theoretical and the empirical literature is that a combination 
of market failures and regulatory distortions probably exists. Ratings tend to be inflated because 
there are naïve investors, which make reputation a weak constraint on rating shopping, and
EHFDXVHWKHUHDUHUHJXODWRU\EHQHILWVZKLFKDOORZ&5$VWRFDWHUWRWKHLQYHVWRUV¶GHPDQGIRU
artificially high ratings. Moreover, there is no easy way in which the market or regulation can 
overcome these problems. If the marginal investors are naïve the market cannot easily self-
correct. Put differently, because transaction costs prevent efficient contracts on the provision of 
ratings from being written, the Coase Theorem breaks down. Regulation could paternalistically 
protect naïve investors by prohibiting the issuer-pays model, rating shopping, or even both of 
them. However, this approach would hardly be effective. On the one hand, in the absence of a 
regulator or a court who can screen rating quality, a market for ratings deprived of its typical 
features may collapse because of free riding244 or moral hazard.245 On the other hand, so long 
as financial regulation lacks viable alternatives to ratings for assessing credit risk, ratings will 
                                                          
241 Gunter Strobl and Xia Han, The Issuer-Pays Rating Model and Ratings Inflation: Evidence from Corporate 
Credit Ratings (Unpublished working paper, 2012). 
242 Inna %DNOD\DU DQG.RUHVK*DOLO µ5DWLQJ 6KRSSLQJ DQG5DWLQJ ,QIODWLRQ(PSLULFDO(YLGHQFH IURP ,VUDHO¶
(2011) Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1903827
243 Cf Becker and Milbourn (n 223). 
244 Cf Pagano and Volpin (n 46). 
245 Cf Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211). 
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still be inflated despite any prohibition of issuer-pays and/or rating shopping when the 
regulatory benefits from inflation are high enough. 
It is assumed, along with the mainstream literature, that ratings are valuable for the society 
because they reduce asymmetric information in finance.246 However, this is conditional on 
ratings being above a certain accuracy threshold, which for simplicity it is assumed to be 
exogenously determined by the existing forecasting technology. Based on the findings of the 
existing literature, there are two reasons why CRAs may produce inaccurate ratings. One is a 
commitment problem.247 Ratings are inflated because investors at the margin cannot recognize 
and punish inaccurate ratings (or cannot reward only accurate ratings), which prevents CRAs 
from committing to accurate predictions. The other reason is the presence of negative 
externalities in financial markets.248 Because financial regulation currently relies on ratings to 
cope with such externalities, inaccuracy of ratings adversely affects not only the investors 
purchasing the rated assets for regulatory benefits, but also their counterparties as well as the 
taxpayers who bear the costs of bailing out regulated investors. Furthermore, neither 
unsophisticated investors nor financial regulators can second-guess the quality of ratings. CRAs 
could not produce anything valuable otherwise. It follows that there is a case for a different 
kind of legal intervention than proposed so far. Rather than tampering with how the market for 
ratings works or scrapping the distortions stemming from financial regulation, in this chapter it 
is proposed to subject CRAs to legal liability while keeping the rest of the status quo. 
Unfortunately, precisely because it is difficult for a third party to second-guess ratings, it has 
been virtually impossible to prove in front of American courts the negligent behavior of rating 
agencies and the portion of losses suffered by investors that is attributable to their conduct. 
                                                          
246 Lawrence J :KLWHµ0DUNHWV7KH&UHGLW5DWLQJ$JHQFLHV¶-(3
247 Cf Cooter and Ulen (n 229). 
248 Dirk +HUHPDQVDQG$OHVVLR03DFFHVµ5HJXODWLRQRI%DQNLQJDQG)LQDQFLDO0DUNHWV¶LQ$OHVVLR03DFFHV
and Roger J Van den Bergh, Regulation and Economics (Edward Elgar 2012). 
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Therefore, as shown by the legal literature,249 CRAs have been de facto immune from liability 
claims. Moreover, particularly in the U.S., the rating agencies have often been able to escape 
liability by invoking the protection of the First Amendment available to journalists, whose 
liability is subject to an actual malice standard.  Despite the efforts of legislators on both side 
of the Atlantic, this situation is not likely to change in the near future.250 Acknowledging the 
difficulty to police the incentives of CRAs through a negligence standard for tort liability, the 
law and economics literature has suggested imposing a punishment on CRAs that produce 
inaccurate ratings by paying them with the debt they rate.251 The approach proposed in this 
chapter has the important advantage to allow corrections for systemic risk, which are obviously 
not available for debt. Building on one of the policy recommendations by Bolton, Freixas and 
Shapiro252 WR IL[ WKHZHDNQHVV RI &5$V¶ UHSXWDWLRQDO FRQVWUDLQW WKH HQKDQFHPHQW of legal 
liability is advocated. However, differently from them as well as from the rest of the literature, 
a complete liability regime supporting the production of accurate ratings (as accurate as allowed 
by the available forecasting technology) without undermining the existence and the functioning 
of a market for ratings is designed. 
 The function of CRAs is to provide investors with certifications of the quality of financial 
assets, which is a form of gatekeeping.253 Strict liability, if appropriately designed, would 
incentivize CRAs to supply such certification services as accurately as possible. The idea to 
                                                          
249 Cf Deats (n 206). 
250 In the U.S., CRAs face now more difficulties to invoke the protection of the First Amendment. However, it 
has been practically impossible to DFWLYDWHWKH&5$V¶OLDELOLW\DVH[SHUWVXQGHU6HFWLRQRIWKH6HFXULWLHV$FW
of 1933 introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act. Cf Coffee, Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (n 48). 
With regard to Europe it is doubtful that the gross negligence standard that was introduced by art. 35a, Reg. (EC) 
no. 1060/2009 as amended by art. 1, (22), Reg. (EU) no. 462/2013 will change the status quo. In fact, it will be 
very hard to prove in courts (i) the grossly negligent behavior, (ii) the causation, and (iii), the portion of the losses 
VXIIHUHG E\ LQYHVWRUV WKDW LV DWWULEXWDEOH WR WKH&5$¶V FRQGXFW+DDU SURYLGHV D FRPSUHKHQVLYH FRPSDUDWLYH
discussion of the recent legal developments concerning the civil liability of CRAs. Brigitte +DDUµCivil Liability 
of Credit Rating Agencies after CRA 3-Regulatory All-or-Nothing Approaches between Immunity and Over-
'HWHUUHQFH¶University of Oslo Faculty of Law Research Paper 2013). 
251 Yair Listokin and Benjamin Taiblesonµ,I<RX0LVUDWH7KHQ<ou Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy 
7KURXJK,QFHQWLYH&RPSHQVDWLRQ¶ 27 YJR. 
252 Cf Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211). 
253 Reinier H .UDDNPDQµ*DWHNHHSHUVWKHDQDWRP\RIDWKLUG-SDUW\HQIRUFHPHQWVWUDWHJ\¶ JLEO 53. 
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introduce strict liability for gatekeepers is not new.254 Importantly, taking into account that the 
JDWHNHHSHUV LQFRPH LV YHU\ VPDOO UHODWLYH WR WKH LQYHVWRUV¶ ORVVHV IURP XQGHUSHUIRUPLQJ
financLDODVVHWVWKHVHSURSRVDOVKDYHDOZD\VFDSSHGJDWHNHHSHUV¶OLDELOLW\DWDSRUWLRQRIWKH
damages on grounds that a full liability exposure would deter gatekeeping altogether. This 
problem is germane to that of crushing liability described by Shavell and Ben-Shahar255 among 
others: if potential injurers are liable for damages in excess to the harm they cause to the society, 
they may refrain from engaging in valuable activities in the first place.  
The problem of crushing liability is particularly severe for CRAs. The main characteristic of 
rating agencies is the probabilistic nature of their predictions. To rate a company triple-A is not 
equal to categorically exclude the possibility of its default; it merely implies a very small 
probability that default will happen. The logic behind the introduction of a strict liability rule 
to govern an activity generating losses with a certain probability is that the producer is assumed 
to be in the best position to insure (or self-insure) against the losses and to raise prices 
accordingly.256 If one tries to apply the same logic to rating agencies, however, three major 
problems arise. 
Firstly, it is possible to insure only against uncorrelated risks. The global financial crisis has 
shown that, especially in the medium-to-long term, defaults of firms and financial assets can be 
significantly correlated. For the purpose of this chapter, these correlations are termed systemic 
risk. Because strict liability makes the injurer residual risk bearer, under such regime CRAs 
would have to pay damages, however limited, stemming from systemic risk, which cannot be 
                                                          
254 Coffee and Partnoy gave birth to a very lively debate on this point. Cf John C Jr &RIIHHµ*DWHNHHSHU)DLOXUH
DQG5HIRUP7KH&KDOOHQJHRI)DVKLRQLQJ5HOHYDQW5HIRUPV¶BULR 301; Frank 3DUWQR\µ+RZDQG
why Credit Rating Agencies are not like other GDWHNHHSHUV¶ LQ <DVX\XNL )XFKLWD DQG 5REHUW ( /LWDQ (eds), 
Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? (Brookings Institution Press and Nomura Institute of Capital 
Markets Research 2006). 
255 Omri Ben-6KDKDUµ&DXVDWLRQDQG)RUHVHHDELOLW\¶LQ0LFKDHO)DXUHHGTort Law and Economics (Edward 
Elgar 2009). 
256 George L 3ULHVWµ7KHCurrent Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort LDZ¶</-
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insured. Consequently, in order to introduce a workable strict liability rule, the CRAs must be 
protected against the risk of correlated defaults. Two different ways to deal with this problem 
are suggested; one with respect to the business risk of corporate bonds and another one, more 
general, to cope with extraordinary events ± like financial crises ± which would make strict 
liability incompatible with the production of ratings, particularly of structured finance products. 
Secondly, like other gatekeepers, CRAs cannot face liability for losses significantly larger 
WKDQWKHYDOXHRIWKHLUEXVLQHVV0DNLQJ&5$VSD\GDPDJHVFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRWKHLQYHVWRUV¶
losses from the default of a large rated company would be obviously unreasonable. Because 
most of these losses would have occurred also in the absence of rating, the expected liability of 
CRAs could not be possibly compensated by higher fees. Facing such a liability exposure, 
CRAs would refrain from producing ratings in the first place. Fortunately, it is not necessary to 
PDNH&5$VOLDEOHIRUWKHIXOODPRXQWRILQYHVWRUV¶ORVVHVLQRUGHUIRUWKHPWRKDYHLQFHQWLYHV
to produce accurate ratings. As suggested by Coffee257 for other gatekeepers, it is sufficient to 
cap the liability at a multiple of their fee income.  The problem with this and other similar 
approaches is the arbitrariness of the multiplier.258 To overcome this problem, the multiplier 
independent on the probability of default assigned and on the fee received by the CRA. 
Importantly, under this regime, CRAs cannot make losses unless their predictions are 
inaccurate. 
Thirdly, CRAs cannot be expected to predict default rates without errors. Contrary to a 
standard assumption in finance, we do not live in a world of perfect foresight. It is illusory for 
the law to police incentives exclusively based on expected values and the underlying 
probabilities.259 2XUDELOLW\WRSUHGLFWWKHIXWXUHLVOLPLWHGVRLV&5$V¶DELOLW\WRFRPPLWWR
                                                          
257 Cf Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms (n 254). 
258 Haar (n 250).  
259 On this point, Alessio M Pacces, The Future in Law and Finance (EIP 2013). 
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their predictions. Imposing on CRAs a strict liability rigidly dependent on the probabilities they 
estimate may discourage them from producing ratings in the first place. For this reason, CRAs 
are allowed to reduce their liability exposure by introducing a contractually determined 
SDUDPHWHUĮZKLFKLVVXSSRVHGWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHXQFHUWDLQW\RIWKHIRUHFDVWLQJWHFKQRORJ\
Through this parameter, the CRAs will be able to prevent crushing liability stemming from the 
uncertainty of their models, while signaling to the market the degree of confidence in their own 
estimates.
4. Capped Strict Liability of CRAs: A Numerical Example 
 
As explained in the previous section, imposing unlimited liability on CRAs is not an option. 
Because the default of any sufficiently large issuer could bankrupt a CRA almost instantly, no 
ratings would be provided under such regime. However, the characteristics of the market for 
ratings offer the opportunity to introduce strict liability with a cap on damages based only on 
objective factors. In the next section, it will be show with a formal model that this liability 
regime is sufficient to deter rating inflation. In this section, the intuition of the model with a 
simple numerical example is illustrated. 
The main task performed by rating agencies is to classify and divide companies in clusters 
according to their probability of default.260 To simplify, let us assume that a CRA perfectly 
knows this probability. If the liability cap is calculated by multiplying the price paid by the 
issuer times the inverse of the highest probability of default associated with the cluster in which 
the issuer is included, the liability of the rating agency will depend directly on the extent of 
rating inflation.  
                                                          
260 Section 5.3 extends the reasoning to a slightly more detailed discussion of the activity performed by rating 
agencies. 
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To clarify the idea with a simple example, let us assume there are 100 firms, each one pays ߛ
= 1 to the CRA for rating, and the cost of rating is zero. Let us also assume that the probability 
of a default (Pr) is equal to 0.01 for all the firms. If the rating agency correctly estimates the 
financial stability of the 100 firms, it will include all of them in the same cluster having ± it is 
assumed ± Pr = 0.01 as the upper bound. When only one firm effectively goes bankrupt the 
rating agency will be held liable for ߛ*1/Pr = 100 and will thus make zero profits. It is worth 
noting that the liability of the CRA is set to 100 independently of the damages stemming from 
bankruptcy, which could be much higher. However, if the rating agency systematically 
underestimates the probability of default (that is it inflates the rating), it will bear higher losses. 
For example, let us assume that all the firms are included in a higher cluster than their 
creditworthiness would grant, with an assigned probability of Pr = 0.005. In this case, if still 
only one firm goes bankrupt, the liability will be equal to 200, imposing on the CRA a loss of 
100.
In this example, it is assumed that CRAs have perfect foresight, that ratings can be produced 
with zero profits, and that no reputational sanction is attached to rating inflation. In the 
mathematical model presented in the next section all these assumptions will be relaxed. 
In concluding this section, it is worth noting that this liability rule compensates investors with 
a sum of money that is in no way related to the harm they have suffered. However, given that 
it is nearl\LPSRVVLEOHWRSURYH&5$V¶QHJOLJHQWEHKDYLRUDQGWKHSRUWLRQRIWKHKDUPVXIIHUHG
by the investors that is attributable to their conduct, it is hard to determine how much harm 
rating agencies effectively cause to the market by producing inaccurate ratings. As suggested 
by Coffee,261 the liability rule should therefore prioritize deterrence over compensation.  
                                                          
261 Cf Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms (n 2544). 
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5. The Model 
 
Let us define ߜ௝ as a measure of rating inflation (or deflation). With regard to the jth cluster of 
creditworthiness, ߜ௝ is defined as: 
ߜ௝ ൌ
௝݉ െ ݏ௝
௝݉
െ ܲݎ௝௝ǡ
(4.1) 
where the index ݆  varies on the whole set J of rating classes,݉ is the number of firms included 
by the nth CRA in the jth class of rating, ݏ௝ represents the number of firms included in the jth
cluster that did not go bankrupt, and ܲݎ௝indicates the default rate for the letter grade associated 
to the jth cluster. In other words, ሺ ௝݉ െ ݏ௝ሻȀ ௝݉ denotes the ex-post probability of default, 
whereas ܲݎ௝indicates the ex-ante prediction. Consequently, if CRAs predictions are confirmed 
ex-post: 
௝݉ െ ݏ௝
௝݉
ൌ ܲݎ௝ Ǣ ߜ௝ ൌ Ͳ௝
(4.2) 
Conversely, we formally define rating inflation as: 
௝݉ െ ݏ௝
௝݉
൐ ܲݎ௝ Ǣ ߜ௝ ൐ Ͳ௝
 (4.3) 
The overall level of rating inflation (or deflation) of the nth CRA is defined as: 
ߜ ൌ෍ߜ௝Ȁܬ
௝
 ௝
(4.4)
The parameter ߚ denotes the difference between the rating assigned to the ith firm by the nth
CRA and the rating potentially assigned to the ith by another CRAs. Hence, ߚ measures the 
level of rating inflation of the nth CRA relative to its competitors. 
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In a perfect market the profits of the nth CRA can be described by the following equation: 
3௡ǡ௝ ൌ෍෍ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
൅ ܴሺߚǡ ߜሻ (4.5)
ߛ௜ǡ௝is the fee collected from each firm net of given rating costs while ܴሺߚǡ ߜሻ is the 
UHSXWDWLRQDOHIIHFWRI&5$¶VFRQGXFW.262 ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜ൯ captures the impact of this conduct on future 
income. The reputational effect then depends on the two parameters defined above, namelyߚ
andߜ.
,QDSHUIHFWPDUNHWLQYHVWRUVZLOOEHDEOHWRGHWHFWDQ\PLVWDNHLQD&5$¶VSUHGLFWLRQVDQGWR
punish it with a reputational sanction ܴሺߚǡ ߜሻ ൏ Ͳ sufficient to make such mistakes 
unprofitable. In addition, because there is no market failure, regulation does not need to rely on 
ratings and there are no regulatory benefits from investing in rated assets. In other words, in a 
perfect market characterized by perfect foresight, no rating inflation could exist because 
reputational sanctions are sufficient to prevent opportunistic behavior, regardless of the paying 
scheme and the liability rule adopted. It follows that in this scenario no liability should be 
imposed on CRAs.
However two market failures have been identified, namely the existence of regulatory benefits 
attached to high ratings and the naivety of some investors. Despite being agnostic about the 
exact impact of each factor, the findings of the literature suggest that both m and ܴ ൫ߚǡ ߜ൯change 
their shape and their behavior because of them. In this case, the regulator confers an independent 
value upon high ratings and hence the reputational effect of rating inflation is altered. Under 
                                                          
262 For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that CRAs only compete on the number of rated firm, not on the level 
of the fees. This assumption is without loss of generality, as our results would hold also for variable fees. 
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these circumstances it is plausible that conflicting reputational concerns arise. Frenkel263
suggests that, especially in concentrated markets, rating agencies facing weak reputational 
constraints might find it profitable to be lenient and inflate ratings while inducing investors to 
believe that they are credible. In other words, not only the reputational sanctions might be 
VRIWHQHGE\LQYHVWRUV¶ODFNRIVRSKLVWLFDWLRQEXWUDWLQJLQIODWLRQPLJKWHYHQEHUHZDUGHGE\
institutional investors. As a result, given the existence of regulatory benefits and naïve 
investors, issuers will be attracted to high ratings regardless of their informative content, and 
hence m becomes dependent on ȕ and on the size of the regulatory benefits. Equation (4.1) thus 
becomes: 
3௡ǡ௝ ൌ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
൅ ܴሺߚǡ ߜǡ ߠሻ
  (4.6) 
Where ܴܾ denotes the regulatory benefits attached to high ratings and ߠ indicates the share 
(in value) of naïve investors. Higher values of ߚ and ߜ result in a higher reputational sanction 
for the CRA. At the same time, the reputational loss is lower if the value of ߠ is higher.  
Being extremely simple, this description cannot capture the complex nuances that 
characterize the functioning of CRAs. However, this simple framework is sufficient to include 
the crucial point made by the literature: given the existing market failures and regulatory 
distortions, CRAs are able to increase their short-term profits by producing inflated ratings. 
Under the status quo, CRAs are de facto immune from liability. Therefore, the additional 
revenues from rating inflation can be larger than the reputational costs to be borne in the future, 
at least up to a certain level of rating inflation.  
                                                          
263 Sivan Frenkel, Repeated Interaction and Rating Inflation: A Model of Double Reputation (Unpublished 
working paper, Hebrew University 2012). 
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Moreover, for individual CRAs, the number of firms to rate depends positively on the level 
of rating inflation. Because solid firms want to communicate their creditworthiness to the 
market, some issuers will want to be rated independently of rating inflation. However, another 
group of issuers will be interested in purchasing a rating only if rating inflation is above a certain 
threshold (for example allowing them to pass the investment grade threshold, which is a 
condition for investor to enjoy regulatory benefits). Inflating ratings is the only way to attract 
the issuers of the second group. If this behavior does not sufficiently harm the reputation of the 
nth CRA, rating inflation not only increases short-term profits, but becomes also necessary to 
survive in the market for ratings. Because the expected liability is nil and the reputational 
sanctions are not sufficient to support an equilibrium where ߜ ൌ Ͳ, CRAs that do not inflate 
their ratings will lose customers and short-term profits to their competitors without increasing 
their future revenues by the same or a higher amount. As a result, all CRAs will inflate ratings 
to the same extent and the equilibrium will be Ɂ ൐ Ͳ and ߚ ൌ Ͳ.
Introducing the following liability regime can improve this equilibrium.  
5.1. Capped Strict Liability under Simplifying Assumptions  
 
Under the proposed strict liability rule, the liability of the nth CRA for any firm defaulting in 
the jth cluster will be equal to: 
ܮ ௝݊ ൌ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕି௦ೕ
௜ୀଵ
Ȁܲݎ௝௝  (4.7) 
The profits of the nth CRA are now equal to: 
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3௡ǡ௝ ൌ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
൅ ܴሺߚǡ ߜǡ ߠሻ െ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕି௦ೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
Ȁܲݎ௝ (4.8)
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume thatܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ ൌ Ͳ. In other words, for the moment 
it is assumed that no reputational sanction is attached to inaccurate ratings. 
We obtain for the jth cluster:
3௡ǡ௝ ൌ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕ
௜ୀଵ
െ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕି௦ೕ
௜ୀଵ
Ȁܲݎ௝௝ (4.9) 
The ratio ሺ݉ሺߚǡ ܴܾሻ௝ െ ݏ௝ሻȀሺ݉ሺߚǡ ܴܾሻ௝ denotes the share of firms that effectively defaulted. 
If this ratio is equal to ܲݎ௝ then the CRA has correctly estimated the probability of default of 
the issuer and 3n = 0. If the CRA has underestimated the probability of default, which is to say 
LW KDV LQIODWHG WKH LVVXHU¶V UDWLQJV WKHQ 3n < 0. 3n > 0 only ifܲݎ௝ > ሺ݉ሺߚǡ ܴܾሻ௝ െ
ݏ௝ሻȀሺ݉ሺߚǡ ܴܾሻ௝. Hence, facing strict liability according to our model, CRAs will never have 
any incentive to inflate ratings. To the contrary, the optimal strategy for them would be to award 
always a probability of default equal to 1. This extreme case of rating deflation is purely 
theoretical, because obviously no issuer will ever be interested in purchasing such a rating. 
Actually, also because highly rated assets bring about regulatory benefits to regulated investors, 
issuers will have an interest to receive a rating that is as high as possible. 
Issuers, CRAs and regulated investors have normally an information advantage compared to 
regulatory authorities and courts. The question is how to induce the market for ratings to reveal 
information efficiently. The proposed strategy is to create, by imposing an appropriate strict 
liability on CRAs, opposing interests for CRAs, issuers and investors. More specifically, the 
CRAs will prefer to supply lower ratings in order to reduce their expected liability, whereas 
issuers and regulated investors will prefer higher ratings. The ratings produced in such a market 
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are going to reflect valuable information about the creditworthiness of issuers and their bonds. 
In fact, this is the only way in which gains from trade can be generated after the profits from 
misrating are disallowed by a capped strict liability rule. This outcome will ultimately benefit 
financial regulators and the society at large. 
In every market the opposing interests of sellers and buyers lead to an equilibrium price that, 
absent market failures, is considered optimal. To re-create such equilibrium in the market for 
ratings it must be ensured that issuers and regulated investors, on one side, and CRAs, on the 
other side, have opposite interests. This has also important dynamic implications. Under the 
status quo, increasing competition between CRAs would only worsen the problem of rating 
shopping.264 This circumstance rules out the most straightforward strategy to improve the 
efficiency of ratings, namely increasing competition. Competition could again be valuable in 
the market for ratings after imposing strict liability on CRAs. In the presence of a capped strict 
liability regime more actual and potential competition between CRAs can be expected to lead 
to more innovation in forecasting techniques rather than to more rating inflation.265
5.2. Capped Strict Liability with Imperfect Foresight and Reputational Sanctions 
 
Under the proposed liability rule, four different conditions have to be fulfilled for an efficient 
market for ratings to emerge: (i)3 = 0 is considered a satisfying equilibrium; (ii) rating agencies 
know the true probability of default; (iii) ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ ൌ Ͳ and (iv) firms defaults are uncorrelated. 
With respect to (i), to use J as the relevant base for the liability rule implies that the profits of 
CRAs, given accurate ratings, are set to zero. They become negative only in the presence of 
                                                          
264 Cf Becker and Milbourn (n 223); Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (n 211). 
265 This point is discussed in more details below, in section 7. 
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rating inflation, which under the assumption of perfect foresight is sufficient to guarantee rating 
accuracy. The condition 3 = 0 is reminiscent of the absence of economic profits under perfect 
competition and is not particularly restrictive. As mentioned in the previous section, this 
equilibrium cannot be improved by exaggerating the probability of default (rating deflation) 
because at some point this will drive the number of rated firms to zero. This scenario is not 
particularly interesting for policymaking; therefore, it is not explored in this chapter. 
More importantly, even under ideal incentives, the CRAs will be prone to make mistakes, 
violating condition (ii). In fact, condition (ii) is never true ± we do not live in a world of perfect 
foresight. In addition, the assumption (iii) ± namely that R = 0 ± should be relaxed too in order 
to take into account the effects of reputation and, more in general, all the factors affecting the 
future income of CRAs. Finally, condition (iv) concerns systemic risk as a source of crushing 
liability. This problem will be tackled in section 5. 
To address (ii) and (iii) the parameter Ͳ ൏ ߙ ൏ ͳ is introduced. ߙ limits the expected liability 
of CRAs. The profit of the nth CRA are now equal to: 
3௡ǡ௝ ൌ ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
൅ ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ െ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕି௦ೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝ୀ
כ ߙȀܲݎ௝ (4.10) 
Where ߙ denotes the fraction of ߛ௜ǡ௝ that is considered to calculate the expected liability. The 
smallerߙ, the more mistakes CRAs are allowed to make without suffering losses (and the more 
economic profits they can make if their ratings are correct). In other words, this scenario lies 
between two extremes: a perfect market where ratings are efficiently policed by reputational 
concerns; and the stylized market described in section 4 in which ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ = 0 and rating 
agencies face liability whenever a rated issuer defaults. In the former case the optimal ߙ (let 
that be ߙכ) is equal to 0, in the latter it is equal to 1. Because, as shown by the literature on 
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CRAs, the reputational sanction is neither optimal nor is it totally absent, ߙכ will lie between 
the two extremes. 
Identifying such an optimal value might seem attractive, but this would be an almost 
impossible task. A benevolent and omniscient regulator could identify the optimal value of ߙ
for any transaction and at any moment in time. However, an omniscient regulator would also 
know the correct rating for any issuer and financial asset and thus the whole problem of accurate 
ratings would simply not arise. On the contrary, regulators neither possess unlimited 
information nor can they be expected to be always benevolent. It seems extremely difficult that 
a public authority can adequately manipulate ߙ in order to guarantee that CRAs earn enough to 
stay in business without being tempted to inflate their ratings. In order to determine ߙ*, it would 
be necessary to know the value of the parametersߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ , the shape of the 
functionsܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯and ݉, and the level of accuracy of the available forecasting technology. 
In more qualitative terms, it is argued that the simultaneous presence of regulatory benefits, 
naïve investors, and imperfect forecasting techniques has affected the market for ratings in a 
very complex way. In our view, re-creating opposing interests between supply and demand for 
ratings is a better strategy than attempting to correct the above reasons for market failure via 
detailed regulations. Given the existing market failures no further assumptions about the shape 
of ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ are made. Instead it is suggested to rely on market mechanisms to determine ߙ,
EDVHG RQ WKH PDUNHW SOD\HUV¶ NQRZOHGJH RI WKH SDUDPHWHUV GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH VL]H RI WKH
reputational sanction ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯. Obviously, the higher is ߙ, the more CRAs will be credible 
because they are punished if they inflate their ratings. However, the expected liability may be 
too high to sustain a market for ratings given the existing forecasting technology. A lower ߙ,
on the other hand, is good to keep CRAs in business, but might be insufficient to cope with the 
problem of rating inflation given the shape of ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯.
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The alternative to choosing ߙ by regulation is to let ߙ be determined contractually. In this 
vein, CRAs are allowed to announce to the market (that is, to the investors) how much they are 
committing to a certain rating with their choice of ߙ. This approach copes with an important 
shortcoming of imposing strict liability on CRAs. CRAs have often stated that their predictions 
are ordinal in nature, not cardinal. The proposed liability rule requires that all CRAs be 
compelled to publish the specific range of probability of default associated to a certain rating, 
and particularly to connect the upper bound of this range to their expected liability. In a sense, 
this implies forcing CRAs to produce ratings as a cardinal measure. Although this increases 
transparency, it would also place on CRAs a burden that they might be unwilling to bear. If the 
value of ߙ is determined by a regulatory authority, there is the concrete risk that this burden 
becomes excessive. As it was mentioned, regulators are not omniscient. Neither are CRAs. 
Imposing on CRAs a given ߙ means committing them to a given level of confidence in their 
own probability estimates. CRAs that find such a level of confidence excessive may simply 
decide to exit the market. 
Conversely, if the rating agencies are allowed to decide how much to µEHW¶ on a certain rating, 
they will be able to take into account the unavoidable uncertainty surrounding predictions of 
the future and the possibility of mistakes or imperfection in their models. This solution has a 
number of advantages. Firstly, it introduces a commitment device to improve the functioning 
of the market for ratings. This device is a varying degree of liability exposure, which CRAs can 
choose freely so long as this choice allows them to produce ratings valued by investors. 
Secondly, because the CRAs know better than anybody else how accurate their forecasting 
models are in predicting future defaults, they can choose the level of commitment that is 
sufficient to keep them in the business thus preventing strict liability from becoming crushing. 
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The key feature of ߙ is its contractibility. Being a commitment device supported by an 
enforceable strict liability rule, ߙ can be as low as to keep CRAs in business and as high as to 
make ratings informative for investors including the naïve ones.266 In other words, ߙ allows 
contracting on unobservable parameters like the determinants of ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯ and the uncertainty 
of forecasting models. In the absence of regulatory distortions, competition in the provision of 
certification services to issuers will always make sure that ߙ is the efficient outcome of the 
opposing interests of CRAs and investors. Moreover, because CRAs will compete on ߙ, this 
mechanism also provides incentives to improve the forecasting technology over time. Only the 
presence of regulatory benefits from high ratings makes this market approach unviable, because 
such benefits could be so high as to offset all the negative determinants of ܴ൫ߚǡ ߜǡ ߠ൯. When 
this is the case, the regulatory benefits can sustain a market for ratings also with ߙ artificially 
low (or even zero). 
If ߙ is contractually determined, financial regulation cannot allow whatever rating to have 
regulatory relevance. More precisely, besides requiring a high rating for investors to enjoy 
regulatory benefits, regulation should also impose that ߙ chosen by the CRA producing the 
rating is above a specific threshold. Under such arrangement, rating agencies would not merely 
claim that a firm deserves a high rating, but they would have to put their money where their 
mouth is in order to EHFUHGLEOH$WWKHVDPHWLPHE\GHFLGLQJH[DFWO\KRZPXFKWRH[SRVH
WKHPVHOYHVWROLDELOLW\&5$VFDQSUHYHQWWKHULVNWKDWDQH[FHVVLYHO\]HDORXVUHJXODWRUIRUFHV
WKHPWRFDUU\DQH[FHVVLYHEXUGHQࡳDWWKHHQG&5$VDUHQRWREOLJHGWRSURGXFHUDWLQJUHlevant 
to regulation. It is important to note that CRAs are not forced to adopt any particular value of 
ߙ. In theory, they could simply decide to shield themselves from any liability claim if that was 
acceptable for issuers and investors. However, if CRAs want their ratings to have a regulatory 
                                                          
266 It is assumed that no investor is so naïve to be unable to rank commitments to liability exposure based on     0 
Į
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value, they should be the first to show reliance in their own predictions by complying with a 
minimum value of ߙ established by regulation 
5.3 Extending the Model: Loss Given Default  
 
In certain cases, especially for corporate bonds, ratings are not only an indicator of the 
probability of default, but also include an estimate of the loss given default (LGD). 
In this section the model is adapted to take into account the LGD as well as any other 
quantitative aspect that CRAs might consider to produce a rating. Once again, for the sake of 
simplicity, let us refer to equation (4.5) under the assumption of perfect foresight. To take into 
account the LGD, equation (4.5) should be modified in the following way: 
3௡ǡ௝ ൌ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
൅ ܴሺߚǡ ߜሻ െ෍ ෍ ߛ௜ǡ௝
௠ሺఉǡோ௕ሻೕି௦ೕ
௜ୀଵ

௝
Ȁܲݎ௝ כ ܮܩܦ௥௜Ȁܮܩܦ௣௜

(4.11) 
LGDr represents the LGD effectively observed whereas LGDp represents the predicted LGD. 
Similarly to our previous discussion on the probability of default, if LGDr > LGDp then the 
expected profits will decrease. If LGDr = LGDp the expected profits will not be altered by 
liability. Lastly, for LGDr < LGDp, 3n would theoretically increase, but as it was explained for 
the probability of default, a scenario in which CRAs systematically underestimate 
creditworthiness is not very realistic because, at some point, issuers will simply stop buying its 
ratings. 
This simple extension shows that this liability rule could be applied, with an identical logic, 
to any quantitative factor employed by rating agencies for the production of their assessment.  
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6. Systemic Risk 
 
To avoid that strict liability becomes crushing, it is necessary to protect CRAs from systemic 
risk, which may result in correlated defaults. Correlated defaults are problematic both because 
they undermine the ex-SRVWDFFXUDF\RI&5$V¶HVWLPDWHVDQGEHFDXVHWKH\DUHDULVNWKDWFDQQRW
be insured (or self-insured) by definition. Although the choice of ߙ allows to take into account 
for the fallacies of forecasting models, a strict liability rule still makes CRAs residual risk bearer 
for the portion of damage compensation triggered by the default of a rated issuer or bond. 
Therefore, apart from the uninteresting case in which ߙ is set to 0, it is important to make sure 
that CRAs do not face liability when defaults depend on systemic risk rather than on the 
individual circumstances of the issuer or of the bond that ratings are supposed to assess with a 
varying degree of precision (ߙ). 
Unfortunately, there is no unique way to cope with this problem. As it will be shown,267 rating 
structured finance products differs from rating traditional corporate bonds precisely because of 
their different exposure to systemic risk. As it will be shown, corporate bonds are rather 
insensitive to fluctuations of economic output in the short term. This offers a straightforward 
way to deal with systemic risk: the strict liability of CRAs should be limited to the short term. 
However, structured finance products are very different from corporate bonds in this respect 
because their defaults can be highly correlated also in the short term. To be sure, contrary to 
traditional corporate bonds whose credit risk mainly depends on firm-specific characteristics, 
structured finance products behave like economic catastrophe bonds268 concentrating defaults 
in the worst states of the economy as a whole. This extreme sensitivity of structured finance to 
                                                          
267 Cf Coval, Jurek and Stafford (n 2120DWWKHZ'5DEOHQµ'LYHUJHQFHLQ&UHGLW5DWLQJV¶FRL 12.
268 Cf Coval, Jurek and Stafford (n 212). 
57_Edle BW Romana.job
111 
 
systemic risk is a problem that cannoWEHDPHOLRUDWHGOLPLWLQJWKH&5$V¶OLDELOLW\WRWKHVKRUW
term. Therefore, this approach is effective only for corporate bonds. As far as structured finance 
products are concerned, addressing systemic risk requires a modification of our strict liability 
regime. The two approaches are presented in turn. 
6.1. Short-Term Liability for Rating Corporate Bonds  
 
Predictions can be medium-to-long term or short term. In this context, three months are 
considered to be a typical short-term horizon, because this is usually the timeframe (the so-
FDOOHGµZDWFKOLVW¶) in which CRAs review their assessment and decide whether to maintain or 
downgrade a certain rating.269 The rating of corporate bonds mainly depends on the probability 
that their issuers ± typically business enterprises ± go bankrupt.270 While medium-to-long term 
predictions in this respect seem to be greatly affected by systemic risk, short-term predictions 
present this problem in an attenuated form. If the focus is a sufficiently short time horizon, there 
is no reason to expect that the correlation between business issuers going bankrupt will be 
significantly positive. This seems to hold true even in times of aggregate economic distress. For 
instance, the data from the Quarterly U.S. Business Bankruptcies show that even during a crisis 
as violent as the global financial crisis, bankruptcies have taken a certain time to propagate.  
Figure 1 illustrates this well. It can be noticed that, although the increase in the frequency of 
bankruptcies between 2006 and 2009 was significant, the short-term fluctuations were not 
particularly violent.  
Figure 1: Bankruptcies of business firms in the U.S. (in thousands) 
                                                          
269 Cf Cristina E %DQQLHUDQG&KULVWLDQ:+LUVFKµ7KHEconomic Function of Credit Rating Agencies±What does 
the Watchlist THOOXV"¶-%)
270 For simplicity I do not include another important determinant, namely the Loss Given Default. See section 5.3. 
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Source: American Bankruptcy Institute (www.abiworld.org) 
The point is illustrated even more clearly by the contrast between Figure 2 and Figure 3. By 
looking at a period of one calendar year, the percent change in the number of bankruptcies is 
dramatic, reaching peaks of 44% and 54% respectively in 2007 and 2008. On the contrary, by 
considering a shorter horizon, for instance a quarter, the percent changes are much smaller. 
These changes are often below the ten percent threshold, and are never above 19%. Without 
pretense to discuss thoroughly the impact of systemic crises on bankruptcy rates, it should be 
emphasized that these data suggest that firm defaults can be indeed correlated; but economic 
crises, however severe, do not spread instantly across issuers. 
Figure 2: Yearly Percent Change in Bankruptcies of Business Firms in the U.S. 
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Source: American Bankruptcy Institute (www.abiworld.org) 
Figure 3: Quarterly Percent Change in Bankruptcies of Business Firms in the U.S. 
Source: American Bankruptcy Institute (www.abiworld.org) 
Based on this observation, the strict liability faced by CRAs rating corporate bonds should 
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shortly after the rating has been issued or confirmed. If the definition of short term coincides 
with the typical interval in which CRAs review their ratings, CRAs will have the opportunity 
to revise their ratings when changed circumstances call for a different assessment. If an 
aggregate shock takes longer than three months to alter the frequency of defaults, CRAs will 
avoid liability just by adjusting their ratings to the new environment when the revisions come 
due. At the same time, liability cannot be avoided simply by downgrading firms that suddenly 
turn out to be riskier than originally foreseen. Once a rating is given or is confirmed, it will 
commit the CRA for three months in a proportion corresponding to the choice of D. After the 
expiration date, the standard negligence rule could be put back in place, which is another way 
to say that CRAs would face no liability, as is currently the case.  
6.2. Postponed Liability for Rating Structured Finance Products 
 
Although limiting liability to the short term offers CRAs an effective protection against 
systemic risk in the case of corporate bonds, this solution may not be sufficient for structured 
finance and, more in general, whenever defaults can be positively correlated also in the short 
term. Under these circumstances, the liability of CRAs simply needs to be excluded if defaults 
depend on systemic risk. In order to achieve this result, it is necessary to depart from the 
traditional deterministic tort law approach and exploit the law of large numbers. In this 
perspective, it is possible to imagine an incentive scheme grounded on the same model 
presented in the previous section, with the modifications below. 
This system would work as follows. A public authority records the rating issued by the CRAs, 
the fees they receive, and the actual frequency of defaults of each structured finance product. 
Using ߙȀܲݎ as a multiplier, the regulator calculates the potential liability that each CRA has to 
face for each default. CRAs should still be allowed to choose ߙ as in the strict liability regime 
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designed before. However, CRAs will not be asked to pay damage compensation whenever a 
structured finance asset defaults. Only after a certain time interval, say one year, the public 
DXWKRULW\ZLOOYHULI\WKHRYHUDOODFFXUDF\RID&5$¶VSUHGLFWLRQVZKLFKLQWXUn, will determine 
whether the CRA in question is to face liability for the assets that defaulted in the previous year. 
For example, let us consider the cluster BBB- (Baa3 using Fitch scale). The historical, 
annualized range of probability of default associated with this cluster is 0.025 - 0.032.271 If, 
during the time interval considered, less than 0.032 of the assets included in the cluster have 
defaulted, then no compensation will be due. Conversely, liability will be triggered if the quality 
of ratings has been below the relevant threshold. In other words, the payment will be due only 
if more than 0.032 of the assets included in the cluster BBB- has defaulted. 
Postponing the imposition of the monetary sanction allows making liability conditional on 
the failure of CRAs to predict default over a sufficiently large number of observations. This 
approach has two advantages in coping with systemic risk. Firstly, if the predictions of rating 
agencies turn out not to be inflated over the relevant timeframe, their profits will not be affected 
by the defaults occurring within their range of predictions because they will simply face no 
liability for those defaults. Compared to the strict liability solution, this mechanism tempers the 
over-deterrence stemming from the uninsurability of systemic risk. However, CRAs would still 
be liable to pay damages when the frequency of default in a given time interval exceeds the 
highest probability of default in the relevant class of rating. This effect is desirable to police 
rating inflation; but it also leaves CRAs exposed to systemic risk, particularly in those scenarios 
RI µHFRQRPLF FDWDVWURSKH¶ZKHUH VWUXFWXUHG ILQDQFH DVVHWV WHQG WR H[SHULHQFH H[WUDRUGLQDU\
rates of defaults. Financial crises are a case in point.  
                                                          
271 7KLVH[DPSOHLVEDVHGRQ)LWFK¶VKLVWRULFDODQQXDOL]HGGHIDXOWH[SHULHQFH&I&RYDO-XUHNDQG6WDIIRUGQ
212). 
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Fortunately, postponing the imposition of liability has a second advantage in coping with 
V\VWHPLFULVN7KHWLPHIUDPHIRUDVVHVVLQJWKHDFFXUDF\RI&5$V¶SUHGLFWLRQFRXOGEHPDGH
long enough to absorb the violent fluctuations in the default of structured finance products 
depending on a financial crisis. Obviously, for this purpose, the length of the interval is crucial. 
Whereas a one-\HDU SHULRG FRXOG EH VXIILFLHQW WR DVVHVV WKH DFFXUDF\ RI &5$V¶ UDWLQJV RI
structured finance in normal times, this might be just too short a time to compensate the sudden 
spikes in defaults coming along with a financial crisis. For this reason, it is advocated the 
introduction of a double layer of protection for the rating of structured finance products. At a 
first stage the ex-ante predictions of rating agency are compared with the ex-post default rates 
during the year in question. As stated above, if the predictions are accurate over one year, no 
liability will be imposed on rating agencies. Conversely, if the CRA has underestimated the 
number of defaults over one year, the public authority could decide on an exceptional basis to 
impose liability on the additional condition that ratings were inflated also over a longer time 
horizon. Importantly, in order to protect CRAs from systemic risk, the relevant timeframe can 
be extended backward, not forward. If, because of a financial crisis, structured finance products 
have experienced extraordinary rates of defaults in a year, it will take many years before the 
situation returns to normality and even longer before the shock can be absorbed by the data.  
Let us illustrate this solution with a simple numerical example. Assume that, for instance over 
the past five years, a rating agency has predicted for a given class of structured finance products 
the expected number of defaults (ED) indicated in the table below. Let also the actual number 
of defaults (ND) be as reported in the following table. 
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Year 1 2 3 4 5 
ED 10 9 8 7 6 40
ND 9 8 7 6 10 40
Only in the fifth year the rating agency has underestimated the number of defaults. Therefore, 
under the normal rule, the CRA should be liable to pay a compensation based on the ߙȀܲݎ
multiplier. However, the public authority might exceptionally determine that a spike from 6 to 
10 defaults from one year to another is a consequence of systemic risk and hence it might extend 
the assessment interval. For example, regulation may provide that in such situations the 
assessment interval could be extended up to the average maturity of the structured finance 
products in question. Let us assume, as in the numerical example, that the average maturity is 
five years, the latter becomes the relevant timeframe to determine whether the CRA is liable. 
As the example shows, over a five-year period ED is equal to ND (40 defaults) and therefore, 
despite the spike in the number of defaults in the fifth year, the CRA will face no liability. 
This solution would reward the CRAs who were more conservative in their ratings the years 
preceding a financial crisis, as those CRAs could count on historical frequencies of default 
below the maximum PD associated with the relevant letter grade. This effect is countercyclical, 
namely it counters, however little, the formation of asset bubbles without standing in the way 
of a recovery of credit.272 Although this solution ultimately relies on the ex-post discretion of 
public authorities to cope with systemic risk ± which it is assumed to be unpredictable ± it is 
                                                          
272 The countercyclical property of our solution is especially relevant given that ratings quality has been shown to 
be lower during booms Heski Bar-,VDDFDQG-RHO6KDSLURµ5DWLQJVQuality Over the Business C\FOH¶
JFE 62. 
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worth noting that this discretion is essentially limited to the declaration of a status of financial 
FULVLVDOORIWKHRWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHVRQ&5$V¶OLDELOLW\VKRXOGEHSUHGHWHUPLQHGE\UHJXODWLRQ
7. The Virtues of Capped Strict Liability 
 
It is worthwhile to briefly highlight the benefits of the approach presented in this chapter. In the 
first place, the liability rule proposed FRQQHFWV&5$V¶H[SHFWHGSURILWVWRWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHLU
ratings, thus inducing them to put their money where their mouth is. In fact, by tying the 
H[SHFWHGOLDELOLW\WRWKHUDWLQJDVVLJQHGDQGWRWKHOHYHORIFRPPLWPHQWDFFHSWHGWKH&5$V¶
profits will depend on the quality of their predictions. It follows that the problem of rating 
shopping is addressed implicitly, as any CRA that produces overoptimistic ratings to attract 
more issuers will be forced to face higher liability.    
Secondly, this proposal introduces a damage cap based on objective factors. The cap has the 
important virtue to prevent over-deterrence of rating activity. At the same time, this approach 
eliminates almost any discretion on the side of regulators and courts. The only exception is the 
declaration of financial crisis status necessary to offer CRAs rating structured finance products 
a second layer of protection against systemic risk. Otherwise, the rule advocated in this chapter 
carries sizeable savings in terms of administrative costs. There will be no need to scrutinize the 
behavior of CRAs or to establish complex standards of care in order to prevent them from 
producing inflated ratings. Moreover, courts will not have to quantify the portion of damages 
attributable to the conduct of CRAs. Determining that an issuer or a bond have defaulted and 
multiplying the price by the probability of default associated with a given rating are (quasi-) 
automatic and (quasi-) costless tasks. The risk of litigation errors, frivolous litigation, and 
opportunistic settlements usually created by strict liability will all be ruled out.  
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Finally, the incentive scheme described above ties the income earned by CRAs to the quality 
of their forecasting techniques, thus creating the right incentives also from a dynamic 
perspective. To understand this point, let us assume that three rating agencies exist: A, B, and 
C. A and B have developed state-of-the-art forecasting models; thus they are able to assess with 
JUHDWHUDFFXUDF\WKDQ&WKHLVVXHU¶VSUREDELOLW\RIGHIDXOW/HWXVDOVRDVVXPHWKDWILUPVDUH
divided in two groups, X and Y, which respectively have a low and a high probability of default. 
Under these assumptions C will not be able to distinguish between X and Y and will therefore 
be forced to assign an average probability of default. Good issuers, however, could obtain better 
ratings from A and B because these rating agencies are able to better assess their 
creditworthiness. As a consequence, issuers belonging to the cluster X will switch to the two 
CRAs that are able to assign them the rating they deserve. The more good firms switch to A 
and B, the higher will be the average level of risk of the pool of firms rated by C. In the end, all 
the good firms that have a low probability of default will be rated by A and B, and the firms 
with a high probability of default will be indifferent between A, B and C. As in the real world, 
the probability of default of rated firms approaches a continuous function, the only competitive 
equilibrium is one where every firm opt for A or B, unless they are so risky to be indifferent 
between A, B, and C. In this case, however, the rating would have hardly any added value for 
the issuer and C would have to exit the market for ratings. 
An identical reasoning applies to the parameter ߙ when CRAs choose freely how much to 
expose themselves to liability. In fact, CRAs that can offer predictions which are more accurate 
will be able to determine with higher precision when they can expose themselves to a higher 
liability. It is obvious that good firms will have every incentive to hire the CRA that can adopt 
a higher value of ߙ, both because this implies a higher commitment to rating accuracy and 
because a relatively high ߙ should be a precondition for ratings to deliver regulatory benefits. 
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For analogy with the mechanism described above, a high Ƚ ZLOOHPHUJHDVDUHVXOWRI&5$V¶
competition on the quality of forecasting techniques. 
8. Conclusion  
 
There has been an enormous debate both at the political and at the academic level on how to 
LQGXFH&5$V¶WRSURGXFHDFFXUDWHUDWLQJV,QWKLVFKDSWHU, it has been argued that tying liability 
to the probabilistic prediction offered by the CRA and exploiting the law of large numbers 
allows developing a framework that gives CRAs the correct incentives. More precisely, it has 
been proposed the introduction of an expiring, capped strict liability rule with a contractual 
component. A damage cap based on objective factors is introduced in order to avoid crushing 
liability, whereas the expiration date is needed to shield CRAs from systemic risk whenever ±
as in the case of corporate bonds ± defaults are largely uncorrelated in the short term. 
Furthermore, CRAs are allowed to determine contractually at what level they want to commit 
to their predictions. Importantly, no liability is imposed on them, unless they want their ratings 
to have regulatory relevance. Finally, in order to protect CRAs from systemic risk also when 
defaults can be correlated in the short term (as in the case of structured finance), a departure 
from the traditional deterministic tort law approach is proposed. By delaying the compensation 
until after few defaults have occurred, CRAs may be punished only when their predictions are 
proven to be inaccurate by the law of large numbers. 
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V. The Indeterminacy Principle of Tort Law and Economics 
1. Introduction 
 
At a first glance, the law and economics movement seems to be the answer to the indeterminacy 
of predictions. Every law and economics textbook contains in one form or another the proof of 
what Dari-Mattiacci called the two fundamental theorems of tort law and economics.273 The 
first, the efficiency-equivalence theorem, states that under the classic assumptions any 
negligence rule gives both parties efficient incentives with respect to care.274 The second, the 
activity level theorem, asserts that under the classic assumptions no negligence rule gives both 
parties efficient incentives with respect to activity level.275 In other words, the classic model of 
WRUWODZDQGHFRQRPLFVSURPLVHVWRRIIHUDYHU\SUHFLVHGHVFULSWLRQRISDUWLHV¶EHKDYLRUDWOHDVW
under strong simplifying assumptions.  
Nevertheless, despite the prominent place that these theorems occupy in the tort law and 
economics arena, much confusion surrounds their real meaning. In this chapter, I attempt to 
shed some light on the real informative content that they carry. More precisely, I will show that 
even under the classic assumptions the only possible statement is that the party who is not the 
residual loss bearer will take optimal care.276 Or better, because no information can be derived 
on the behavior of the party who is not the residual bearer, even the extremely simplified world 
described by the economists is dominated by an indeterminacy principle.  
                                                          
273 Cf Cooter and Ulen (n 229); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (HUP 1987); Mitchell A 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (Little Brown 2007). The definition first appeared in Giuseppe 
Dari-Mattiacci, Tort Law and Economics (n 55). 
274 The classic assumptions are: (i) parties are rational and utility maximizing (ii) perfectly informed about the 
legal rules, (iii) risk neutral, (iv) there are no administrative costs (v) and compensation is perfect. Cf Shavell, 
Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). 
275 Cf Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49).  
276 The residual loss bearer is the party that will bear the losses deriving from accidents in which neither of the 
two parties have been negligent.  
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First, I show that the two fundamental theorems cannot hold at the same time. The two 
fundamental theorems can coexist only iISDUWLHV¶EHKDYLRULVGHWHUPLQHGWKURXJKDWZR-step 
procedure; first, the parties determine their respective care levels and only later decide their 
activity level.277 Implicit in this approach is the assumption that care and activity level are 
independent goods, instead of being (imperfect) substitutes.278 Once this implicit assumption is 
relaxed, the classic model can no longer offer any information on the behavior of the residual 
loss bearer (indeterminacy principle). 
Second, in contrast with the received wisdom, I show that under the standard assumptions the 
traditional negligence rules generally do not allow reaching a second-best outcome. More 
precisely, building on the literature on loss sharing between non-negligent parties,279 I show 
that under the traditional assumptions there can be infinite rules leading to a higher social 
welfare than negligence and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence.280
Given the little informative content of the traditional model, in the second part of this chapter 
I suggest integrating its study with the concept of optimal space of uniform standards. That is 
to say, the optimal area in which standards should be uniform considering the following factors: 
(i) characteristics of the environment, (ii) similarity of preferences and characteristics of 
individuals, (iii) uniformity of activity level across space and (iv) uniformity of activity level 
over time.281 Combining the concept of optimal space of uniform standards, with the framework 
                                                          
277 &I-DFRE1XVVLPDQG$YUDKDP'7DEEDFKµ$UHYLVHGPRGHORIXQLODWHUDODFFLGHQWV¶ 29 IRLE 169. 
They note how this approach is extremely common and used, for example by Shavell, Economic Analysis of 
Accident Law (n 273) 22 and Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (HUP 2004) 195. 
278 This approach is far from extinct. In a recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci et al. adopt the mirror image of this 
assumption. They assume that one part\¶VFDUHOHYHOFDQQRWDIIHFWRWKHUSDUW\¶VDFWLYLW\OHYHO&I*LXVHSSH'DUL-
0DWWLDFFL%UXQR/RYDWDQG)UDQFHVFR3DULVLµ/RVV6KDULQJEHWZHHQ1RQQHJOLJHQWSDUWLHV¶-,7(
It is however apparent that this assumption does not necessarily hold. If all drivers in a certain city become ruthless 
it is very likely that pedestrians will lower their activity level, and not only adopt more care.  
279 Cf Dari-Mattiacci, Lovat and Parisi (n 278). 
280 With infinite rules, I mean that there can be infinite criteria for sharing losses among the parties leading to 
higher welfare than negligence and strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. This is, after all, a 
relevant dimension under which negligence rules can be differentiated.  
281 The literature generally focuses on (ii). 
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of the classic model it is possible to draw some normative implications. For example, when the 
optimal space of uniIRUP VWDQGDUGV LV VPDOO UXOHV LQ ZKLFK FRXUWV GR QRW GLFWDWH SDUWLHV¶
behavior (i.e. strict liability) tend to be superior. Conversely, when the optimal space of uniform 
standards is large, it might be better to opt for rules in which the court set due care levels for 
both parties (i.e. negligence with a defense of contributory negligence).  
2. The Classic Model 
 
To justify the claims presented in the introduction to this chapter, I will reproduce the proof 
offered by the classic literature.282
Tort law and economics scholars usually divide accidents into unilateral and bilateral.  In the 
former case only the injurer is able to take precautions affecting either the probability of the 
accident or the size of the potential losses. In a bilateral setting also the victim can affect the 
likelihood of the accident and/or the magnitude of the expected losses. Because the theorems 
are mostly relevant in bilateral settings, unilateral accidents will not be discussed.  
Following the classic literature, it will be assumed that parties are risk neutral, that there are 
no administrative costs, and that compensation is perfect. Moreover, in order to behave as 
predicted by the model, parties are assumed to be perfectly informed about the legal rules, 
rational, and utility maximizing.283 Lastly, the activity level has to be intended in its literal 
meaning, yet within the framework of the classic model it could be defined more conveniently 
in a different way. As Shavell284 VXJJHVWHGµcare¶ is the set of precautionary measures included 
in the negligence criterion DQGµDFWLYLW\OHYHO¶ is the residual set of precautionary measures not 
                                                          
282 6WHYHQ6KDYHOOµ7KH2SWLPDO8VH2I1RQPRQHWDU\6DQFWLRQVas D'HWHUUHQW¶ (1987) 77 AER 584. 
283 Cf Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). 
284 Ibidem. 
64_Edle BW Romana.job
126 
 
included in the negligence criterion.285 This alternative definition will be discussed in section 
3.
In bilateral settings both the victim and the injurer can affect the likelihood of an accident; 
thus adequate incentives to both parties have to be provided.  A rule of strict liability without a 
defense cannot achieve this result. As the victim will be compensated for all her losses she will 
have no incentives to take care. Conversely, the injurer will be forced to internalize all the losses 
she causes and will thus take optimal care and engage in the activity optimally.286
A better result can be obtained under a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory 
negligence; the victim will now be induced to take optimal care to avoid being held liable (recall 
that it was assumed due care to be set at the optimal level).  Given that the victim will take due 
care, the injurer will have to bear all the losses and will therefore take optimal care too.  
The social optimum cannot be reached if the activity level is taken into account. Because the 
victim will be entirely compensated for all the losses she suffered, she will compare her private 
marginal benefit (PMB) from engaging in the activity with her private marginal cost (PMC), 
instead of taking into account the social marginal cost (SMC). As a result, she will engage in 
the activity too often. Conversely, being the residual loss bearer, the injurer will be induced to 
internalize every loss she causes; she will therefore compare the marginal benefits from the 
activity with the SMC and engage in the activity optimally. 
Symmetrically, under a negligence rule the injurer will take due care but she will engage 
excessively in the activity because she will be able to escape liability for all the losses. The 
victim is now the residual loss bearer and hence she will engage in the activity optimally. From 
these considerations it is possible to infer that any negligence rule will induce both parties to 
                                                          
285 Cf also Giuseppe Dari-MDWWLDFFLµ7KH2SWLPDO6FRSHRI1HJOLJHQFH¶5/(
286 Strict liability is usually considered the dominant rule in unilateral settings since the incentives given to the 
victim are irrelevant. 
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take optimal care (efficiency equivalence theorem) but no negligence rule can induce both 
parties to adopt the optimal activity level (activity level theorem).  
An obvious postulate is that the behavior of the residual loss bearer will depend on the 
behavior of its counterpart; as the party who is not the residual loss bearer will have an excessive 
activity level, the residual loss bearer will not behave as she would have, had her counterpart 
engaged in the activity optimally. This is due to the fact that injurers and victims play what is 
usually defined as a non-cooperative game; each player acts independently but their payoffs 
depend on the strategies of the other players.287 It would be illogical to imply that an excessive 
activity level of one of the parties would not affect the behavior of its counterpart.  
2.1 The Mathematical Model (Trying to Apply the Theorems) 
 
The income equivalent of total welfare in a non-market bilateral situation can be described as 
follows:288
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ݕݐ݈ሺݔǡ ݏሻ (5.1)
x ܹ is the total welfare; 
x ݔ is the level of precaution adopted by the injurer; 
x ݕ is the activity level of the injurer; 
x ܣሺݔǡ ݕሻ is the income equivalent of the utility to an injurer of engaging in his activity 
at level y exercising care ݔ;
                                                          
287 John Nash, µ1RQ-FRRSHUDWLYH*DPHV¶54 Annals of Math 286. 
288 The model presented in this section closely follows Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). This 
model implies a linear relationship between the activity levels and the harm. More recent formulations of the 
classic model have abandoned this assumption. The proof offered holds also if the more general model is adopted. 
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x ݏ are the precautions adopted by the victim; 
x ݐ LVYLFWLP¶VDFWLYLW\OHYHO
x ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ is the income equivalent of the utility to a victim of engaging in his activity 
at level ݐ exercising care ݏ;
x ݈ሺݔǡ ݏሻ are the expected accident losses per victim per unit of injurer activity and of 
victim activity.  
I define univocally the optimal level of precautions and activity (denoted by ݔכ, ݕכǡ ݏכ and ݐכ)
that maximize the function ܹ.
For any given level of precautions ݔ, ܣ is a strictly increasing function of y until it reaches its 
maximum, to become strictly decreasing afterwards. Specifically, for any ݔ, Ay(x,y)>0 for 
y<y(x) and Ay(x, y)<0 for y>y(x). y(x) is uniquely defined by either  Ay(x,y)=0 or, if this never 
holds, y(x)=0. H(s, t) has analogous properties. Under a rule of strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence the victim will have to set s=s* but she will not take into account the 
term ytl(x, s) when determining her activity level, hence t>t*. Conversely, the injurer faces the 
problem of maximizing W, given s and t chosen by the victim;289 for the two fundamental 
theorems to hold (under the definition of optimality adopted) the injurer should adopt x=x* and 
yy*. 
 A symmetrical reasoning applies to a negligence rule. The injurer will choose x=x* and y>y*
and the victim should respond by choosing s=s* and tt*.
3. A Puzzling Hidden Assumption 
 
                                                          
289 +LVQRZDFRQVWDQWVRWRPD[LPL]H:LVWKHVDPHDVPD[LPL]LQJ$(xyyt/x,s*
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In the previous section, in line with the prevailing literature,290 I determined the care levels and 
the activity levels of the parties through a two-step procedure. First, I identified the care levels 
of the parties and then I derived their activity levels. Nevertheless, it is intuitive that the two 
problems are strongly interrelated. To put it differently:  
µin contrast to the common result in the literature, the socially optimal behavior of 
injurers [and victims] cannot be determined in two steps: first by finding the level 
of care that minimizes total accident costs incurred each time injurers [and victims] 
engage in the activity; and then by raising the level of activity as long as the 
marginal utility for injurers exceeds the incrHPHQWWRWRWDODFFLGHQWFRVWV¶291
Let us refer to the familiar example of drivers (injurers) and pedestrians (victims). The 
traditional two-step procedure implicitly assumes that pedestrians will always answer to an 
excessive number of cars only by walking less, because the parties have already determined 
their respective care levels when they decide how much to engage in the activity. In fact, if the 
parties determine their care and activity levels in two different moments, the choice of the 
former is not affected by the behavior in terms of the latter. That is, even if injurers will have 
an excessive activity level, the victims will still take optimal care but they will walk less miles. 
However, this is not necessarily true.  
Let us move to a typical city where drivers and pedestrians have to coexist and where a rule 
of strict liability with a defense is in place. As pedestrians are not the residual loss bearers, they 
will adopt optimal care but will have an excessive activity level. Drivers can decide to react in 
GLIIHUHQWZD\VWRYLFWLPV¶EHKDYLRUi) they can adopt optimal care but drive fewer miles. (ii)
They can drive just as much as they used to, but at a lower speed (or taking more care). In other 
                                                          
(J6KDYHOOFoundations of Economic Analysis of LawQ
 1XVVLP DQG 7DEEDFK Q  $V WKH DXWKRUV VXJJHVW WKLV DSSURDFK LV YHU\ FRPPRQ LQ WKH PDLQVWUHDP
OLWHUDWXUH
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words, under the classic assumptions a rule of strict liability with a defense might lead the 
injurer to engage in the activity optimally, but to adopt excessive care. (iii) Drivers might simply 
decide to take a longer route in order to avoid the city center packed with pedestrians. They 
would drive more miles while adopting a lower care level than the one they would have adopted 
in the city center. In this case, under the classic assumptions, a rule of strict liability with a 
defense leads the injurer to engage in the activity excessively, yet to take less than optimal care.  
It is incorrect to rule out the second and the third possibility implying that to adopt optimal care 
and to lower the activity level is always the best reaction.   
This conclusion is reinforced if the broader definition of activity level advocated by Shavell292
and Dari-Mattiacci293 is adopted. In fact, it should be implicitly assumed that every time the 
victim adopts a low level of unobservable precautions (an excessive µDFWLYLW\ OHYHO¶), the 
LQMXUHU¶VEHVWUHVSRQVHLVDOZD\VWRLQFUHDVHWKHOHYHORIXQREVHUYable precautions (to lower the 
µDFWLYLW\OHYHO¶). Why this should be the case is a puzzle that is very likely to not be solved, 
especially considering that the set of precautions that victims and injurers have at their disposal 
might be completely different. To imply some sort of parallelism between their sets of 
observable and unobservable precautions appears to be illogic.  
Informally, this example shows that parties do not necessarily adopt optimal care, unless it is 
assumed that the observable precautions and unobservable precautions are independent goods. 
Such an assumption offers a strongly distorted representation of reality and ± as it will be shown 
in the following section ± it contradicts the mathematical model used to demonstrate the two 
theorems.  
                                                          
292 Cf Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49). 
293 Cf Dari-Mattiacci (n 285). 
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3.1 A moving maximum 
 
In this section, I will show that the two theorems only hold under the very restrictive assumption 
that care and activity level are independent goods. Total welfare in a non-market bilateral 
situation can be described by (5.1): 
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ݕݐ݈ሺݔǡ ݏሻ (5.1)
The behavior of a function that respects the assumptions imposed by the seminal article of 
Shavell ± for given values of s and t ± is shown in the following figure 
             
Let us assume that t and s have been chosen optimally by the victim; the global maximum 
will be identified by a certain pair x, y. In other words, given s* and t*, the maximum welfare 
will be reached for x*, y*. As soon as there is a departure from t*, the function H(s,t) will no 
longer assume its optimal value; because s and t appear also in the term ytl(x,s) a departure from 
t* is not a linear transformation and hence it will inevitably change the shape of the curve too. 
The global maximum will no longer be in x*.  ThH,QMXUHUZLOOQRORQJHUWDNHµoptimal care¶.
w 
y 
x 
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Let us now focus on a negligence rule. The injurer will set x equal to x*, but she will not take 
into account the term ytl(x,s) when determining her activity level y, hence y > y*. On the other 
hand, the victim has to maximize W, given the care level and the activity level chosen by the 
injurer. The curve has now a different shape from the original one given y*, therefore it cannot 
be claimed that the victim will adopt the optimal care level s* and a suboptimal activity level.  
3.2 Redefining what is Optimal: A Cure Worse than the Disease 
 
I defined univocally the optimal care level and the optimal activity level (denoted by x*, y*, s*
and t*) as the levels of precaution and the levels of activity that maximize (5.1). It is possible 
to offer a cure to the fundamental theorems, yet this probably creates more problems than it 
solves.  The first theorem would formally be valid if µRSWLPDO¶ is defined as any behavior that 
maximizes the welfare function faced by an agent. ,ZLOOODEHOWKLVµSULYDWH-RSWLPXP¶On the 
one hand, this definition is redundant, because it is already embedded in the concept of 
economic rationality that economic agents maximize their own utility function. On the other 
KDQG WKLV µFXUH¶ LQWURGXFHVambiguity in the terminology and weakens even the most basic 
normative implications that follow from the classic model. Also, note that if we focus on private 
optimums parties not only adopt optimal care, but also an optimal activity level. Therefore, 
under this definition of optimality it is the second theorem that becomes false.  
Let us assume that a negligence rule is in place and that total welfare is still described by 
(5.1). 
Once again, the value of x, y, s and t that maximize (5.1) are x*, y*, s* and t*. The injurer will 
now adopt a care level equal to x* and an activity level yn > y* that maximizes the function
A(x*,y).                       
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 The victim has to maximize the function:  
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ݕݐ݈ሺݔǡ ݏሻ (5.2)
The victim will choose the values sn and tn   that maximize (5.7KHVHYDOXHVDUHµRSWLPDO¶
given the behavior of the injurer but they are different from s* and t*.
Let us switch to a rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence. In this case 
the victim will be induced to adopt a care level of s* and the activity level ts > t* that maximizes 
the function H(s*,t).
The injurer will now face the following function: 
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ݕݐ݈ሺݔǡ ݏሻ (5.3)
To maximize (5.3) she will choose the corresponding values xs and ys. These values are once 
again optimal given the behavior of the victim, but are different from x* and y*.
Although it is true that the level of care adopted under both rules is optimal (if we refer to 
private optimum), they are not equal nor are they necessarily equivalent in terms of welfare. 
Under a rule of negligence the parties will adopt the levels of care x* and sn, whereas under a 
rule of strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence they will adopt xs and s*. There 
is no sound reason to argue the equivalence of these pairs of care levels, even though they are 
both called µoptimal¶.
Summarizing, if we focus ± as we should on the social optimum the first theorem is false. 
Alternatively, defining DVµRSWLPDO¶DQ\EHKDYLRUWKDWPD[LPL]HVWKHZHOIDUHIXQFWLRQIDFHGE\
an agent (i.e. private optimum), the first theorem would become true, yet the second theorem 
would be false. Under the latter definition of optimality, parties adopt both optimal care and 
optimal activity level. The two theorems cannot coexist, because they cannot be simultaneously 
valid.
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As under different rules parties maximize different functions under different constraints, they 
will adopt different care levels depending on the existing rule. Moreover, these care levels will 
generally be different from the univocally defined x* and s* and hence will not be optimal. 
Alternatively, we can focus on private optimums, yet by doing so the fundamental theorems 
EHFRPHWDXWRORJLFDOLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\DXWRPDWLFDOO\IROORZIURPWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIDJHQWV¶
UDWLRQDOLW\7RSXWLWGLIIHUHQWO\LWLVWUXHWKDWSDUWLHVZRXOGDGRSWµRSWLPDO¶FDUHLHWKH\ZLOO
maximize their own utility function), yet it is not possible to draw any inference on the 
efficiency of their behavior in terms of overall social welfare.  
Furthermore, it cannot be proven that yn > ys or that ts > tn; the mathematical model confirms 
the qualitative intuition presented in section 3. Under a rule of strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence the activity level of the injurer might even be higher than under a rule 
of negligence. 
These findings are summarized in the following tables:  
Table 1: 
  Strict Liability  w/ a defense Negligence 
Care Level I x? x=x*
Activity Level I y? y>y* 
Care Level V s=s* s?
Activity Level V t>t* t?
The notation x?, y?, s?, and t? is used when from the classic model it cannot be inferred if the 
value of the variable will be higher, equal, or lower than the optimal value.  As shown by Table 
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1, no information can be obtained on the behavior of the party who is not the residual loss bearer 
(indeterminacy principle).  
In Table 2 the behavior of the parties under the different rules is compared.   
Table 2: 
 S.L. w/ a 
defense
Negligence Comparison 
Care Level I x? x = x* ?
Activity Level I y? y > y*  ?
Care Level V s = s* s? ?
Activity Level V T > t* t? ?
Table 2 shows that the fundamental theorems carry a very small informational content. Even 
within the classic assumptions, it is not possible to compare the different rules under any 
dimension.
3.3. How Efficient are Traditional Negligence Rules? 
 
It is generally stated that first best results are impossible to achieve,294 yet a second best solution 
can be reached by choosing either for negligence or strict liability with a defense of contributory 
negligence. This optimistic conclusion is, however, not supported by the mathematical model.
 Let us introduce a parameter Ͳ ൏ ߙ ൏ ͳdenoting how losses are allocated between non-
negligent parties. Let us assume that for ߙ=0 all the losses resulting from accidents in which 
                                                          
6KDYHOOStrict Liability versus NegligenceQ
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both parties have taken due care are borne by the injurer, whereas for ߙ=1 all the losses are 
allocated on the victim. Therefore, under strict liability with a defense of contributory 
negligence ߙ=0 and under a negligence rule ߙ=1.
As ߙ is a continuous variable, there exist an infinite number of criteria to allocate losses 
among non-negligent parties.295 Each of these solutions (could) lead to a different pair of care 
levels and to a different level of social welfare. Whenever one of the traditional rules is chosen, 
there could be an infinite number of sharing criteria leading to a higher overall welfare. In fact, 
there can be infinite rules leading to a higher welfare than negligence and strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence.  
Let us recall that under a negligence rule the injurer will maximize the function A(x*,y). The 
reason is that under a negligence rule non-negligent injurers will not bear any loss, and hence 
the weight (ߙ) of the term ytl(x.s) is equal to 0. As an example, let us now assume that ߙ =0.1. 
The injurer will therefore adopt x* and take the yĮ that maximizes the following function:296
ܣሺݔכǡ ݕሻ െ ͲǤͳ כ ݕݐ݈ሺݔכǡ ݕሻ (5.4) 
The victim will now maximize the following function: 
ܹ൫ݔכǡ ݕఈǡǡ ݏǡ ݐ൯ ൌ ܣ൫ݔכǡ ݕఈǡ൯ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ͲǤͻ כ ݕఈǡݐ݈ሺݔכǡ ݏሻ (5.5) 
Once again, the values ݏఈ and ݐఈ chosen by the victim are optimal given the behavior of the 
injurer, but are different from s* and t*. Notably, there is no way to rule out the possibility that 
this outcome is more efficient than the one reached under a negligence rule. As ߙ can assume 
infinite values, there can be infinite rules that are better than negligence and strict liability with 
a defense of contributory negligence.297
                                                          
Dari-Mattiacci, Lovat and Parisi (n 278). 
296 Or the sake of simplicity, I assume that ߙ ൌ ͲǤͳ LVQRWHQRXJKWRXQGHUPLQHLQMXUHUV¶LQFHQWLYHVWRWDNHRSWLPDO
care. 
297 Cf Dari-Mattiacci, Lovat and Parisi (n 278). 
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Two additional points should be noted. First, although under the non-univocal definition of 
optimal behavior every negligenFHUXOHIRUPDOO\OHDGVERWKSDUWLHVWRDGRSWWKHµRSWLPDO¶OHYHO
of care, these optimums are not identical, nor can they be assumed to be equivalent from an 
efficiency point of view. In other words, even if we want to preserve the assertion that every 
single negligence rule leads both parties to adopt optimal precautions, we cannot save the label 
µHIILFLHQF\HTXLYDOHQFHWKHRUHP¶.298 In contrast with a common result of the literature, the pairs 
of care level adopted under the various rules are not necessarily equally efficient.299
Second, the so-FDOOHG µOHVVHU RI WZR HYLO SULQFLSOH¶ ± explained below ± must also be 
reinterpreted accordingly.300 It is common wisdom that: 
µ[T]he preferred liability rule depends on whether it is more important to control 
the injureU¶VRUWKHYLFWLP¶VDFWLYLW\OHYHO,IWKHLQMXUHU¶VDFWLYLW\OHYHOLVRIJUHDWHU
concern, then strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence should be 
XVHG ,I WKH YLFWLP¶V DFWLYLW\ OHYHO LV PRUH LPSRUWDQW WKHQ QHJOLJHQFH LV
SUHIHUDEOH¶301
Nevertheless, the choice of the optimal rule does not depend only on the deviation in terms 
of activity level (i.e. under a negligence rule the distance between yn and y*). It depends also on 
the departure of the behavior of the residual loss bearer from the one that maximizes W (i.e. 
under the same rule the distance between sn and s* and tn and t*). Unless new hypotheses are 
introduced, we cannot infer that larger departures in terms of activity level lead to a greater 
                                                          
298 Giuseppe DariǦMattiaccLDQG*HUULW'H*HHVWµ7KHFiltering Effect of Sharing RXOHV¶-/6
299 Among the many authors that have embraced this syllogism cf Dari-0DWWLDFFLµ,WIROORZVWKDWDQHJOLJHQFH
rule which makes the injurer pay only 1% of the accident cost in the case of both parties being negligent and lets 
the victim bears 99% of the loss is as efficient with respect to care as a 50-50 rule, as a 90-10, as a 75-35 and so 
IRUWK¶>QRWHWKDWWKHDXWKRUrefers also to the extreme cases of pure negligence and strict liability with a  defense 
of contributory negligence]. Dari-Mattiacci (n 55). 
300 David Gilo and Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts (2009) 108 
MLR 277. 
301 Cf Polinsky (n 273). 
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welfare loss. In fact, even if the deviation in terms of activity level is larger under a certain rule, 
WKHUHODWHGSDLURIµRSWLPDOFDUHOHYHOV¶PLJKWEHLQIHULRU
It could be argued that the care level of the residual bearer departs from the optimum as a 
consequence of the deviation in terms of activity level of the counterpart, and thus the latter is 
relevant. However, it should also be admitted that the deviation in the activity level is a mere 
reflex of the due care level imposed by the FRXUWV$WDFORVHU ORRN WKH µlesser of two evil 
principle¶ simply means that we should control the variable that is more important to control.  
Syllogistic thought is an irresistible temptation and it is indeed natural to think that (i) if all 
rules induce the parties to adopt the optimal level of care and (ii) if under every rule the party 
who is not the residual bearer has an excessive activity level (iii) then the only difference among 
different rules is the level of activity. On the contrary, the rules should be evaluated in terms of 
the deviation of the three variables that are not directly fixed by the courts (y, s and t under a 
negligence rule, and x, y and t under a rule of strict liability with a defense), but the model offers 
no guidance from this perspective. In other words, we are again back to where we started. No 
prediction can be made on the behavior of the parties. 
4. 0D[LPL]LQJ«Nothing
 
Despite its scarce informative content, the classic model can be an interesting starting point to 
study the many faces of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity exists under a number of dimensions, yet 
law and economics scholars generally focus only on some of them. In this section, I will argue 
that studying the main sources of heterogeneity jointly allows identifying the optimal space of 
uniform standards. This concept can be integrated into the framework of the classic model. 
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4.1 When? 
 
A first dimension under which heterogeneity should be studied is time. Most of the models 
focus on the level of activity, yet not on when the activity is engaged. A simple numerical 
example is enough to show that the variable time should not be ignored. Let us assume to be in 
a city in which drivers (injurers) and pedestrians (victims) have to coexist. For the sake of 
simplicity, it will be assumed that in this city there are only 20 people. 10 of them are (only) 
drivers, whereas the other 10 are (only) pedestrians. It will also be assumed that accidents 
happen only between one driver and one pedestrian. Furthermore, it will be assumed that courts 
can observe the activity level and the care level of both parties.302 When a certain regulation 
has to be introduced it generally has no expiration date. Affirming that the optimal activity level 
for drivers is 1000 miles is a meaningless statement, unless the relevant time interval during 
which the 1000 miles can be covered is defined. In other words, given the information available, 
the courts (or the legislator) have to maximize W over a certain time interval. For example, it 
could be said that the relevant time interval is a year; therefore, the courts have to identify the 
optimal number of miles that should be covered during this time interval. The courts will 
therefore define a negligence criterion that will induce parties to adopt the care levels x* and 
s*, and the activity levels y*/per year and t*/per year.303
The idea that maximizing the function (5.1) over the relevant time interval always implies 
that also the total welfare is maximized has never been questioned. Nevertheless, this idea is 
wrong. In the example, it was assumed that courts want to define how many miles pedestrians 
and drivers should cover every year. As they have all the relevant information on the precaution 
costs and on accident costs, they can maximize (5.1). Let us suppose that the optimal activity 
                                                          
302 +HUH,DPGHSDUWLQJIURPWKHWUDGLWLRQDODVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHDFWLYLW\OHYHOLVQRWREVHUYDEOH
7KHOLWHUDOPHDQLQJVRIRSWLPDOFDUHDQGDFWLYLW\OHYHODUH being used. It has also been assumed that activity 
level is observable and is included in the negligence criterion. 
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level for pedestrians is 100 miles a year while adopting a care level of 10. It will also be assumed 
that for drivers it is optimal to drive 1000 miles a year and to adopt a care level of 20. Following 
the classic literature, these values are called µoptimal¶ as they maximize (5.1); however, it would 
be a very lucky coincidence if these values also maximize the total welfare over a year.  
To understand why let us assume that pedestrians only leave their apartments from January 
to June, whereas drivers use their cars only from July to December. As accidents by assumption 
only take place between one driver and one pedestrian, the optimal level of care for both parties 
is 0. Because drivers and pedestrians never share the streets, even the smallest precaution is 
inefficient. In other words, the value of the parameters that maximize (5.1) over a year do not 
maximize the sum of social welfare in the two semesters. Under these circumstances, 
maximizing (5.1) over a year is an empty exercise, as it is possible to achieve a better result by 
choosing any value of x and s smaller than x* and s*. Ideally total welfare is maximized for x=0
and s=0.   
The example offered here is clearly oversimplified; however it shows that maximizing (5.1) 
is an empty exercise, unless it is assumed that injurers and victims are uniformly distributed 
over the relevant time interval.  The mathematics behind it is trivial: since the relationship 
between the variables is not linear, to maximize (5.1) over a certain time interval does not imply 
that also the sum of the welfare in the fractions of that interval is maximized. In this case, if W
is maximized over each semester better result is obtained than maximizing W over the year. In 
other words, when people engage in the activity is a crucial piece of information that is 
completely ignored by the classic model. 
Abandoning our oversimplified example does not change the scenario.  
Let us move to a real city and let us relax the assumption that accidents cannot happen 
between two drivers. Let us also relax the assumption that people walk and drive only six 
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months per year. It still seems plausible that the optimal level of precautions that drivers and 
pedestrians should adopt is heavily dependent on how crowded the streets are. As stated above, 
under a rule of strict liability with a defense the victim will have to set s equal to s*. It was 
assumed that also the activity level is observable and hence t = t*. The injurer will choose the 
combination of care level and activity level (x*,y*) that maximizes W, given the (optimal) 
behavior of the victims. If the number of victims is not constant during the year (e.g. there might 
be fewer pedestrians during winter due to the cold weather, whereas the summer breeze might 
offer an incentive to walk), also the optimal behavior of the injurer is bound to change 
accordingly. To prove this point mathematically it suffices to note that the combinations of x
and y that maximize W change for different values of t.  If during winter tw < t*/2 and during 
summer ts > t*/2 (with ts + tw = t*), there will be a combination of x and y that is optimal for 
winter (xw, yw), and another combination that is optimal for summer (xs , ys). A better result in 
terms of welfare can be achieved if injurers adopt xw, yw during the winter and xs ,ys during the 
summer instead of x* and y* all over the year.
It might be suggested that the obvious solution is to adopt as the relevant time interval a 
season instead of a year; however, this would offer very little relief. In fact, it can be argued 
that the activity level of pedestrians is not the same during the entire winter, as it is very likely 
that there is a peak in the activity level of drivers and pedestrians during Christmas holidays. If 
this is the case, a week should be considered as the relevant time interval. Even doing so, the 
optimum will not be reached because people might be more likely to walk during the weekend 
than during weekdays.  The answer could be further narrowing down the relevant time interval 
to a day. However, as people tend to walk more during the day than during the night also this 
solution would not be satisfying. If administrative costs are not considered, the relevant time 
interval should tend to zero, or at least be small enough to guarantee that the distribution of 
victims (injurers) is constant inside the interval.  
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Assuming that the activity level and the care level imposed by the court can change over time, 
equation (5.1) should be rewritten in the following way: 
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐሻ ൌ ෌ ሾܣ߬ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܪ߬ሺݏǡ ݐሻ െ ݕݐ݈߬ሺݔǡ ݏሻሿ௡ఛୀଵ ,
(5.4)
where ߬ represents the time.  
Conversely, if it is assumed that the courts have to define a single due care level and a single 
activity level for the whole period, (5.1) should be rewritten as follows: 
ܹሺݔǡ ݕǡ ݏǡ ݐǡ ߬ሻ ൌ ܣሺݔǡ ݕǡ ߬ሻ ൅ ܪሺݏǡ ݐǡ ߬ሻ െ ݕݐ݈ሺݔǡ ݏǡ ߬ሻ (5.5)
4.2 Where? 
 
An identical line of reasoning applies with regards to where  activities are engaged. 304 Unless 
it is assumed that the activity level is uniform across the relevant area as a whole, maximizing 
W in a certain area does not guarantee that the total welfare is maximized. For activities like 
driving, there are significant differences even between contiguous areas (two bordering roads 
can have a very different number of cars and pedestrians), hence the size of the optimal area 
should tend to zero. Once again, if the court can change the due care level depending on the 
area a negligence rule with a defense of comparative negligence has a comparative advantage. 
To the contrary, a strict liability rule is preferable whenever due care has to be uniform in areas 
that present different characteristics or where the parties have different activity levels.  
                                                          
304 To demonstrate this point it suffices to replicate the proof offered with regards to when the activity is engaged. 
In fact, an average care level will over deter good drivers, while not being sufficient to prevent accidents caused 
by bad drivers. Assume that a speed limit is set at 50 km/h. Good drivers who could safely go at 60 km/h would 
be forced to reduce their driving speed (over deterrence), while bad drivers who should go at 40 km/h will be 
allowed to go faster than they should (under deterrence).  
73_Edle BW Romana.job
143 
 
4.3 Who? 
 
Lastly, the analysis can be extended to injurers¶ heterogeneity.305 If the injurers are 
heterogeneous, any negligence standard defined having in mind the average injurer is bound to 
simultaneously over-deter some injurers and under-deter others. The same logic applies to 
victims in bilateral precaution contexts.  
4.4 The optimal space of uniform standards 
 
Combining the different sources of heterogeneity it LVSRVVLEOHWRVWXG\WKHRSWLPDOµVSDFH¶WR
impose uniform standards. In this vein, the optimal space of uniform standards depends on four 
variables: (i) characteristics of the environment, (ii) similarity of preferences and characteristics 
of individuals, (iii) uniformity of activity level across space and (iv) uniformity of activity level 
over time.
From a positive perspective, this framework can explain many features of legal systems.  An 
example is the lower speed limit in proximity of schools, especially at certain times of the 
day.306 First, court can discriminate among the different areas and times, as the information on 
where schools are located and the time of the day at which children enter and leave the school 
are publicly available. Second, courts can discriminate between the different kinds of victims, 
as it is easy to isolate the individuals who can only adopt a low level of care (i.e. the children). 
Nevertheless, discrimination is not perfect because it is not possible to tell if the children in 
some primary schools are more responsible than the children in another school are. Lastly, 
                                                          
305 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (HUP 1987); Daniel L 
5XELQIHOGµ7KHEfficiency of Comparative NHJOLJHQFH¶-/6$OIUHG(QGUHVDQG7LP)ULHKHµ7KH
ReasRQDEOH3HUVRQ6WDQGDUG7UDGLQJ2II6WDWLFDQG'\QDPLF(IILFLHQF\¶(-/(
306 Cf Fernando Gomez and Juan--RVq*DQX]Dµ&DXWLRQ&KLOGUHQ&URVVLQJ+HWHURJHQHLW\RI9LFWLP&DUHDQG
WKH1HJOLJHQFH5XOH¶RLE 3. 
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courts cannot discriminate among injurers, because it is prohibitively costly to assess the skill 
of each driver. 
5. Conclusions 
 
µUnder strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence both injurers and 
victims will be lead to take optimal care when they engage in their activities. 
Furthermore, since victims will take due care, injurers will pay for the accident 
ORVVHVWKH\FDXVHDQGWKXV«ZLOOFKRRVHWKHFRUUHFWOHYHORIDctivity given victims 
EHKDYLRU¶307
The indeterminacy principle states that under the classic assumptions no inferences can be 
made about the behavior of the parties. It can only be stated that the party who is not the residual 
loss bearer will take optimal care, but this is something that was assumed by hypothesis.   
As paradoxical as it may sound, the quoted passage and the indeterminacy principle are 
describing the results of the same model. Although the importance of simplified models should 
not be underestimated, the qualitative description of their results should be as precise as possible 
if the law and economics movement wants to be a bridge for scholars with different 
backgrounds. Even admitting that the equivalence between the indeterminacy principle and the 
two fundamental theorems has always been taken for granted by mathematical economists,308
it is probably not as intuitive for legal scholars. At the same time by uncovering the veil and 
                                                          
307 Cf Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (n 49).
308 This point is very dubious. As stated above, Nussim and Tabbach correctly note how the classic literature 
generally refers to a two-step procedure to determine parties care and activity levels; if both parties first define the 
respective care level and only at a second stage the activity levels are derived no identity would exist between the 
fundamental theorems and the indeterminacy principle. Cf Nussim and Tabbach (n 277). 
74_Edle BW Romana.job
145 
 
exposing this identity, it is shown that even the over-simplified world described by the 
economists is dominated by the indeterminacy principle.  
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VI. Conclusions 
1. Main findings 
 
The goal of this thesis was to show that the role that probabilistic considerations play in the law 
should be enhanced. 
The argument provided for this statement is grounded on a series of hierarchically ordered 
claims. At the base of this pyramid of arguments lies the idea that natural sciences and 
philosophy have long abandoned a strictly deterministic (in the Laplacian sense) view of the 
world. Quantum mechanics and chaos theory have demonstrated that perfect predictability is 
nothing more than a chimera, thus forcing scientists to acknowledge our limits. The works from 
Capra perfectly capture the new attitude of natural scientists.309 /DSODFH¶VEROGVWDWHPHQWVKDYH
been replaced by a quasi-mystic deference to the mysteries of nature. In this vein, philosophers 
of sciences have accepted chance as a radical ultimate, or at least as unavoidable at an 
epistemological level. Similarly, probabilistic theories of causation have started to gain 
momentum and are generally considered one of the most important innovations in the field of 
the philosophy of science.310
Although some influential legal scholars have recognized the change of perspective of natural 
scientists, they generally regarded this process as irrelevant to the study of the law.311
Diametrically opposed to this position, the second claim that I have advanced is that legal 
scholars cannot remain deaf to the developments of other disciplines. The reason is twofold. 
                                                          
&I&DSUDQ
&I6RVDDQG7RROH\Q73
&I:ULJKWCausation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble 
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts (n 38)
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On the one hand, the meaning of the basic concepts of tort law (i.e. causation and harm) is 
dependent on our postulates on the nature of the world.312 On the other hand, overlooking the 
philosophical debate on determinism hides the synergies between the traditional goals of tort 
law. With regards to the former issue, admitting the inherent limits of scientific knowledge 
forces us to redefine what should be considered the main asset of a victim. In fact, in a 
SUREDELOLVWLFZRUOGDVWDWHPHQWRIWKHNLQGµ,KDYHEHHQKDUPHGEHFDXVHWKHLQMXUHUKDVEHHQ
QHJOLJHQW¶ LV LQFRUUHFW7KHRQO\SRVVLEOH VWDWHPHQWVDUH LQ WKH IROORZLQJ IRUPµEHFDXVH WKH
LQMXUHUKDVEHHQQHJOLJHQW,KDGDJUHDWHUFKDQFHRIJHWWLQJKDUPHG¶,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHYLFWLP
has never had an entitlement to not being harmed. He was entitled only to not being at the 
receiving end of conducts that increased the probability of being harmed. Similarly, postulating 
the validity of scientific determinism does not allow recognizing risk exposure as a form of 
harm.313 To the contrary, once the existence of intrinsic limits in our capacity to make 
predictions is acknowledged, compensation for risk creation cannot be denied anymore.  
On the other hand, although still possible, in a deterministic world it is harder to accommodate 
concepts like welfare maximization and corrective justice. Not surprisingly, these two goals 
have generally been perceived as mutually exclusive. To the contrary, I have suggested that 
accepting the inherently probabilistic nature of the world allows strengthening the claim that 
corrective justice and welfare maximization are necessary complements. In fact, once the 
conception of harm advocated in this thesis is adopted, non-Aristotelian versions of corrective 
justice are even harder to pursue. As importantly, to defend a pure concept of corrective justice 
in a probabilistic world, a legal scholar has to accept that the emergence of material harm is 
totally irrelevant to the law. Not many legal scholars would follow this path, and hence a mixed 
theory between corrective justice and deterrence seems more attractive.  
                                                          
&I3HUU\Q 
313 Ibidem. 
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Once having established that (i) we live in a world that can be interpreted only in probabilistic 
terms and (ii) that legal philosophers and legal scholars cannot ignore this fact, it was possible 
to move to the third level of the pyramid.   
From this perspective, in this thesis I have advocated that whenever the law speaks a different 
language from the one used in other sciences it creates practical problems that cannot be solved 
within the traditional framework. The endless debate on causation in toxic cases and medical 
malpractice is a prominent example. Whenever courts decide to speak a non-probabilistic 
language and to adopt a dichotomic view of causation, it becomes impossible to correctly 
interpret the probabilistic evidence produced by scientific studies. In turn, this creates relevant 
problems in terms of both corrective justice and efficiency. For example, it would be both 
inefficient and µunMXVW¶ to never hold a doctor that constantly makes the same mistake liable, 
EHFDXVHLWUHGXFHVSDWLHQWV¶FKDQFHVRf recovering only marginally. Furthermore, I have argued 
that postulating the existence of the deterministic demon creates problems stretching way 
beyond the analysis of causation. A deterministic mindset often prevents us from contemplating 
probabilistic solutions. From this perspective, Credit Rating Agencies are a perfect example. 
Both the legal and the economic literature have not sufficiently appreciated that ratings are 
inherently probabilistic and therefore their regulation has to be framed exclusively in 
probabilistic terms. In chapter IV, I have shown that complex regulation and sophisticated 
economic studies are not necessary to provide Credit Rating Agencies with correct incentives 
to issue accurate ratings. More precisely, the introduction of an expiring, capped strict liability 
rule with a contractual component has been advocated. A damage cap based on the probabilistic 
predictions offered by CRAs should be introduced to avoid crushing liability. Furthermore, to 
shield CRAs from systemic risk ± in the case of corporate bonds - an expiration date is needed. 
Lastly, in order to protect CRAs from systemic risk also when defaults are correlated in the 
short term (i.e. structured finance), the traditional deterministic tort law approach should be 
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abandoned. By delaying the compensation until after few defaults have occurred, CRAs may 
be punished only when their predictions are proven to be inaccurate by the law of large numbers.  
However, credit rating agencies only provide one example of the possible benefits derived by 
a deeper understanding of the role that probabilistic considerations should be playing in the law. 
In the next section, I will hint to another possible area of research. 
The tip of the pyramid is represented by the idea that once the demon is defeated there is no 
way to bring it back to life. 
In fact, although at a first glance the law and economics movement seems to be the answer to 
the indeterminacy of predictions, even the most basic of the models developed by this strand of 
research is dominated by an indeterminacy principle. As shown in chapter V, the traditional tort 
law and economics model cannot inform about the actual behavior of injurers and victims. The 
only possible statement is that the party who is not the residual loss bearer will take optimal 
care. However, this is an assumption introduced by law and economics scholars and not a 
conclusion derived from the model. 
In conclusion, if all these claims are accepted, then it will be worthwhile investigating the 
role that probabilistic considerations can play within the law. 
2. Future Research 
 
Grounding the law on a more modern conception of the world inevitably raises many questions 
and opens several avenues for future research both at a theoretical and at a practical level. With 
regards to the former, having established that a Laplacian version of determinism cannot be 
adopted, not every kind of determinism can be ruled out a priori. There are several kinds of 
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GHWHUPLQLVPWKDWµFURSXSLQSK\VLFV¶.314 It is therefore interesting to explore how these forms 
of determinism can inform causal investigation in the law.  
Secondly, it has been argued that, in a probabilistic world, risk exposure constitutes a form of 
harm. It is, however, important to investigate whether this statement can be accepted tout court,
or some limitations have to be introduced. At a first glance, it seems that besides limiting the 
number of cases being brought to the court, there is no sound reason to limit the scope of 
compensation for risk exposure.  
Lastly, it is important to analyze whether the relationship between corrective justice and 
deterrence changes again once the role of more sophisticated forms of determinism is 
understood (or once the boundaries of compensation for risk exposure are defined). In fact, 
deterrence and corrective justice can be considered mutually exclusive in a Laplacian world, 
whereas they become necessary complements in a probabilistic world. It is therefore interesting 
to investigate their relation under more sophisticated forms of determinism that have not been 
falsified yet.  
Adopting a probabilistic view of the world is far from being a mere philosophical whim. Other 
strands of research can investigate the practical consequences of such a move. A paradigmatic 
example was the case of credit rating agencies (CRAs). On the one hand, a pure probabilistic 
liability regime has been shown to support the production of accurate ratings (as accurate as 
allowed by the available forecasting technology) and, on the other hand, it has been shown that 
it could pierce the shield of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
(Freedom of Speech). In this vein, it is interesting to investigate if a similar approach can be 
extended to other areas. 
                                                          
314 Cf Earman (n 5). 
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 Another area that would be worth exploring is environmental regulation. In fact, although 
causal uncertainty has been acknowledged by the literature on environmental disasters315, it has 
generally been perceived as dichotomist in nature. Either an accident is characterized by causal 
uncertainty316 or it is not317. On the contrary, the degree of causal uncertainty associated with 
an environmental disaster increases with the distance from the accident (in time and in space) 
of its negative effects. More precisely, it seems that for every single accident the degree of 
causal uncertainty is a continuous function depending on the distance of its effects (both in time 
and in space). Therefore, a formal model should be developed to understand if under the 
assumption of continuity of causal uncertainty criminal sanctions, tort law, and regulation are 
necessary complements. In the proximity of an accident it is relatively easy to identify the causal 
link between the conduct and the harm. As for this kind of harms it is often possible to meet a 
high standard of proof, criminal sanctions and liability are an effective mean to induce injurers 
to internalize these externalities. The more we depart from the accident (both in time and in 
space), the harder it becomes to identify the causal link beyond any reasonable doubt, which is 
the typical standard of proof in criminal law. Here the burden of proof required to impose 
criminal sanctions cannot be met, whereas tort law remains effective. However, departing even 
further from the accident, even a preponderance of evidence becomes hard to achieve. As 
preponderance of evidence is required to hold an alleged plaintiff liable, also liability would 
becoming ineffective. Consequently, ex post liability has to be complemented by ex ante 
regulation, as the latter does not require proving any causal relationship with the harm.  
                                                          
315 0LFKDHO* )DXUH µ7KH FRPSOHPHQWDU\ UROHVRI OLDELOLW\ UHJXODWLRQ DQG LQVXUDQFH LQ VDIHW\PDQDJHPHQW
WKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH¶JRR 689.  
316 (EHUKDUG )HHVV *HUG0XHKOKHXVVHU DQG $QVJDU:RKOVFKOHJHO µ(QYLURQPHQWDO OLDELOLW\ XQGHU XQFHUWDLQ
causatLRQ¶2009) 28 EJLE 133. 
317 .ODDVYDQ¶W9HOGand Jason F. Shogren. µ(QYLURQPHQWDO IHGHUDOLVPDQGHQYLURQPHQWDO OLDELOLW\¶ 
JEEM 105. 
78_Edle BW Romana.job
153 
 
This framework could easily be extended to other areas of tort law (i.e. toxic cases and 
medical malpractice).  
To summarize, a theoretical shift from Laplacian determinism to a more modern conception 
of the universe has been advocated. The consequences of such shift are pervasive and call into 
question many established dogmas. In this thesis, I have attempted to discuss some of these 
issues, yet much work remains to be done.  
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Summary
Despite the findings of natural scientists and philosophers, the law of torts is still clinging on a 
strictly deterministic (in the Laplacian sense) idea of the world. Probabilistic considerations are not 
alien to the legal world, yet they are generally regarded as ad hoc exceptions to handle particularly 
complex cases. From this perspective, this thesis advocates the need for a theoretical shift. A 
probabilistic approach to reality should become the norm, whereas determinism should only be 
considered a heuristic tool when confronted with prima facie deterministic cases. 
In Chapter II it is shown that a strictly deterministic concept of causation is inadequate to face the 
intricacies characterizing modern litigation. In fact, the deterministic version of the ‘but for’ test 
necessarily creates frictions with the kind of evidence produced by modern science. The 
introduction of a purely probabilistic concept of causality is advocated and a distinction is drawn 
between the ex-ante and the ex-post probabilistic approach to causation. The former seems to be a 
better approach for lagged torts, whereas the latter is more appropriate to handle instant torts. Also, 
it is shown that in a probabilistic world the very concept of harm assumes  a different meaning.
Building on the new definition of harm introduced in Chapter II, in Chapter III it is suggested that 
the debate on the goals of tort law should be reconsidered. In a probabilistic world welfare 
maximization and corrective justice are not mutually exclusive, but must be regarded as necessary 
complements. 
In Chapter IV, it is argued that the problems created by a deterministic mindset stretch way beyond 
the analysis of causation. In fact, a Laplacian (deterministic) view of the world often prevents us 
from contemplating probabilistic solutions even when deterministic options have failed. From this 
perspective, Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are a perfect example. Both the legal and the economic 
literature have advanced solutions to improve CRAs incentives to issue accurate ratings. Yet, in 
most cases, the proposed solutions did not exploit the probabilistic nature of ratings, thus they were 
not framed exclusively in probabilistic terms. To the contrary, by designing a simple and legally 
workable strict liability rule it is possible to tie CRAs profits to the quality of their probabilistic
predictions.
In Chapter V, it is investigated whether the law and economics movement can be considered the 
answer to the indeterminacy of predictions haunting other sciences. Not surprisingly, the answer to 
this question is no. Even the extremely simplified world of tort law and economics is dominated by 
an indeterminacy principle.
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Samenvatting
Ondanks de bevindingen van natuurwetenschappers en filosofen, houdt het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht
nog steeds vast aan een strikt deterministisch (in de Laplaciaanse betekenis) wereldbeeld. Hoewel 
probabilistische overwegingen de juridische wereld niet vreemd zijn, worden zij over het algemeen 
beschouwd als ad-hocuitzonderingen om bijzonder complexe zaken te benaderen. Vanuit dit 
perspectief bepleit dit proefschrift de noodzaak van een verschuiving in de theorie. Een 
probabilistische benadering van de werkelijkheid zou de norm moeten worden, terwijl determinisme
slechts zou moeten worden beschouwd als een heuristisch instrument bij prima facie deterministische 
casussen.
In hoofdstuk II wordt aangetoond dat een strikt deterministische opvatting van causaliteit niet 
toereikend is met het oog op de complexiteit die kenmerkend is voor de moderne procesvoering. De 
deterministische versie van de condicio sine qua non-test resulteert onvermijdelijk in fricties met het 
door de moderne wetenschap gegenereerde bewijsmateriaal. De introductie van een zuiver 
probabilistische opvatting van causaliteit wordt verdedigd en er wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
de ex-ante en de ex-post probabilistische benadering van causaliteit. De eerste lijkt een betere 
benadering te zijn voor situaties waarin de schade niet direct volgt op de onrechtmatige daad (‘lagged 
torts’), terwijl de laatste meer geschikt is voor sitauties waarin dat wel het geval is (‘instant torts’).
Ook wordt aangetoond dat het begrip ‘schade’ als zodanig in een probabilistische wereld een andere 
betekenis aanneemt.
Voortbordurend op de nieuwe definitie van schade die in hoofdstuk II wordt gegeven, wordt in 
hoofdstuk III gesuggereerd dat het debat over de doelstellingen van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht
moet worden heroverwogen. In een probabilistische wereld sluiten welvaartsmaximalisatie en 
corrigerende rechtvaardigheid elkaar niet uit, maar moeten zij worden beschouwd als elkaars 
noodzakelijke complementen. 
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In hoofdstuk IV wordt gesteld dat de problemen die door een deterministische denkrichting ontstaan, 
veel verder reiken dan de analyse van causaliteit. In feite worden wij er door een Laplaciaans 
(deterministisch) wereldbeeld vaak van weerhouden probabilistische oplossingen te overwegen, zelfs 
wanneer de deterministische opties mislukt zijn. In dit kader zijn Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) een 
perfect voorbeeld. Zowel de juridische als de economische literatuur biedt geavanceerde oplossingen 
ter verbetering van de prikkels voor CRAs om nauwkeurige ratings uit te geven. Maar meestal werd 
met de voorgestelde oplossingen niet de probabilistische aard van de ratings benut, waardoor zij niet 
uitsluitend in probabilistische termen werden ingekaderd. Door daarentegen een eenvoudige en 
juridisch werkbare risicoaansprakelijkheidsregeling te creëren, is het mogelijk de winsten van CRAs
te koppelen aan de kwaliteit van hun probabilistische voorspellingen. 
In hoofdstuk V wordt onderzocht of de rechtseconomische beweging als het antwoord kan worden 
gezien op de onbepaaldheid van voorspellingen die andere wetenschappen kwelt. Het is geen 
verrassing dat het antwoord op deze vraag negatief is. Zelfs de extreem vereenvoudigde wereld van 
het economische analyse van het onrechtmatigedaadsrecht wordt gedomineerd door het 
onzekerheidsprincipe.
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